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One of the reasons behind the financial crisis in 1997 was excessive dependence of Asian economies on commercial banks for domestic financing. Banks were the major source of corporate financing because the other major source, bond markets, was underdeveloped and small. On the other hand, the 2008 global financial crisis led to constraints in acquiring local currency and foreign currency liquidity in the corporate sector, as foreign banks withdrew investments from Asia. Furthermore, Asia needs large quantities of capital (US$750 billion per year for 2010-2020) to develop infrastructure connectivity within and across its economies. Local and regional capital can be channeled for long-term infrastructure projects and other productive investment through bond markets. At this juncture, to enhance bond financing, it is important to examine factors that promote effective development of bond markets. This study attempts to identity the major determinants of bond market development in Asian economies, through examining its relationship with selected key financial and economic factors, and to provide policy recommendations for further developing Asian bond markets. Major determinants for bond market development in Asia include the size of an economy, the stage of economic development, the openness of an economy, the size of the banking sector, and the interest rate spread.

Notwithstanding incumbency advantages and network effects enjoyed by the United States (US) dollar, considerations about the stability of its value have led Asian countries to fear they are holding their foreign exchange reserves in a depreciating currency. At the same time, it pays for the regional countries to adjust their reserve currency composition to match the point of reference of their exchange rate policy. This paper examines empirically which regional currency or currencies seem to matter for exchange rate determination in Asia beyond the very short term. To this end, we employ country-specific Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models to compare the relative impact which fluctuations in the Asian Currency Unit (ACU), yuan, and yen separately have on movements of Asian currencies. Contrary to recent evidence based on daily data, we found monthly exchange rates variations in the region are more heavily influenced by the cumulative effect of key Asian currencies than by the yuan or the yen individually within the sample period we used. To the extent that exchange rates in the region shift over time from benchmarking the US dollar towards a broad range of Asian currencies, Asian central banks will find it more attractive to cross-hold Asian bonds. This calls for the development of deep private markets in such assets, as well as institutional prerequisites for internationalizing key regional currencies.

This paper takes stock of recent research dealing with the degree to which the trilemma choices of Asian countries facilitated a smoother adjustment during the global crisis of 2008-2009, and the way the region has been coping with the adjustment to the postcrisis challenges. We point out that emerging Asia has converged to a middle ground of the trilemma configuration: limited financial integration, a degree of monetary independence, and controlled exchange rate buffered by sizable international reserves. This configuration, with the proper management of balance sheet exposure and public finances, facilitated a smoother adjustment of emerging Asia to the crisis, and was instrumental in inducing the rapid resumption of growth. The swings of financial flows, from large deleveraging of foreign positions in 2008 to the renewed inflows in 2010, validate the insight of the public finance approach to financial integration: the gains from deeper financial integration should be balanced against the costs of growing exposure to turbulences. A key lesson of the crisis is the need to apply a comprehensive cost/benefit approach to prudential policies, to the regulation of external borrowing and of domestic financial intermediation, and to the accumulation and use of international reserves. We illustrate these results in the context of the challenges facing emerging Asia's adjustment during the global financial crisis, and the postcrisis policy stance dealing with the renewed inflows of capital.

Asian economic regionalism has emerged from a bottom-up process, driven by market forces in the absence of a grand plan for regional integration. While the financial crisis of 1997-98 triggered new regional cooperation initiatives, more recently several Asian political leaders have formulated proposals for the creation of a regional economic community, suggesting the possible start of a top-down approach. Based on the results of a survey of Asia's opinion leaders conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2010, this paper discusses how Asia's institutional architecture for economic and financial integration is taking shape, suggesting the need to strengthen existing institutions that promote Asian regionalism and to create new ones. While the focus of the paper is on monetary and financial integration, the analysis also covers other integration pillars such as trade and investment, connectivity and infrastructure, and regional public goods. It suggests the need to create new institutions in support of Asian regionalism and to adopt a broad perspective in moving towards the formation of a region-wide economic community based on strong political commitment and grassroots participation.

This paper reviews recent state interventions in financial crises and draws lessons for crisis management. A number of areas are identified where crisis management could be strengthened, including with regard to the tools and instruments used to involve the private sector in crisis resolution (with a view to reducing the recent enhanced role of official bailouts and the associated moral hazard), to allow for the orderly resolution of systemically important financial firms (to make these firms safe to fai), and with regard to achieving better integration with ex ante macroprudential surveillance. The paper proposes the establishment of high level systemic risk councils (SRCs) in each country with responsibility for overseeing systemic risk in both tranquil times and crisis periods and coordinating the activities of key government ministries, agencies, and the central bank.

Asia faces very large infrastructure funding demands, estimated at around US$750 billion per year for energy, transport, telecommunications, water, and sanitation during 2010-2020 (ADB/ADBI 2009). Asia has large savings, significant international reserves, and rapid accumulations of funds that could be utilized for meeting these infrastructure investment needs, but Asian markets have failed to use available resources to channel funding into highly needed infrastructure projects. This paper explores issues and challenges in financing infrastructure for seamless Asian infrastructure connectivity and for other high priority development financing needs, and seeks methods and instruments to help direct Asian and international resources to cost-effectively and efficiently support infrastructure and other development needs. The paper discusses three important topics: First, what are the lessons for Asia from the European Union's experience of developing and integrating financial markets and using development banking institutions to support infrastructure investment? Second, how can Asian public and private resources, such as pension funds, social security funds, sovereign wealth funds, and private portfolio funds contribute to infrastructure development across Asia? Third, can Islamic financial markets provide funds for Asian infrastructure development? Finally, the paper makes recommendations regarding financing options and how Asian financial markets and infrastructure companies could be further developed and integrated to mobilize Asian and other regions' savings for financing priority infrastructure projects in the region.

In this paper, we examine capital account openness and exchange rate flexibility in 11 Asian economies. Asia has made slow progress in de jure capital account openness, but has made much more progress in de facto capital account openness. While there has been a gradual increase in exchange rate flexibility, most Asian economies continue to have largely inflexible exchange rates. This combination of advancing de facto capital account integration without greater exchange rate flexibility has led to procyclical monetary policy, when capital flows are procyclical. This paper emphasises the need for a consistent monetary policy framework.

This paper discusses the role of state intervention for prevention, containment, and resolution of financial crises based mainly on the Korean experience during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Crises in emerging market and developing economies tend to be more complicated than those faced by advanced economies because they are twin crises: financial and currency crises. Such crises require the development of a comprehensive strategy covering the stabilization of the domestic financial market and the foreign exchange market, closely coordinated responses by different government bodies, an extraordinary effort for financial restructuring, and the introduction of a new regulatory framework. This effort should be based on an effective crisis management team of experts given a clear mandate with well defined power; strong political support; effective communication with the market players, both domestic and foreign; and sufficient mobilization of public funds. In this regard, this paper emphasizes the importance of building a reliable information base, prompt actions, orchestrating political consensus, and a balanced approach to restructuring and regulation among different types of financial institutions. The paper also highlights the need for a new international financial architecture matching the rapid integration into the global market of the financial markets of emerging and developing economies while their currency remains non-convertible.

It is widely believed that the practice of securitization is one of the causes that led to the 2007-08 financial crisis. In this paper, I show that securitized products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO) are particularly vulnerable to systematic risk and tend to show higher tail risk. These characteristics, in turn, are closely associated with joint failures and systemic risk. In order to achieve greater stability of the financial system, it is important to prevent the recurrence of the collapse of specific markets as this may lead to the collapse of other components of the financial system. From this perspective, the financial regulations that should be applied to these problematic financial products and their relation to possible systemic risks are discussed.

How much can regional monitoring of financial markets and coordination of financial sector policies contribute to preventing and mitigating financial crises? This paper reviews and compares the experiences of Europe and Asia, which have taken different routes and have achieved different levels of regional financial integration. The analysis suggests that the harmonization and coordination of regulation and supervision, with a strong focus on maturity and currency mismatch problems, would constitute an important step toward mitigating the risk of crisis. However, regional monitoring and coordination will remain difficult as long as lender-of-last-resort activities and fiscal support packages are organized on a national level. Against this background, the crisis is a wake-up call for further progress on monetary integration in Asia along the lines of the reformed Chiang Mai Initiative. In Europe, the crisis reveals the need to establish a sustainable regulatory and supervisory structure that properly defines and reflects the responsibilities of regional and national authorities in crisis management, including its fiscal dimension.

This paper examines the motivation for, and the success of, regional efforts in Asia to promote local currency bond markets. The analysis demonstrates that Asian local currency bond markets made substantial gains as a region going into the current global financial crisis. However, we argue that the current financial crisis requires a reassessment of the merits of promoting local currency bond markets and the gains that have been made to date. While most of the initial motivations for encouraging the development of domestic local currency bond markets appear to remain valid, there are some exceptions. However, the degree to which success in the development of these markets will be sustained remains unknown until global financial markets regain tranquility and official interventions into these markets are removed.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe went from being largely closed to being largely open to international capital flows. This paper discusses their experience with capital account liberalization and coping with large capital inflows. We start with a discussion of basic economic characteristics and the real convergence achieved so far, and then discuss the pace and sequencing of capital account liberalization and the degree of international financial integration over the past decade. We then analyze trends and patterns of capital inflows in these countries in recent years. These stylized facts are useful for understanding the macroeconomic implications and policy challenges of coping with large capital inflows, which we discuss next. Finally we conclude with policy implications for emerging Asian economies.

The paper discusses the pros and cons of capital account liberalization. Rather than contrasting liberalization and regulation of capital flows as irreconcilable antagonisms, we argue that capital account liberalization requires institutional and regulatory safeguards. Even though the effectiveness of specific capital controls cannot be taken for granted, we reject the view that financial globalization has deprived national policymakers of the means to protect their economies against crisis. In addition to national safeguards, we assess the chances for crisis prevention and resolution on the regional level and present options to overcome institutional deficits on the global level. We conclude that reforms of the international financial architecture can help prevent illiquidity and ensure a fair burden sharing in the case of insolvency, without aggravating moral hazard behavior of the parties involved.