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The article discusses how the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to install six interceptor rockets--designed to strike a ballistic missile in midcourse--in silos at Fort Greely in Alaska by mid-October. President George W. Bush is expected to declare that the first phase of the long-awaited national missile defense is operational. The reason for the deployment is to counter the threat that a rogue state--namely, North Korea or Iran-will attempt to hit the U.S. with nuclear or biological weapons delivered on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But despite the more than $80 billion spent by the U.S. on missile defense since 1985, this system will not provide significant protection for many years, if ever. The political pressure to claim that the U.S. is secure against a rogue nation's attack has led to a defense that will not counter even the earliest threats from the emerging missile powers. A strong defense against ballistic missiles is a worthy goal. The destructive capacity of nuclear warheads is so enormous that it would be unconscionable not to explore methods for preventing them from hitting the U.S. Missile interception schemes can be divided into three broad categories: terminal, boost phase and midcourse. Terminal defense involves stopping the missile's warhead in the final phase of its trajectory, typically when it is less than a minute away from its target. For example, a one-megaton nuclear warhead would need to be intercepted at an altitude of at least 10 kilometers to prevent the city from being incinerated by the heat of the hydrogen bomb. Further, the interceptor rocket could not be launched until the warhead enters the atmosphere, allowing the defense to distinguish between the heavy weapon and any light decoys accompanying it. Boost-phase intercept requires disabling the ballistic missile in the first few minutes of its flight, while it is still ascending. This strategy puts high demands on the interceptor. INSET: Stopping a Missile with a Missile.

Focuses on the technical aspects of the issue of space-based ballistic missile defense program in the United States. Political implications of President Reagan's Strategic Defensive Initiative; Background on the search for a defense against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles; Envisioned outcomes of the introduction of space weapons.

Distinguishes antisubmarine-warfare techniques whose utility is tactical and would be useful against submarines carrying strategic offensive missiles. Precedent set by the prohibition of a nationwide anti-ballistic missile defenses under the strategic-arms-limitation talks signed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R in 1972; Compatibility of an invulnerable submarine-based deterrent force with the active conduct of a tactical, nonnuclear and antisubmarine war; Significant purpose of active sonar devices.

The article argues that offensive tactics and cheap penetration aids could nullify the effectiveness of the anti-ballistic missile systems in the U.S. The system will nourish the illusion that an effective defense against ballistic missiles is possible and will lead to demands that the light system be expanded into a heavy system. The Sentinel system will provide for long-range inception by Spartan antimissile missiles and short-range interception by Sprint antimissile missiles.

Presents a letter to the editor in the February 1985 issue of the 'Scientific American' journal about the United States' support for programs that enhance the invulnerability of strategic forces and the provision of missiles with penetration aids.

Discusses the drawbacks of the Brilliant Pebbles space based interceptors, which were supposed to protect the U.S. against Soviet nuclear strikes; Finding that the interceptors will not work unless the Soviet Union allows the U.S. to direct the disarming of their nuclear arsenal; Skepticism about the Strategic Defense Initiative, or 'Star Wars' defense; Examination of what it takes for Brilliant Pebbles to be cost-effective at the margin; Observation that a transformation of the Soviet force to silo-based SS-25s would reduce the effectiveness of the defensive constellation and would require its expansion by much m ore than factor 10; Opinion that there is hope for space-based defense but not with Brilliant Pebble.

This article analyzes several proposals for a U.S. ballistic missile defense system from space. One type of space weapon that have been proposed for intercepting incoming missiles during the boost phase are space-based interceptors that would propel a kinetic kill vehicle into a collision with the missile and space-based lasers. Another proposal involves intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 20 minutes of their midcourse through space. A suggestion is made that systems limited to destroying missiles from space will be useless unless they can deal with the countermeasure of cheap and easily deployed balloon decoys.