1. RESERVE PRICE VERSUS ENTRY FEE IN STANDARD AUCTIONS
- Author
-
Chakraborty, Indranil
- Subjects
Auction firms -- Standards -- Analysis ,Online auctions -- Standards -- Analysis ,Risk aversion -- Analysis ,Equilibrium (Economics) -- Analysis ,Housing ,Monopolies ,Legal fees ,Auctions ,Fees ,Online auction ,Business, general ,Economics - Abstract
Analysis of standard auction rules when bidders are risk averse is usually carried out under the assumption that the seller is able to set an optimal reserve. The role of entry fees has been generally overlooked in that analysis. We consider bidders with constant absolute risk aversion and show that reserve price is an essential tool in the second price auction while entry fee is essential in the first price auction. Furthermore, setting a reserve price and entry fee combination optimally may change some of the rankings of the standard auctions that hold under optimal reserves. (JEL D44), I. INTRODUCTION Rent extraction from 'higher type' buyers in the monopoly seller's problem often involves lesser allocation for 'lower types,' and in some situations, screening out low-type buyers below a [...]
- Published
- 2019
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