Search

Memories for spatial locations often show systematic errors toward the central value of the surrounding region. The Category Adjustment (CA) model suggests that this bias is due to a Bayesian combination of categorical and metric information, which offers an optimal solution under conditions of uncertainty (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). A fundamental assumption of this model is that representations of locations are unbiased but uncertain; during cohibination, greater metric uncertainty results in relatively greater emphasis on categorical information, ultimately leading to increased bias (but also minimizing error across multiple estimates). Sampaio and Wang (2009) have demonstrated that metric information is not lost during this combination process, supporting the CA model's assumption that underlying spatial representations are undistorted. Here, we examine the 2nd half of the CA model's central assumption: that increasing metric uncertainty drives the combination process. Participants recognized point locations within visually complex images in a 4-choice task. Our results indicate that individuals recognized the correct location over other, biased alternatives, confirming that metric information is unbiased at the time of retrieval. In addition, we found that, when participants make errors, they are more likely to select locations that are biased toward the category prototype. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that categorically biased locations are most likely to be chosen under conditions of uncertainty. Indeed, under these conditions, categorically biased locations were chosen more frequently than the correct location. These results suggest that systematic errors are the result of combination across multiple levels of spatial representations that are undistorted but somewhat uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Category Adjustment (CA) model, spatial estimates (e.g., of location) involve Bayesian combination across multiple, hierarchical pieces information, each weighted by its relative certainty. Recent work, though, has shown that men and women differ in terms of their certainty regarding fine-grained and categorical information in location memory. Here we demonstrate that this reflects a more general sex difference in visuospatial processing by examining bias patterns in a line angle judgment task (JLAP-15). In addition, the data suggest thatmultiple, hierarchical levels of categorical information influenced spatial judgments. These results imply that the hierarchical combination outlined by the CA model extends beyond two levels, and that men and women apply differential weighting to these representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memories for spatial locations often show systematic errors toward the central value of the surrounding region. This bias has been explained using a Bayesian model in which fine-grained and categorical information are combined (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). However, experiments testing this model have largely used locations contained in simple geometric shapes. Use of this paradigm raises 2 issues. First, do results generalize to the complex natural world? Second, what types of information might be used to segment complex spaces into constituent categories? Experiment 1 addressed the 1st question by showing a bias toward prototypical values in memory for spatial locations in complex natural scenes. Experiment 2 addressed the 2nd question by manipulating the availability of basic visual cues (using color negatives) or of semantic information about the scene (using inverted images). Error patterns suggest that both perceptual and conceptual information are involved in segmentation. The possible neurological foundations of location memory of this kind are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]