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Any defects of sociality in individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are standardly explained in terms of those individuals' putative impairments in a variety of cognitive functions. Recently, however, the need for a bidirectional approach to social interaction has been emphasized. Such an approach highlights differences in basic ways of acting between ASD and neurotypical individuals which would prevent them from understanding each other. Here we pursue this approach by focusing on basic action features reflecting the agent's mood and affective states. These are action features Stern named "vitality forms," and which are widely assumed to substantiate core social interactions [D. N. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant (1985); D. N. Stern, Forms of Vitality Exploring Dynamic Experience in Psychology, Arts, Psychotherapy, and Development (2010)]. Previously we demonstrated that, although ASD and typically developing (TD) children alike differentiate vitality forms when performing actions, ASD children express them in a way that is motorically dissimilar to TD children. To assess whether this motor dissimilarity may have consequences for vitality form recognition, we asked neurotypical participants to identify the vitality form of different types of action performed by ASD or TD children. We found that participants exhibited remarkable inaccuracy in identifying ASD children's vitality forms. Interestingly, their performance did not benefit from information feedback. This indicates that howpeople actmatters for understanding others and for being understood by them. Because vitality forms pervade every aspect of daily life, our findings promise to open the way to a deeper comprehension of the bidirectional difficulties for both ASD and neurotypical individuals in interacting with one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motor planning is not a monolithic process, and distinct stages of motor planning are responsible for encoding different levels of abstractness. However, how these distinct components are mapped into different neural substrates remains an open question. We studied one of these high-level motor planning components, defined as second-order motor planning, in a patient (R.G.) with an extremely rare case of cerebellar agenesis but without any other cortical malformations. Second-order motor planning dictates that when two acts must be performed sequentially, planning of the second act can influence execution of the first. We used an optoelectronic system for kinematic analysis to compare R.G.’s performance with age-matched controls in a second-order motor planning task. The first act was to reach for an object, and the second was to place it into a small or large container. Our results showed that despite the expected difficulties in fine-motor skills, second-order motor planning (i.e., the ability to modulate the first act as a function of the nature of the second act) was preserved even in the patient with congenital absence of the cerebellum. These results open new intriguing speculations about the role of the cerebellum in motor planning abilities. Although prudence is imperative when suggesting conclusions made on the basis of single-case findings, this evidence suggests fascinating hypotheses about the neural circuits that support distinct stages of the motor planning hierarchy, and regarding the functional role of second-order motor planning in motor cognition and its potential dysfunction in autism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]