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Can the theory of autocracy promotion learn something from the most recent erosion in democracy seen across the Western Balkans (WB)? The case of the WB is interesting because it takes place within the context of the EU enlargement process, which is a form of democratic promotion (dissemination). I argue that the current version of the EU enlargement process is a form of hybrid regime enabling rather than democracy dissemination. My major claim is that the significant driver for autocratic tendencies and the authoritarian stability of these regimes comes from within the EU enlargement process and only subsequently from these regimes' internal political dynamics and other autocracies' influences. I offer several contributions to the existing research on autocracy and democracy promotion. I model the problem as a strategic bargaining game between the promoter and receiver. The EU Commission is prepared to tolerate a certain level of authoritarianism in the WB countries for two reasons: if the WB incumbent guarantees stability and accepts the Euro-Atlantic policy, the outcome is a hybrid regime with less likelihood to transform into some form of autocracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our understanding of the "closing space" argument is much nuanced if we widen the conceptualizations of both "closing" and "space". "Closing" would thus include state attempts to restrict not only the promotion of democratic/human rights norms, but also other types of norms (conservative, right-wing, Islamist). A broader definition of "space" would likewise include not only the space occupied by CSOs, but also that of other politically important actors, such as political parties and religious communities. Lastly, we stand to gain from putting the spotlight on democratic states' efforts to control outside influences on its domestic political sphere. The article thus proposes an analytical framework focusing on state regulations of foreign funding to CSOs, political parties, and religious communities, which is applied in two exploratory case studies of Israel and Tunisia. The article finds that the two states attempt to control norm diffusion not only via domestic CSOs, but also through political parties and religious groups. Regulations do not always target human rights and democratic norms. Foreign funding regulations have at times favoured foreign funding for nationalistic, right-wing norms: at others, democratic norms over Islamic norms. Thus, the "closing space" phenomenon is more complex than usually understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Hugo Chávez strove to change the socio‐political and economic system of his country, Venezuela. His revolutionary mission implied a strong regional projection and was intended to disseminate his transformative project in the wider region. This article focuses on the outward‐directed efforts of Chávez to shape his regional environment and examines the active and intended promotion of the Chavista model. The analysis shows that Chávez's mission was guided by four objectives: gaining ideological protagonism, facilitating the installation of like‐minded leaders, bolstering their persistence in power, and exporting his 'alternative' model of rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Venezuela provides a strong test case for the weakening of democracy and the strengthening of autocracy promotion. External actors are a key part of the domestic political game: the European Union and the United States (EUUS) promote 'democracy by coercion' and recognised Juan Guaidó as president, whereas China, Cuba and Russia (CCR) bolster the regime of Nicolás Maduro. A comparative foreign policy analysis argues that, firstly, EUUS sanctions have resulted in strengthening CCR's autocratic leverage and linkage; and secondly, the division 'between the West and the Rest' has posed an additional obstacle for a transition to democracy and national reconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional organisations (ROs) around the world increasingly use sanctions against member states in situations of democratic crisis. This special issue unpacks the trend of RO sanctions in regions that are both democracy-dense (Europe and the Americas) and autocracy-dense (Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East). We argue that regional sanctions cannot be taken at face value as instruments of democracy promotion. Instead, the politics of regional sanctions unveil controversies over the substance and limits of democracy, as well as over practical processes of regional interference in a sphere that is at the core of 'domestic affairs'. In this introductory article, we situate the special issue at the crossroads of debates within comparative regionalism, sanctions, and democracy/autocracy promotion, and discuss how the membership premise crucially distinguishes RO measures from foreign policy and United Nations (UN) sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given Asia-Pacific's diversity and the large variance of potentially relevant causal factors, the region presents social scientists with a natural laboratory to test competing theories of democratic erosion, decay and revival and to identify new patterns and relationships. This introductory article offers a brief review of the relevant literature and introduces the different categories of analysis that build the analytical framework considered in various forms in the special issue. The article discusses the reasons for the renewed pessimism in democratization and democracy studies and provides a survey of different conceptualizations intended to capture forms of democratic regression and the autocratization concept to which the contributors to this special issue adhere. We discuss how Asia-Pacific experiences fit into the debate about democracy's deepening global recession and examine assumptions about the causes, catalysts and consequences of democratic regression and resilience in the comparative politics literature. Finally, the remaining twelve articles of this special issue will be introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compares Chinese autocracy promotion in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Cambodia from the perspective of mass atrocities. Theory posits that foreign powers influence the thinking and behaviour of domestic elites through external incentives. It is the purpose of the article to identify the incentives that link Chinese foreign policy to repressive outcomes as they unintentionally and indirectly reinforce domestic ethno-nationalist narratives and therefore the likelihood and risk of mass atrocities. What are the implications? The so-called "black knight" is not as powerful as some scholars wish to portray: China has become hostage to its own incentives and this will ultimately threaten to undermine its foreign policy goals as the reorientation of foreign policy in Sri Lanka, opposition against Chinese projects in Myanmar and public discontent of the Cambodian opposition with China have demonstrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, there has been a rise of interest in the concept of autocracy promotion, with scholars questioning whether the efforts by authoritarian governments to influence political transitions beyond their borders are necessarily pro-authoritarian. An extension of this question is whether some authoritarian governments may at times find it in their interest to support democracy abroad. This article aims to answer this question by focusing on the case of Turkey. It argues that, despite its rapidly deteriorating democracy since the late 2000s, Turkey has undertaken democracy support policies with the explicit goal of democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the Arab Spring and, while not bearing the intention of democratic transition, has employed democracy support instruments in the form of state-building in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005 to the present day. Based on original fieldwork, the article finds that non-democracies can turn out as democracy supporters, if and when opportunities for strategic gains from democratisation abroad arise. The article further suggests that even in those cases where strategic interests do not necessitate regime change, a non-democracy may still deploy democracy support instruments to pursue its narrow interests, without adhering to an agenda for democratic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State elites in hybrid regimes have increasingly sought to manipulate the legal regulation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as part of the growing backlash against democracy assistance in nondemocratic countries around the world. Sophisticated laws detailing burdensome NGO registration procedures and complex regulations enabling invasive government oversight of NGOs represent upgraded forms of civic curtailment and democracy resistance. This paper analyses these significant developments in a systematic, cross-national fashion over time by constructing a new dataset of NGO legal barriers in hybrid regimes from 1995 to 2013. It demonstrates that the expansion of repressive NGO regulations are shaped by international factors, particularly autocratic linkages, in the form of trade or defence pacts with Russia and China, as well as authoritarian learning from the colour revolutions. It thus contributes to debates on autocracy promotion and authoritarian resurgence by moving beyond the regime level to focus on the sub-regime dimension of freedom of association. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether and to what extent China’s involvement in Central Asian countries undermines the democracy promotion efforts of the European Union and the United States. Findings confirm that China does indeed challenge Western efforts, but in an indirect way. First, Chinese provision of substantial and unconditional financial assistance makes Western politically conditioned aid appear both ungenerous and an infringement of sovereignty. Second, the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, inclusive of China’s leadership role, creates an institutional means through which the (semi-)authoritarianism of member states is legitimized and challenges Western emphasis on democracy and human rights. Finally, by the power of its own example, China demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, the rule of law and social well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The majority of today’s authoritarian regimes have little hope of promoting autocracy beyond their own borders, let alone to consolidated democratic countries. However, China and Singapore are two prominent examples of non-democratic countries whose soft power arsenals have given them some global appeal beyond that enjoyed by most authoritarian regimes. But to what extent has China’s and Singapore’s power of example influenced consolidated democracies in terms that the latter wanting to replicate some political practices or even norms in these non-democratic regimes? In this article, we engage recent works to examine this question in relation to how Australians perceive the political example offered by China and Singapore. Focusing our analysis on several prominent polls conducted recently by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, we suggest that at present there is little evidence of a causal impact of the rise of authoritarian powerhouses such as China and Singapore on how Australians view democracy at home. Through these case studies, this article sheds some light on the theoretical as well as practical questions about the inherent impediments of authoritarian diffusion in consolidated democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does China's vision for a New Silk Road constitute autocracy promotion? This critical commentary argues that while China may currently be showing no signs of promoting autocracy strictly defined, its broad-ranging economic, political, and cultural initiatives along its New Silk Road will likely influence how foreign governments and everyday people think and act. Though still in its infancy, the New Silk Road represents an ambitious new geopolitical project that may require scholars and analysts to rethink both the thesis and concept of autocracy promotion in the years ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do China, Russia, and the European Union (EU) facilitate or hinder political liberalization in Belarus? In this paper, using the qualitative case study method, I primarily highlight the competition that the EU faces with the Russian active autocracy promotion in Belarus. The EU provides aid only in exchange for promise of democratic and economic reforms, which might be very costly and danger the persistence of ruling elites. Russia, at the same time, offers economic and diplomatic support to Belarus, which is, however, conditioned by privatization of the Belarusian strategic assets in favor of Russian stakeholders. I also claim that China, with growing international ambitions, passively supports autocracy in Belarus, by providing financial aid without interfering with internal political affairs. For Belarus, whose leadership still enjoys legitimation by a large part of the population due to the economic stability, losing major state enterprises might weaken sovereignty. Thus, diversification of economic partners is of crucial importance for Belarus. I argue that Belarusian ruling elites may have found an escape away from democratic and autocratic pushes from the EU and Russia, respectively, by increasing linkages with China. To promote effectively democracy in its neighborhood, the EU ought to reconsider interactions with external non-democratic actors. The paper concludes by providing some policy recommendations for the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent scholarship has increasingly focused on the international dimensions of authoritarian rule, and the idea of autocracy promotion has gained considerable academic currency. While the literature on autocracy promotion has identified some clear patterns of external support for autocratic incumbents, it has so far failed to demonstrate that these efforts can best be understood as a unified, coherent set of foreign policies that constitute intentional efforts to promote a particular regime type abroad. This article identifies the key deficiencies of existing treatments of the concept and identifies a roadmap to establish some conceptual clarity on the topic. It advances a “strict” definition of autocracy promotion that requires a clear intent on the part of an external actor to bolster autocracy as a form of political regime as well as an underlying motivation that rests in significant part on an ideological commitment to autocracy itself. It also introduces a new typology that places autocracy promotion within the wider context of the international politics of authoritarian rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, observers have raised concerns about threats to democracy posed by external support for authoritarianism coming from regional powers such as Russia, China and Venezuela. This article assesses the efficacy of autocracy promotion through a close examination of Russian efforts to shape regime outcomes in the former Soviet Union. It finds that while Russian actions have periodically promoted instability and secessionist conflict, there is little evidence that such intervention has made post-Soviet countries less democratic than they would have been otherwise. First, the Russian government has been inconsistent in its support for autocracy - supporting opposition and greater pluralism in countries where anti-Russian governments are in power, and incumbent autocrats in cases where pro-Russian politicians dominate. At the same time, the Russian government's narrow concentration on its own economic and geopolitical interests has significantly limited the country's influence, fostering a strong counter-reaction in countries with strong anti-Russian national identities. Finally, Russia's impact on democracy in the region has been restricted by the fact that post-Soviet countries already have weak democratic prerequisites. This analysis suggests that, despite increasingly aggressive foreign policies by autocratic regional powers, autocracy promotion does not present a particularly serious threat to democracy in the world today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the literature on the autocratic regimes has been rapidly growing in the last years, there still exists a research gap in this field: which impact do autocratic regimes have on the regime transition in the neighbouring countries? The literature on autocracies has demonstrated that autocratic political leaders tend to support each other. This article argues that the external influence of an autocracy may be more complex. The article analyses the case of Russia's international standing in relation to the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko. Using detailed process tracing, it has been shown that in terms of the Russian position, pragmatic goals may undermine ideological goals. Thus, while the main objective of Russia is to ensure the stability of gas contracts, the unintended consequences of its actions undermine the consolidation of autocratic regime in Ukraine. The article builds on the literature on regime transition, autocracy, and international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Non-democratic regional powers are increasingly blamed for authoritarian backlashes in formerly democratising countries, or for the persistence of entrenched autocratic regimes in their neighbourhood. Yet there is a striking scarcity of theoretical deliberations as to why powerful autocracies should prefer autocratic neighbours over democratic ones. Employing a rational-choice model that links foreign policy behaviour to the logic of domestic politics, this article develops a theoretical argument why, and under which circumstances, autocratic regional powers should be expected to attempt to impact upon governance structures in their regional environment. Combining a political economy perspective with findings from transition literature, the authors conclude that, all else equal, autocratic regional powers have strong incentives to favour similar political systems in nearby states, but that this interest must be weighted against an overarching interest in political stability. The article discusses these theoretical findings against the backdrop of country cases in the regional environments of Russia and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]