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Authenticated multiple key exchange protocols not only allow participants to agree the multiple session keys within one run of the protocol but also ensure the authenticity of the other party. In this paper, we propose an identity-based multiple key exchange protocol. The authentication part of the proposed protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model under the BDH assumptions. The proposed identity-based multiple key exchange protocol is secure in a formal security model under the random oracle model upon the CDH assumptions and the BDH assumptions. Compared with the identity-based multiple key exchange protocols in the literature, the proposed protocol is more efficient and holds stronger security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The radio-based medium of satellite communication systems is vulnerable to interference on physical channels: unintentional interferences occur frequently and jamming attacks can be achieved using low-grade technology. While application layer security protocols cannot defend against denial of service (DoS) attacks where the attacker jams continuously, effective security protocols ensure that communication can continue after such interference has stopped. This paper analyses an authentication and key agreement protocol for satellite communications. The presented analysis reveals that the protocol is susceptible to a new DoS attack, where attackers jam a single message to achieve a permanent DoS condition. A new authentication and key agreement protocol is proposed that additionally addresses the scenario where messages send over the mobile satellite channel may not reach their intended recipient due to accidental or malicious interference. Analysis of the new protocol demonstrates that it is effective in countering the disruptive effects of jamming. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In 2010, Vo et al. (2010) proposed an enhancement of authenticated multiple key exchange protocol based on Lee et al.’s protocol. In this paper, we will show that Vo et al.’s multiple key exchange protocol cannot resist reflection attack. It means that their protocol fails to provide mutual authentication. Furthermore, we propose an improvement of Vo et al.’s protocol. Our proposed protocol with reflection attack resilience can really provide mutual authentication. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In this paper, we present a strongly secure identity-based (ID-based) two-party authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol, which captures all basic desirable security properties including master key forward secrecy, ephemeral secrets reveal resistance and so on, and is provably secure in the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model. The security of the protocol can be reduced to the standard Computational Bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Our scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Also, we give a strongly secure variant of the protocol. The variant has a much lower computational overhead than the original scheme, while its security relies on the Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption. Currently, there are few ID-based AKA protocols that are provably secure in the strong eCK model. Compared with previous ID-based AKA schemes, our protocols have advantages over them in security or efficiency. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Password-based authentication is widely used for systems that control remote access to computer networks. In order to address some of the security and management problems that occur in traditional password authentication protocols, research in recent decades has focused on smart card based password authentication. In this paper, we show that the improved smart card authentication scheme proposed by Xu-Zhu-Feng is vulnerable to internal and impersonation attacks. We propose an improvement of their solution, present a new efficient strong smart card authentication protocol, and demonstrate that the new protocol satisfies the requirements of strong smart card authentication and is more efficient. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: To enable the verification of authentication protocols, Schneider formulated the rank function approach which could be used, under suitable circumstances, to verify protocols modelled using the process algebra CSP. We develop this theoretical result and extend it to a practical framework which can be used to model and analyse a wider variety of security protocols with respect to a wider range of security specifications than were hitherto possible. These results are achieved using PVS, which also provides tool support for the rank function approach. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Authentication protocols help to establish trust about the identities of communicating entities. Along with authorization and data confidentiality, authentication forms a critical component of most non-trivial security frameworks. Over past several years, an alarming number of seemingly secure authentication protocols have been shown to be flawed. By exploiting such flaws, malicious entities can potentially take on identities of trusted entities. Attacks on authentication protocols are often too subtle to uncover by simple means, hence considerable research has gone into techniques for analyzing and verifying them. Though the problem is perhaps best studied using formal methods, techniques in that category are generally rather complex and specialized. This paper proposes a different approach - using simulation as a means of validation. Though unable to conclusively prove security, simulation can be very effective in uncovering hidden flaws. This could be particularly useful for large systems where it may be nearly impractical to apply formal methods. A framework is presented to model authentication protocols with state machines and to validate some of their security properties through simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses digital storage devices, or transient storage devices (TSD). Businesses need authentication of these devices before they allow a host to mount them due to security issues. The Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers' (IEEE) Computer Society has developed a protocol for standards in authentication for TSDs. The IEEE directive states that the host can authenticate TSD's identity and the TSD can also authenticate the host's identity. Analysts say authentication will solve many problems associated with the spread of TSDs.