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When do judges defer and when do they defy? This paper examines the conditions under which individual judges overrule their appointers under conditions of increasing authoritarianism. While studies of judicial decision-making under job insecurity, dictatorship, and transition conditions have been undertaken (Helmke 2002; Moustafa 2007; Herron and Randazzo 2003), there is a need to investigate judicial behavior in hybrid regimes. In this type of political settings, when do courts bless, and when do they bite? The paper develops a theoretical framework to explain the behavior of judges in cases involving the government in hybrid regimes. Those theoretical contentions are then tested, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the case of the Philippines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do courts develop the daring to rule against the state in authoritarian regimes? This paper provides an empirical assessment of why and when judiciaries "gamble" to rule against the government during periods of authoritarianism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asserts that opportunities to gain autonomy from the state may be opened by political and economic developments. Several variables that enable the courts to go against the government in authoritarian regimes using coded decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines are examined. Malaysia has a dual legal structure, in which a political sphere is unbounded by legal parameters and an economic order regulated by law.