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Multiculturalism in the Northeastern Asian states of Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan as well as the members of ASEAN are interesting case studies in how states manage migration policy and create migrant policy. Examining their migration practices, we can understand East Asian perspectives on multiculturalism employing traditional migration frameworks revolving around control and management of entry of migrants, state-building and ethnocentric rationale for/or against pro-migrant policies. This review article will delineate how different states in the region construct migrant policies in line with their state’s interests, which include domestic, regional and international interests by employing the below nine articles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, a notable aspect of East Asia was its lack of a regional human rights mechanism. Two regional human rights initiatives towards providing the region with such are now been undertaken - an inter-governmental level one by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and one based on a network of domestic commissions by the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. This article surveys the evolution of these two initiatives, and considers them in the context of the enduring "Asian values" debate. It argues that even though there are shortcomings to both initiatives, their mutually propelling development improves the prospects for a human rights mechanism in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia and the Asia-Pacific are core components of the global economy, and there have been important recent developments in the regionalism of both regions. After the 1997-1998 financial crisis, East Asian countries initiated more exclusive regional cooperation and integration ventures mainly through ASEAN Plus Three, but lately this process has stumbled. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has also failed to make substantial progress. Attention has instead increasingly turned to free trade agreements (FTAs), yet these have hitherto been overwhelmingly bilateral in nature. There are still only a few truly regional FTAs in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific-and these are on a sub-regional scale. However, various frustrations over the messy and fractious pattern of heterogeneous bilateral agreements led to the recent initiation of 'grand regional' FTA talks. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is an Asia-Pacific-based, United States-led project while the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an East Asia-centred project. Each contains highly diverse memberships and the successful conclusion of TPP and RCEP talks is not assured. It is argued that, if negotiated, the RCEP is more likely to advance meaningful and effective regionalism than the TPP due to the former ascribing more importance to regional community-building. Furthermore, bilateral FTAs already in force may over the long term transform into more comprehensive economic agreements that address new regional and global challenges such as energy security and climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines why Asia's multilateral defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. It argues that explanations that stress the "catalytic role" of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats are underdetermining. Rather, Asia's new multilateral defence diplomacy reflects strategic emulation on the part of ASEAN elites, who localized ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEAN's central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has also been helped by the changing role of militaries h7 some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article briefly assesses the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political elites in East Asia tend to view the concept of human security with scepticism. On the one hand, broader notions of security are acknowledged. However, traditional views on sovereignty and deeply embedded norms relating to non-intervention and consensus politics have fostered conservative views towards parts of the human security agenda that challenge state/elite perspectives. This article identifies and explores this tension, and comments on the potential for different ‘strands’ of human security to inform future regional cooperation and dialogue, and concludes that human security's breadth continues to fuel an endless debate about its clarity and utility in East Asia. Such confusion is a challenge for its future relevance in the region, both as a conceptual tool and as a policy agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

If the assessment of ASEAN's success in the past is difficult, speculations on whether ASEAN will be a success will be close to impossibility. Yet this is what is intended in this article. However, this is done by first defining robust criteria of success of conflict prevention. Conflict prevention is successful if conflicts and battle deaths can be avoided, either by means of conflict resolution or transformation, or simply by means of conflict avoidance. By starting with this criterion the article will argue that ASEAN peacefulness cannot be explained by durable objective conditions. Instead, it is built on imagined realities. The imagined realities of the ASEAN Way are getting more difficult to sustain due to their interaction with material and normative/institutional developments. Many of the constructed foundations of the ASEAN Way are unsustainable in the new realities where communication has become easy and uncontrollable, and societies have become wealthier and more democratized. However, the article will show that evidence of existing conflict violence suggests that ASEAN has started to reformulate its approach to conflict prevention and that this has largely been successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2008 crisis affected all regions across the globe. East Asia appeared one of the regions best positioned to overcome its impact because of the resilience of strong developmental states. The crisis has raised the question of whether the East Asian economic growth model is too dependent on high export performance. The sharp decline of private consumption in the OECD economies in 2008-2009 has affected continued economic success in East Asia. Now the challenge for East Asian developmental states is to search for a new economic strategy moving away from extreme dependence on exports. This imperative was first acknowledged by China, which has initiated an ambitious support package to stimulate domestic demand and private consumption, relying less exclusively on global foreign markets. Thus China has provided new and more accessible markets to its ASEAN neighbours, with the potential to substitute declining import capacity in Europe, Japan and the USA. A structural consequence of the global crisis indicates an acceleration in the rise of East Asia's economic integration. However, this new facilitation of export benefits for the ASEAN countries may delay or hinder long-term needed reforms to raise domestic living standards and wealth redistribution across Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China occupies an important economic position in Eastern Asia, accounting for circa 60% of trade turnover and capital flows in the region. Based on the regional production network in Eastern Asia, the Chinese economy might constitute an integral part of the regional market. China is interested in a liberal, secure and stable regional market which promotes the adoption of an active role of a participant and promoter of regional trade agreements (RTA) by China, i.e. the free trade agreement China - ASEAN, proposed trilateral free trade agreement of South-Eastern Asia, or EAFTA. China is also interested in participating in and promoting regional monetary and financial cooperation, for example as part of the Chiang Mai Initiative and the development of the regional capital market. The Chinese concept of regionalism is complex due to the diversity of the neighbouring geographic areas. Despite the attachment of China to the ASEAN+3 variant, this country is relatively flexible in its approach to the form and nature of its own participation in multi-dimensional integrations structures, i.e. EAS1. At the same time China has made effort for developing institution outside the regional, i.e. for example SOC, potential security system for the North-Eastern Asia based on Hexalateral Talks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the European Union's and the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's regional and interregional integrative dynamics in response to the avian influenza outbreak in East Asia of 7 years ago. It sketches the collaborative efforts from an institutionalist perspective and outlines the variables influencing the behaviour of regional organisations. To explain and predict behavioural patterns, the article takes into account the following moderating variables: the kind of affectedness, mode of regional and interregional cooperation, the degree of institutionalisation and the role of international actors. The independent variable is the crisis itself. It replaces goal formulation for action and interaction during periods of normalcy. The succeeding paragraphs argue that a transnational crisis may trigger integrative dynamics and institutional change, but, that the mode of regional and interregional cooperation and the degree of institutionalisation matter in the long run and are the essential factors in differentiating the cooperative dynamics. These two variables are vital elements contributing to the institutional design of a regional organisation. In the end, the article views the institutional design to be the central and constant determinant of integrative behaviour both in times of and in absence of crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines Chinese security relations with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The article characterizes these relations as "non-traditional." The author states that while this security cooperation is under-appreciated, its importance should be obvious in analysis in the West. The author notes that the Chinese-ASEAN alliance has strategic significance in the region. The relationship between China and ASEAN is the foremost example of East Asian regionalism, according to the article.

Despite the development of an increasingly sophisticated literature on comparative regional integration drawing from a variety of cases, the European experience remains the most often used benchmark against which other integrative processes are judged; there is still an often implicit expectation that 'successful' processes of regionalism will end up looking something like the European Union. While it is correct to move away from such a 'Euro-dominance', the theoretical lessons learned continue to have salience when applied to emerging and competing forms of integrative processes in East Asia. In particular, when economic considerations dominate regional relations - at times of economic crises - then integrative logics and strategies come to the fore. In more 'normal' times when geo-strategic considerations reassert themselves, then the consensus over region building and the very nature of the region itself is weakened and cooperation is replaced by competing visions and the over-supply of region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The gradual institutionalization of defence diplomacy is becoming an increasingly prominent and potentially important feature of security dialogue in the Asian region. This stands in marked contrast to Asia's recent history, where across the region multilateral defence or military interactions have traditionally been regarded with suspicion. This article examines the emergence of Asia's most prominent exercise in defence diplomacy: the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). Within a relatively short space of time, this forum has developed into one of the most important opportunities for regional defence ministers and senior military officers to meet and exchange views on security issues. Yet despite its growing standing, the SLD has received virtually no scholarly attention. The article begins by reviewing the origins and development of the SLD, before outlining its operating modalities. It seeks to account for the apparent appeal of the SLD, measured in terms of its capacity to consistently attract high-level representation and favourable reviews. The article explores how the SLD might develop in the future and outlines some of the challenges it faces, including the rise of potentially competing mechanisms for defence diplomacy in East Asia. The article closes by outlining a number of areas for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of regional economic agreements involving East Asian economies in the years since the financial crises is usually explained in the political economy literature by reference to economic factors. These agreements have been viewed either as a response to the costs of increasing interdependence and/or to the demand by domestic exporters to level the playing field when their rivals benefit from preferential trade agreements. A detailed examination of economic data finds no support, however, for the argument that intra-regional economic interdependence in East Asia has increased significantly since the financial crises. Case studies suggest that business has not played a major role in either promoting or opposing the agreements - not surprisingly in that the agreements are unlikely to have a major economic impact, and are not being widely used. Rather than there being an 'economic domino' effect at work, the new East Asian regionalism is best understood as being driven by a 'political domino' effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the influence of 'track two' policy networks in shaping regional political and security cooperation in East Asia. It focuses on two of the most established and lauded political-security networks: the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), critically exploring their effectiveness and influence today. Drawing on extensive interviews, participant observation and an analysis of documentary sources, it concludes that there is little evidence to suggest these networks have affected the significant institutional change described in much of the literature. Rather, there is persuasive evidence that their influence on track one has waned in recent years. After canvassing a range of alternative explanations for this state of affairs, it argues that recent scholarship on track two has paid insufficient attention to the scope conditions that are a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for unofficial networks to successfully achieve policy diffusion. Non-official diplomacy can affect institutional change, but it is less common than most accounts suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) value added and limitations regarding its ability to play a role in regional security in East Asia. It is stated that ASEAN's contributions to regional security and within ASEAN-plus arrangements are not uniform, and are dependent on the relationship and the arrangement. It is mentioned that China, the U.S., and many other ASEAN states were initially resistant to the idea of new, expanded regional arrangements.

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's 2008 proposal for an Asia-Pacific community, while ambitious and likely to be resisted by many in the East Asian region, raises important concerns about Asia's regional architecture at a time of profound change and challenge from economic uncertainty, human insecurity, environmental problems and intrastate conflict. This article examines how historic Australian and Asian discourses of identity have shaped Asian-Australian relations and how identity discourses now interact with profound contemporary struggles over the pace and direction of normative and institutional change, as exemplified by struggles over the ASEAN Charter or approaches to Burma. One key to this process of change will be how the region defines 'community' in both ideational and institutional terms. Will it be people- or elite-centred? Will it be exclusivist and conservative, or open and cosmopolitan? The article critiques older discourses that conceived Australian identity as radically different from Asia and Asian identity as homogenous and anti-Western, arguing that these enabled repressive forms of politics at home and hobbled the ability of the region to grapple collectively with new challenges and insecurities abroad. It argues for homogenising and egoistic models of identity to be abandoned in favour of a more pluralist and cosmopolitan orientation - a new vision of 'unity in diversity' where there are no civilisations to clash. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to explore how stable regional order under the possible community formation can be created in East Asia in moves towards China's ascendancy. For this objective, it takes advantage of a framework assuming that the development of an East Asian community would be possible under conditions that the states in the region develop common identity and norms, as well as multilateral institutions that guarantee the long-term interest. Moreover, the society needs to be involved in identity formation and institution-building. This article argues that China has been gradually embedded into formal multilateral institutions and less formal policy networks formed by state and non-state actors, which have been conducive to the creation of a regional community. However, both collective norms at the governmental level and shared cultural consciousness at the public level have not developed enough to have significant influences on directing China firmly to the formation of a regional community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most critics argue that ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Plus Three regional surveillance is limited by its peer review process because governments reject external interference in matters of domestic economic management. This article suggests that surveillance's limits also arise because of a more fundamental conflict over how financial/economic risk is problematised. The governmentality framework and the East Asian experience reveal how the process of constituting economic/financial risk using disciplinary knowledge is inherently subjective and, consequently, political and open to contestation. In addition to the contested nature of disciplinary knowledge, three other phenomena—the prevalence of imitative behaviour in markets, the value of practical knowledge for governance and the problem of 'ambiguous economics'—complicate surveillance and make it difficult for surveillance processes to deliver objective and neutral assessments, despite a genuine demand for them. In view of these realities, the ideal institutional form for surveillance appears to be a non-hierarchical setting in which dialogic interactions take centre stage, thereby allowing surveillance participants to debate assessments, offer reasons for adopting particular practices, exchange practical experiences and collectively work out responses to contested issues. However, these are precisely the features of the present surveillance structure that critics argue ought to be changed in favour of a more hierarchical mechanism. This article's analysis of surveillance using the governmentality framework leads to the counter-intuitive insight that surveillance is best structured as a form of Habermasian 'public sphere'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains East Asian regionalism as the product of two sets of negotiations. The first negotiation is between East Asia on the one hand and global forces and structures on the other. The second negotiation is intra-regional and includes a critical negotiation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Southeast Asia and East/Northeast Asia, which also provides the primary focus of this article. This article details ASEAN's extensions into East Asian regionalism as part of interdependent efforts to adapt transitioning global and regional systems. Conceiving these regional negotiations to be not just economic and utilitarian but first and foremost normative, this article details the opportunities and dilemmas represented by 'East Asia' for ASEAN, ASEAN-Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia as a meaningful organizing principle. Dilemmas associated with the ASEAN Plus Three process, an East Asia free-trade area and the ASEAN Charter provide illustrations of East Asia's understood challenges for Southeast Asia in addition to the ways that Southeast Asian agencies have been shaping the form and content of recent East Asian efforts and also how regional-global and intra-ASEAN negotiations continue to provide key constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The East Asia Summit is the newest leaders-led regional organization in the Asia Pacific with a broad mandate and an unclear future. Its membership means that it is stuck halfway between being an East Asian regional body such as the ASEAN+3 process and an Asia-Pacific body such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Expanding the East Asia Summit to include the United States would enhance its ability to be the primary strategic forum in Asia and clearly identify the Summit as on Asia-Pacific body. This would not only improve Asia's regional architecture, but would also serve the interests of the United States, ASEAN, Japan, China and India. The biggest challenge facing this positive development is convincing the United States to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and overcoming the concerns of the other regional bodies about an enhanced East Asia Summit. In 2009, a new administration in Washington and the EAS meeting in Vietnam will provide a powerfully symbolic opportunity to invite the United States into the East Asia Summit and allow the Summit and the United States to find their proper homes in Asia's evolving regionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the most recent data compiled from a variety of sources, this article presents a brief comparative educational profile of ASEAN member countries, other developing countries and developed countries of the East Asian region. Concentrating on financial conditions in education, the article analyses the investment in education, priority given to education in the national economies, intra-sectoral priorities, the unit costs, and the present mechanisms of funding education, including the role of the private sector in the same. The experience of East Asia may provide some important lessons for the developing countries in their endeavour to educate their people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]