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This study uses difference-in-differences (DiD) analyses to examine the consequences of adopting the U.S. critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure requirement for preparers and users of financial reports. The CAM requirement is one of the largest expansions of the U.S. audit report since the 1940s. We document significant changes to financial statement footnotes referenced by CAMs, which suggests an indirect consequence where management disclosure changes in areas that are expected to be scrutinized following auditor-provided disclosure. Results also suggest that, on average, CAM disclosures do not provide incremental information to the market. To further examine market reaction, we develop well-specified prediction models for the expected number and subject areas of CAMs. We find limited initial evidence that the market reacts negatively when unexpected CAMs are disclosed. Overall, our findings provide insights on the new CAM standard and particularly demonstrate its relevance to management disclosure decisions and to the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY: We contribute to the literature on auditor's task-specific expertise by examining the role of auditor experience in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), a complicated and increasingly prevalent corporate event that can give rise to misreporting. We find that in industries with more complex accounting, clients of M&A expert auditors are less likely to experience M&A-related misstatements. In industries with less complex accounting, M&A experts pass audit fee savings to their clients during acquisition years. Additional analyses suggest that firms are more likely to switch to an M&A expert auditor during an acquisition year, but only in industries with complex accounting. Overall, our results suggest that firms with an acquisitive strategy that engage with M&A expert auditors experience improved M&A-related audit outcomes. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SYNOPSIS: We use new data to examine auditor response to negative media coverage of client environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices. This coverage can be indicative of an increased risk of material misstatement, which is an important assessment in client retention and pricing decisions. Specifically, media criticism can threaten a client's financial condition, as well as reveal management effectiveness and integrity issues that are further compounded by negative attention and related financial problems. We therefore predict that auditors will notice and incorporate media-provided ESG information in their risk response, which has not been examined by prior research. Supporting this prediction, we find that ESG-related negative media coverage of an audit client is associated with a higher likelihood of auditor resignation and increased audit fees. This response is incremental to the issues that underlie this media coverage. Overall, these findings identify an additional economic incentive for companies to avoid poor ESG practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Calls from practice suggest that audit committee members with industry expertise can improve audit committee effectiveness. Nevertheless, regulators and the extant literature have focused on the financial expertise of the audit committee. We posit that audit committee industry knowledge is valuable because accounting guidance, estimates, and oversight of the external auditor are often linked to a company's operations within a particular industry. Taking a holistic view, we examine two measures of financial reporting quality (financial restatements and discretionary accruals) and two measures of external auditor oversight (audit and nonaudit fees). As predicted, we find that audit committee members who are both accounting and industry experts perform better than those with only accounting expertise. We also find that in certain instances, supervisory experts who are also industry experts perform better than supervisory experts alone. Overall, these results suggest that industry expertise, when combined with accounting expertise, can improve the effectiveness of the audit committee in monitoring the financial reporting process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Securities regulators around the world are considering the costs and benefits of alternative policies for providing information to financial markets on corporate internal control. These policy options differ on the level of auditor involvement, among other dimensions. We examine the association of relative auditor involvement and auditor characteristics with Section 302 internal control disclosures made by US ‘non-accelerated filers’ from 2003 to 2005. We find more material weaknesses disclosed in the fourth quarter, when there is relatively more auditor involvement, relative to the first three quarters. Clients of larger audit firms have higher disclosure rates (although they are probably less risky due to more stringent client acceptance standards), but this difference is due to fourth quarter disclosures. Audit firms with Section 404 experience also have greater material weakness disclosure, implying process improvement associated with knowledge sharing across engagements. Collectively, our results shed light on ways to increase the effectiveness of internal control regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]