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Purpose: This paper analyzes the effect of the banking market (concentration and competition) on financial development. Design/methodology/approach: In order to estimate the effects of banking concentration and competition on financial development, we conducted an empirical analysis using the System Generalized Method of Moments (S-GMM) through a dynamic panel data model. Findings: The main results suggest that concentration and competition affect financial development. In particular, an increase in bank concentration may inhibit the country's financial development, due to the lack of competition. Our results do not confirm the controversy between concentration and competition, suggesting that concerning financial development, concentration is the reverse of competition. Practical implications: The results of this study add a new perspective on banking market power: a financial system concentrated or uncompetitive constrains financial development. Originality/value: The literature that combines the investigation of the effects of banking market structure (concentration) and banking market conduct (competition) on financial development is scarce. Although a concentrated banking sector can reduce competition through barriers to new entrants (which could expand financial services offer), it is also true that a concentrated banking sector can be competitive. In order to avoid the controversy, our paper chooses to look into a comprehensive approach considering independent measures of bank concentration and bank competition, which together refer to the banking framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss more efficient mechanisms of regulation in the financial system.Design/methodology/approach The authors developed a theoretical two-period model of financial flows (FFs) that considers households, banks, and a social planner.Findings It is important to highlight that different from other studies that do not distinguish between financial crisis and financial instability, the authors assume financial instability does not mean crisis, but represents a deviation in the behavior of the aggregate financial intermediation and in the financial operations of each bank from the equilibrium.Practical implications The practical implication of the model is the proposition of an efficient policy for financial stability based on forward-looking financial regulations.Social implications An important result is that bank failures occur when banks do not maintain sufficient resources to support the liquidity constraint from the interbank market. Another result is that the central bank reacts, via exchange of reserves with the market, to financial instability. This behavior on the part of the central bank is inefficient because the banks will assume that in the case of failure they will be “saved;” thus it creates an adverse incentive (moral hazard) that can amplify the risk over the entire financial system.Originality/value The originality of the model is the proposition of an efficient policy for financial stability based on a forward-looking financial regulation. In this strategy the regulator acts in advance (ex ante) to minimize the mismatch of FFs in relation to the flow balance. This manner of acting is a counterpoint to the financial regulation based on capital requirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]