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Recent studies have suggested that abstract control states (i.e., internal attentional states independent from concrete stimuli and responses) can be stored in episodic memory and retrieved subsequently. However, the duration of such a control state memory remains unclear. Previous research has found a quick and complete decay for stimulus-response bindings after 2000-5000 ms. Here, we tested a possible decay of control state bindings with retrieval delays of 2000, 3000, or 5000 ms. Five preregistered experiments used a confound-minimized prime-target task to measure the congruency sequence effect (CSE) separately for trials in which a nominally irrelevant context feature changed or repeated across trials. Analyses of the individual experiments did not result in conclusive evidence. A mega-analysis integrating the data of all experiments (N total  = 326) replicated evidence for binding and retrieval of control states, in that larger CSEs were found for context repetition trials. Importantly, Bayesian analysis indicated that this effect was not modulated by the length of retrieval delay. While this finding suggests that bindings of abstract control states can be relatively robust, we also discuss possible limitations of the present research., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Cognitive control theories describe the active maintenance of goal representations over temporal delays as central for adaptive behavior. Dynamic adaptations of goal representations are often measured as the congruency sequence effect (CSE), which describes a reduced congruency effect in trials following incongruent trials compared to congruent trials. Previous studies questioned active maintenance of CSEs and instead found that CSEs decrease rapidly over time (Duthoo et al., 2014; Egner et al., 2010). However, in these studies, CSEs can be attributed to both, control adaptations following conflict and binding effects due to repetition of stimulus (S) and response (R) features. In four experiments, we demonstrate that CSEs originating solely from control adaptions were not affected by temporal delays. Additional within-subject conditions partially replicated previous research showing a decrease in CSEs in task designs allowing for S-R binding effects and controlled for task complexity as a potential moderator. Together, results support theories which predict an active maintenance or retrieval of cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Theoretical accounts of self-representation assume a privileged role for information that is linked to the self and suggest that self-relevant stimuli capture attention in a seemingly obligatory manner. However, attention is not only biased toward self-relevant information, but self-relevant information might also tune attention more broadly, for instance, by engaging cognitive control processes that regulate allocation of attention. Indeed, research in social, clinical, and developmental sciences predicts a close link between a cognitive representation of the self and cognitive control processes. The present research is concerned with such a possible signaling function of the self to recruit cognitive control and tested predictions that follow from this view using the well-known Stroop task. Participants identified the print color of words. Self-reference was manipulated such that a prime was presented before or together with a Stroop word that comprised of either a possessive pronoun (e.g., "my green") or a definite/indefinite article as control (e.g., "the/a green"). Results of three experiments ( N total = 137) showed that self-reference priming reduced the congruency effect in the Stroop task relative to control conditions. This finding is incompatible with an attentional bias account assuming that self-relevant distractors always impair performance, but rather suggests that stimuli relevant to the self can facilitate cognitive control processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Conflict-monitoring theory proposes that conflict between incompatible responses is registered by a dedicated monitoring system, and that this conflict signal triggers changes of attentional filters and adapts control processes according to the current task demands. Extending the conflict-monitoring theory, it has been suggested that conflict elicits a negative affective reaction, and that it is this affective signal that is monitored and then triggers control adaptation. This review article summarizes research on a potential signaling function of affect for cognitive control. First, we provide an overview of the conflict-monitoring theory, discuss neurophysiological and behavioral markers of monitoring and control adaptation, and introduce the affective-signaling hypothesis. In a second part, we review relevant studies that address the questions of (i) whether conflict elicits negative affect, (ii) whether negative affect is monitored, and (iii) whether affect modulates control. In sum, the reviewed literature supports the claim that conflict and errors trigger negative affect and provides some support for the claim that affect modulates control. However, studies on the monitoring of negative affect and the influence of phasic affect on control are ambiguous. On the basis of these findings, in a third part, we critically reassess the affective-signaling hypothesis, discuss relevant challenges to this account, and suggest future research strategies.

The present study tested whether the coupling of covert attentional shifts and motor planning of pointing movements can be modulated by learning. Participants performed two tasks. As a primary movement task, they executed a pointing movement to a movement target (MT) location. As a secondary visual attention task, they identified a discrimination target (DT) that was presented shortly before initiation of the pointing movement. These DTs either occurred at the same or at different locations with the MT. A common finding in such and similar settings is the enhanced visual target identification when locations of MT and DT coincide. However, it is not known which factors govern the flexibility of spatial attention-action coupling. Here, we tested the influence of previously learned spatial contingencies between MT and DT on the coupling of covert attention and motor planning. These contingencies were manipulated in three groups (always same locations, always opposite locations, non-contingent locations) in a training session. Results indicated that in a subsequent test phase, previously learned contingencies enhanced visual identification accordingly, even when targets for the movement task and the visual task were presented at opposite sides. These results corroborate previous findings of a rather flexible interaction of attention and motor planning, and demonstrate how one can learn to control attention by means of motor planning.

According to the ideomotor principle, behavior is controlled via a retrieval of the sensory consequences that will follow from the respective movement ("action-effects"). These consequences include not only what will happen, but also when something will happen. In fact, recollecting the temporal duration between response and effect takes time and prolongs the initiation of the response. We investigated the associative structure of action-effect learning with delayed effects and asked whether participants acquire integrated action-time-effect episodes that comprise a compound of all three elements or whether they acquire separate traces that connect actions to the time until an effect occurs and actions to the effects that follow them. In three experiments, results showed that participants retrieve temporal intervals that follow from their actions even when the identity of the effect could not be learned. Furthermore, retrieval of temporal intervals in isolation was not inferior to retrieval of temporal intervals that were consistently followed by predictable action-effects. More specifically, when tested under extinction, retrieval of action-time and action-identity associations seems to compete against each other, similar to overshadowing effects reported for stimulus-response conditioning. Together, these results suggest that people anticipate when the consequences of their action will occur, independently from what the consequences will be.

Binding and retrieval of stimulus features, response features, and their attentional weighting tune cognitive processing to situational demands. The two mechanisms promote successful actions, especially in situations in which such actions depend on controlled processing. Here we explored binding and retrieval of attentional control states that follow from erroneous actions. By definition, such errors are characterized by insufficient cognitive control but at the same time, error detection has been shown to trigger corresponding adjustments to prevent future failures. We reanalyzed existing datasets and conducted a novel experiment to investigate whether error-induced control states become bound to task-relevant stimuli. Results point towards a binding and retrieval of error-induced control states; however, the effect appears to be less reliable than for binding and retrieval of specific stimulus and response features. We discuss potential implications and alternative interpretations in terms of a mediating impact of error-induced control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]