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Recent studies have suggested that abstract control states (i.e., internal attentional states independent from concrete stimuli and responses) can be stored in episodic memory and retrieved subsequently. However, the duration of such a control state memory remains unclear. Previous research has found a quick and complete decay for stimulus-response bindings after 2000-5000 ms. Here, we tested a possible decay of control state bindings with retrieval delays of 2000, 3000, or 5000 ms. Five preregistered experiments used a confound-minimized prime-target task to measure the congruency sequence effect (CSE) separately for trials in which a nominally irrelevant context feature changed or repeated across trials. Analyses of the individual experiments did not result in conclusive evidence. A mega-analysis integrating the data of all experiments (N total  = 326) replicated evidence for binding and retrieval of control states, in that larger CSEs were found for context repetition trials. Importantly, Bayesian analysis indicated that this effect was not modulated by the length of retrieval delay. While this finding suggests that bindings of abstract control states can be relatively robust, we also discuss possible limitations of the present research., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Cognitive control theories describe the active maintenance of goal representations over temporal delays as central for adaptive behavior. Dynamic adaptations of goal representations are often measured as the congruency sequence effect (CSE), which describes a reduced congruency effect in trials following incongruent trials compared to congruent trials. Previous studies questioned active maintenance of CSEs and instead found that CSEs decrease rapidly over time (Duthoo et al., 2014; Egner et al., 2010). However, in these studies, CSEs can be attributed to both, control adaptations following conflict and binding effects due to repetition of stimulus (S) and response (R) features. In four experiments, we demonstrate that CSEs originating solely from control adaptions were not affected by temporal delays. Additional within-subject conditions partially replicated previous research showing a decrease in CSEs in task designs allowing for S-R binding effects and controlled for task complexity as a potential moderator. Together, results support theories which predict an active maintenance or retrieval of cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Theoretical accounts of self-representation assume a privileged role for information that is linked to the self and suggest that self-relevant stimuli capture attention in a seemingly obligatory manner. However, attention is not only biased toward self-relevant information, but self-relevant information might also tune attention more broadly, for instance, by engaging cognitive control processes that regulate allocation of attention. Indeed, research in social, clinical, and developmental sciences predicts a close link between a cognitive representation of the self and cognitive control processes. The present research is concerned with such a possible signaling function of the self to recruit cognitive control and tested predictions that follow from this view using the well-known Stroop task. Participants identified the print color of words. Self-reference was manipulated such that a prime was presented before or together with a Stroop word that comprised of either a possessive pronoun (e.g., "my green") or a definite/indefinite article as control (e.g., "the/a green"). Results of three experiments ( N total = 137) showed that self-reference priming reduced the congruency effect in the Stroop task relative to control conditions. This finding is incompatible with an attentional bias account assuming that self-relevant distractors always impair performance, but rather suggests that stimuli relevant to the self can facilitate cognitive control processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Conflict-monitoring theory proposes that conflict between incompatible responses is registered by a dedicated monitoring system, and that this conflict signal triggers changes of attentional filters and adapts control processes according to the current task demands. Extending the conflict-monitoring theory, it has been suggested that conflict elicits a negative affective reaction, and that it is this affective signal that is monitored and then triggers control adaptation. This review article summarizes research on a potential signaling function of affect for cognitive control. First, we provide an overview of the conflict-monitoring theory, discuss neurophysiological and behavioral markers of monitoring and control adaptation, and introduce the affective-signaling hypothesis. In a second part, we review relevant studies that address the questions of (i) whether conflict elicits negative affect, (ii) whether negative affect is monitored, and (iii) whether affect modulates control. In sum, the reviewed literature supports the claim that conflict and errors trigger negative affect and provides some support for the claim that affect modulates control. However, studies on the monitoring of negative affect and the influence of phasic affect on control are ambiguous. On the basis of these findings, in a third part, we critically reassess the affective-signaling hypothesis, discuss relevant challenges to this account, and suggest future research strategies.

The present study tested whether the coupling of covert attentional shifts and motor planning of pointing movements can be modulated by learning. Participants performed two tasks. As a primary movement task, they executed a pointing movement to a movement target (MT) location. As a secondary visual attention task, they identified a discrimination target (DT) that was presented shortly before initiation of the pointing movement. These DTs either occurred at the same or at different locations with the MT. A common finding in such and similar settings is the enhanced visual target identification when locations of MT and DT coincide. However, it is not known which factors govern the flexibility of spatial attention-action coupling. Here, we tested the influence of previously learned spatial contingencies between MT and DT on the coupling of covert attention and motor planning. These contingencies were manipulated in three groups (always same locations, always opposite locations, non-contingent locations) in a training session. Results indicated that in a subsequent test phase, previously learned contingencies enhanced visual identification accordingly, even when targets for the movement task and the visual task were presented at opposite sides. These results corroborate previous findings of a rather flexible interaction of attention and motor planning, and demonstrate how one can learn to control attention by means of motor planning.

According to ideomotor theory, human action control uses anticipations of one's own actions' future consequences, that is, action effect anticipations, as a means of triggering actions that will produce desired outcomes (e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Using the response-effect compatibility paradigm (Kunde, 2001), we demonstrate that the anticipation of one's own manual actions' future consequences not only triggers appropriate (i.e., instructed) actions, but simultaneously induces spontaneous (uninstructed) anticipatory saccades to the location of future action consequences. In contrast to behavioral response-effect compatibility effects that have been linked to processes of action selection and action planning, our results suggest that these anticipatory saccades serve the function of outcome evaluation, that is, the comparison of expected/intended and observed action outcomes. Overall, our results demonstrate the informational value of additionally analyzing uninstructed behavioral components complementary to instructed responses and allow us to specify essential mechanisms of the complex interplay between the manual and oculomotor control system in goal-directed action control. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

Current models of cognitive control assume gradual adjustment of processing selectivity to the strength of conflict evoked by distractor stimuli. Using a flanker task, we varied conflict strength by manipulating target and distractor onset. Replicating previous findings, flanker interference effects were larger on trials associated with advance presentation of the flankers compared to simultaneous presentation. Controlling for stimulus and response sequence effects by excluding trials with feature repetitions from stimulus administration (Experiment 1) or from the statistical analyses (Experiment 2), we found a reduction of the flanker interference effect after high-conflict predecessor trials (i.e., trials associated with advance presentation of the flankers) but not after low-conflict predecessor trials (i.e., trials associated with simultaneous presentation of target and flankers). This result supports the assumption of conflict-strength-dependent adjustment of visual attention. The selective adaptation effect after high-conflict trials was associated with an increase in prestimulus pupil diameter, possibly reflecting increased cognitive effort of focusing attention.

Task performance suffers when an aspect of a stimulus is associated with an incorrect response, thereby evoking cognitive conflict. Such impairment is reduced after recent or frequent conflict occurrence, suggesting attentional adjustment. We examined adjustment to conflict evoked by a temporarily irrelevant S-R rule when participants frequently switched between two semantic classification tasks by manipulating the proportion of conflict trials in one of them. Controlling stimulus-specific presentation frequencies, we found reduced conflict effects under conditions of a higher proportion of conflict trials in the task to which the manipulation was applied, whereas there was no such effect in the other task. Additional analyses demonstrated task-specificity regarding trial-to-trial conflict adjustment. Because conflict was evoked in the absence of perceptually distinct target and distractor stimulus features, these adjustment effects cannot be attributed to perceptual selection., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Non-informative, task-irrelevant auditory alerting signals often lead to increased interference effects in selective attention paradigms (e.g., Simon, Eriksen flanker). Some authors conclude that the alerting attentional network, activated by the alerting signal, reveals an inhibitory influence upon the executive attentional network, resulting in attenuated executive control. Alternatively, in the present study we argue that increased interference effects might be explained by alerting signals facilitating response activation processes (i.e., the activation of established S-R links). In a modified Eriksen-flanker paradigm, we contrasted these assumptions. We used word flanker stimuli for which S-R associations were established and word flanker stimuli without S-R associations. The presence of an alerting signal increased flanker compatibility only for flanker stimuli for which S-R associations existed while flanker compatibility effects were the same for all flanker types in conditions without alerting signals. Therefore, we conclude that alerting signals enhance stimulus triggered visuo-motor response activation processes.

Human actions are guided either by endogenous action plans or by external stimuli in the environment. These two types of action control seem to be mediated by neurophysiologically and functionally distinct systems that interfere if an endogenously planned action suddenly has to be performed in response to an exogenous stimulus. In this case, the endogenous representation has to be deactivated first to give way to the exogenous system. Here we show that interference of endogenous and exogenous action control is not limited to motor-related aspects but also affects the perception of action-related stimuli. Participants associated two actions with contingent sensory effects in learning blocks. In subsequent test blocks, preparing one of these actions specifically impaired responding to the associated effect in an exogenous speeded detection task, yielding a blindness-like effect for arbitrary, learned action effects. In accordance with the theory of event coding, this finding suggests that action planning influences perception even in the absence of any physical similarities between action and to-be-perceived stimuli.

Goals are often at the basis of human actions. As an essential mechanism of behavioural adaptation, individuals need to be able to flexibly implement new task goals so as to alter their actions (switch tasks) in response to contextual changes. The present study investigated the effect of acute psychosocial stress on cognitive control processes of flexible task-goal implementation with temporal focus on the occurrence interval of the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) stress response. For this, forty-eight healthy volunteers were either challenged with a standardised stress-induction protocol (the Trier Social Stress Test) or underwent a standardised control situation. Subsequently, they were exposed to a task-switching procedure with two tasks alternating in random order. Participants of the stress group displayed increased salivary α-amylase activity immediately after stress exposure as well as elevations of salivary cortisol from 10 min after stress cessation, reflecting the typical stress-related activity increases in the sympathetic nervous system and the HPA axis, respectively. At the time interval of elevated cortisol levels, stressed individuals persistently showed larger performance differences between task switches and task repetitions (switch costs) than controls. This effect was reliably evident when tested 5-20 min as well as 25-40 min following treatment cessation. These results indicate that acute psychosocial stress impairs cognitive control processes of flexible task-goal implementation essential for voluntary goal-directed behaviour.

In the task-switching paradigm, mixing costs indicate the performance costs to mix two different tasks, while switch costs indicate the performance costs to switch between two sequentially presented tasks. Applying tasks with bivalent stimuli and responses, many studies demonstrated substantial mixing and switch costs and a reduction of these costs as a result of practice. The present study investigates whether extensive practice of a task-switching situation including tasks with univalent stimuli eliminates these costs. Participants practiced switching between a visual and an auditory task. These tasks were chosen because they had shown eliminated performance costs in a comparable dual-task practice study (Schumacher et al. Psychol Sci 12:101-108, 2001). Participants either performed the tasks with univalent responses (i.e., visual-manual and auditory-verbal stimulus-response mappings) or bivalent responses (i.e., visual-manual and auditory-manual stimulus-response mappings). Both valence conditions revealed substantial mixing and switch costs at the beginning of practice, yet, mixing costs were largely eliminated after eight practice sessions while switch costs were still existent.

Interference evoked by distractor stimulus information, such as flankers in the Eriksen task, is reduced when the proportion of conflicting stimuli is increased. This modulation is sensitive to contextual cues such as stimulus location or color, suggesting attentional adjustment to conflict contingencies on the basis of context information. In the present study, we explored whether conflict adjustment is modulated by temporal variation of conflict likelihood. To this end, we associated low and high proportions of conflict stimuli with foreperiods of different lengths. Flanker interference was higher with foreperiods associated with low conflict proportions, suggesting that participants use the foreperiod as a contextual cue for attentional adjustment. We conjecture that participants initially adopt the strategy useful for conflict contingencies associated with short foreperiods, and then readjust during the trial, in the absence of any additional exogenous cue, when the imperative stimulus has not occurred during a certain time interval.

When a stimulus-response event is frequently paired with a specific foreperiod, response performance for this event is improved after this foreperiod. This phenomenon is referred to as specific temporal expectancy. In four experiments, we investigated whether stimulus- or response-related processing benefits from specific temporal expectancy. In a speeded choice reaction task, different features of the imperative stimuli were frequently paired with foreperiods in such a way that only in some experiments were the responses also frequently paired with foreperiods. Participants revealed evidence for specific temporal expectancy when responses were frequently paired with foreperiods, but not when only the stimuli were frequently paired with foreperiods. We concluded that specific temporal expectancy affects response-related processing.

The present study investigated the role of causal attribution for performance monitoring in the medial frontal cortex. To this end, we compared internally and externally-caused errors in a selective attention task with respect to error-related EEG activity and error-induced adjustments of speed and attentional selectivity. Both error types evoked early negativities and later positivities in the response-locked event-related potential. However, whereas internally-caused errors caused posterror slowing, externally-caused errors were followed by reduced attentional selectivity. Moreover, the amount of reduced attentional selectivity was related to the amplitude of the early negativity on externally-caused errors. This suggests that posterror adjustments are initiated on the basis of perceived causality and, thus, causal attribution of errors.

Recent evidence from choice response time experiments with variable foreperiods (FPs) has shown that temporal expectancy can be event specific. When a certain target appears particularly frequent after one certain FP, participants tend to expect that target after that FP. This typically results in best performance for that target when it appears after that FP. In the present study, we investigated how temporally precise event-specific temporal expectancy is, and in which range of FPs it can be found. Two target stimuli were asymmetrically distributed over two "peak-FPs" and were equally distributed over 13 additional FPs. Event-specific expectancies were found for peak-FP pairs of 500/1,100 ms and 300/500 ms. Furthermore, the event expectancies generalized to a wide range of nonpeak FPs surrounding the peak FPs.

This study investigated the impact of divided attention on masked priming. In a dual-task setting, two tasks had to be carried out in close temporal succession: a tone discrimination task and a masked priming task. The order of the tasks was varied between experiments, and attention was always allocated to the first task-that is, the first task was prioritized. The priming task was the second (nonprioritized) task in Experiment 1 and the first (prioritized) task in Experiment 2. In both experiments, "novel" prime stimuli associated with semantic processing were essentially ineffective. However, there was intact priming by another type of prime stimuli associated with response priming. Experiment 3 showed that all these prime stimuli can reveal significant priming effects during a task-switching paradigm in which both tasks were performed consecutively. We conclude that dual-task specific interference processes (e.g., the simultaneous coordination of multiple stimulus-response rules) selectively impair priming that is assumed to rely on semantic processing.

Interference effects are reduced after trials including response conflict. This sequential modulation has often been attributed to a top-down mediated adaptive control mechanism and/or to feature repetition mechanisms. In the present study we tested whether mechanisms responsible for such sequential modulations are subject to attentional limitations under dual-task situations. Participants performed a Simon task in mixed single- and dual-task contexts (Experiment 1), in blocked contexts with dual-task load either, in trialN (Experiment 2a), in trialN-1 (Experiment 2b), or in both trials (Experiment 3). Results showed that the occurrence of a sequential modulation did not depend on dual-task load per se as it occurred predominantly in conditions of lowest and highest task load. Instead, task factors such as the repetition of task episodes and stimulus-response repetitions determined whether a sequential modulation occurred.

Irrelevant tone (accessory) stimuli facilitate performance in simple and choice reaction time tasks. In the present study, we combined accessory stimulation with a selective attention paradigm in order to investigate its influence on mechanisms of response selection. In the framework of a spatial stimulus-response compatibility task (Simon task), we tested whether accessory stimuli selectively affect bottom up triggered response activation processes (e.g., direct route processing), processing of task-relevant stimulus features (indirect route processing), or both/none. Results suggest a two-component effect of accessory stimuli within this selective attention task. First, accessory stimuli increased the Simon effect due to beneficial direct route processing. Second, accessory stimuli generally decreased reaction times indicating facilitation of indirect route processing.

Recent research suggests that processing of irrelevant information can be modulated in a rapid online fashion by contextual information in the task environment depending on the usefulness of that information in different contexts. Congruency effects evoked by irrelevant stimulus attributes are smaller in contexts with high proportions of incongruent trials and larger in contexts with high proportions of congruent trials (e.g., Corballis & Gratton, 2003; Lehle & Hübner, 2008). The present study investigates these context-adaptation effects in a masked-priming paradigm. Context-specific adaptation effects transfer to stimulus identities that are equiprobale in all contexts - an observation that renders explanations in terms of event-learning processes unlikely. Yet, context-specific effects vanished when the irrelevant information remained unconscious. The results suggest that context-specific adaptation of congruency effects reflect cognitive control operations that alter the processing of irrelevant information depending on the experienced utility of that information for action control.

In task switching experiments participants have to respond to the same set of stimuli while task instructions vary (e.g., digit stimuli are assigned to left- or right-sided key presses by means of magnitude vs. parity classification). Response congruency effects denote worse performance for a stimulus, which is associated with different responses in the two tasks as compared to a stimulus, which is associated with the same response. Previous research suggests that such effects reflect direct links between stimuli and responses acquired in the course of experimental practice. In the current study we investigated the impact of stimulus-specific practice and task instruction by reversing the S-R mapping of one task (Experiment 1) or replacing one task with a new one (Experiment 2) in the second half of an experimental session. Consistent with the direct link account, S-R links practiced during the first half of the experiment largely determined congruency effects despite altered task instructions. Furthermore, the results suggest that previously practiced S-R links (a) can be relatively quickly overwritten by practicing a novel S-R mapping, and (b) are subject to passive decay when no longer in use.

Change detection in rapidly alternating pictures separated by a blank frame has been shown to be very difficult (e.g., [Rensink, R. A., O'Regan, J. K., & Clark, J. J. (1997). To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science, 8, 368-373]). The three experiments reported here focus on the mechanism behind detection. More specifically, we explored whether information about the stimulus material accumulates in visual memory and thereby improves change detection. For that purpose the first experiment varied the number of repetitions of the original and modified stimulus version. Results showed that detection improved with more repetitions. The second experiment demonstrated that repetition performance improved more when both the original and the modified picture were repeated. Finally, the third experiment strengthened these findings by showing poorer detection performance when the repetition sequence was randomized. Together, our findings suggest accumulation of information in memory over picture presentations and moreover improved performance when both picture types were repeated. These results underline the importance of developing representations for both picture versions in change detection.

This paper reviews psychophysical evidence for the existence and the nature of two types of anticipation in goal-oriented action. The first one relates to attained changes of the perceptual world, thus to action goals. These anticipations determine appropriate motor output. We argue that goal codes do not only serve as a reference unit, against which currently produced behavioral effects are compared. Rather voluntary actions appear to be planned literally in terms of intended behavioral effects. The second type of anticipation relates to the environmental conditions that have to be met to bring an intended effect into being. These anticipations serve to trigger selected actions, when appropriate execution conditions are encountered. Altogether, the behavioral evidence portrays a remarkable automaticity of goal-oriented action. Once a goal exists (wherever it might come from), corresponding efferent output is generated and executed under appropriate conditions.

The report comprises recent theoretical considerations, experimental research, and simulations which all aim at a clarification of anticipatory mechanisms of behavioral control.

When a target requires different responses to a relevant and to an irrelevant task in a task-switching paradigm, there is response conflict. This target-induced response conflict was combined with conflict caused by a subliminally presented prime presented prior to the target. We found that target-related conflict reduced prime-induced conflict effects within the same trial However, target-related conflict modified prime-related conflict effects according to the irrelevant stimulus-response (S-R) rule, but not according to the relevant S-R rule. Moreover, trial-to-trial modulations of the target congruency effect were observed in task repetition trials, but not in task switch trials. These results indicate that conflict resolution mechanisms, at least under the present circumstances, operate in a strictly task-specific manner.

When an action produces an effect, the effect is perceived earlier in time compared to a stimulus without preceding action. This temporal bias is called intentional binding (IB) and serves as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Typically, IB is investigated by presenting a rotating clock hand while participants execute an action and perceive a resulting tone. Participants are asked to estimate the time point of tone onset by referring to the clock hand position. This time point estimate is compared to a time point estimate of a tone in a condition in which the tone occurs without preceding action. Studies employing this classic clock paradigm employed auditory action effects. We modified this paradigm to investigate potential IB of visual action effects, and, additionally, to investigate how IB differs for visual action effects (Experiment 1) in comparison to auditory action effects (Experiment 2). Our results show that, like the IB of an auditory effect, the time point of a visual action effect is shifted toward the causing action, and that the size of the IB depends on the delay duration of the effect. Comparable to auditory action effects, earlier action effects showed stronger IB compared to later action effects. Yet overall IB of the visual effects was weaker than IB of the auditory effects. As IB is seen as an indicator of sense of agency, this may have important implications for the design of human-machine interfaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stimuli caused by actions (i.e., effects) are perceived earlier than stimuli not caused by actions. This phenomenon is termed intentional binding (IB) and serves as implicit measure of sense of agency. We investigated the influence of effect delay and temporal predictability on IB, operationalized as the bias to perceive the effect as temporally shifted toward the action. For short delays, IB increased with delay (Experiment 1: 200 ms, 250 ms, 300 ms). The initial increase declined for longer delays (Experiment 2: 100 ms, 250 ms, 400 ms). This extends previous findings showing IB to decrease with increasing delays for delay ranges of 250 ms to 650 ms. Further, the hypothesis that IB, that is, sense of agency, might be maximal for different delays depending on the specific characteristics and context of action and effect, has important implications for human-machine interfaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous studies showed decreased performance in situations that require multiple tasks or actions relative to appropriate control conditions. Because humans often engage in such multitasking activities, it is important to understand how multitasking affects performance. In the present article, we argue that research on dual-task interference and sequential task switching has proceeded largely separately using different experimental paradigms and methodology. In our article we aim at organizing this complex set of research in terms of three complementary research perspectives on human multitasking. One perspective refers to structural accounts in terms of cognitive bottlenecks (i.e., critical processing stages). A second perspective refers to cognitive flexibility in terms of the underlying cognitive control processes. A third perspective emphasizes cognitive plasticity in terms of the influence of practice on human multitasking abilities. With our review article we aimed at highlighting the value of an integrative position that goes beyond isolated consideration of a single theoretical research perspective and that broadens the focus from single experimental paradigms (dual task and task switching) to favor instead a view that emphasizes the fundamental similarity of the underlying cognitive mechanisms across multitasking paradigms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]