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This study performs a meta-regression analysis of studies examining the efficacy of arms embargoes in stopping weapons transfers to target countries. Based on the existing body of literature, the effectiveness of arms embargoes remains a subject of debate, contingent on both the rigorous enforcement of the embargo by the sender and the embargo-busting practices of exporting countries. Drawing upon a dataset comprising over 150 estimates, the findings of this analysis suggest that there is only a weak, yet statistically significant, negative impact of arms embargoes on arms transfers to target states. This result implies that, on average, arms embargoes are only successful to a limited extent in impeding or reducing the arms trade with these nations. However, the findings also demonstrate that there is substantial heterogeneity in the embargo effect reported across the primary studies, indicating that certain embargoes still exhibit strong efficacy. Specifically, comprehensive obligatory arms embargoes that are imposed by multiple senders substantially reduce the major conventional arms transfers to target states, particularly within the first year of their imposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms-exporting countries – even those that are liberal democracies – sell weapons to governments that violate human rights. Does the public support the provision of weapons to human rights violators? We examine public attitudes on arms exports through a survey experiment in Israel – a major arms exporter that is often criticized for arming repressive governments. Our analysis finds that human rights violations substantially increase the public's opposition to the sale of arms – by 21 percentage points. Furthermore, opposition to the arms sale arises even when the recipient country carries economic or strategic importance. Overall, we find a public preference for arms exports constrained by ethical concerns – a preference that is often at odds with governments' export practice. This study enhances our understanding of the domestic politics of the arms trade, which has received little scholarly attention, but increases in importance with rising public scrutiny and criticism of arms sales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms transfers result from economic and political motives, with the latter often dominating the former. While this is accepted knowledge for the post‐World War II period, it seems not to apply earlier. Much existing research argues that in the interwar years, weapons were traded as purely commercial goods because governments had neither the ability nor willingness to control and direct arms transfers. We reassess this idea and argue that, while formal control was largely absent, governments could steer weapons shipments nonetheless because arms producers depended on them as main customers, sales agents, and financiers of their export business. Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments actively used this influence. To test whether interwar arms transfers were the result of political or commercial interests, we use newly collected, historical data on the small arms trade and inferential network analysis methods. Our results suggest that although economic drivers existed throughout the interwar period, political considerations were especially influential when international relations were hostile at the start and end of the period. This research contributes to our understanding of international economic relations between the world wars and of the drivers of arms transfers across time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the Cold War era has ushered in a century in which great military powers like the US, China, and Russia continue to dominate the arms trade, yet minor powers are also investing heavily in arms manufacturing and technologies and profiting from lucrative arms transfers. Changes in the arms trade have fostered cooperative international regulatory practices and agreements, but recent conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine highlight the need for strong end-use monitoring, post-shipment verification, and international accountability for dubious trade deals. This study analyzes changes in top arms producers, new complexities in arms regulation due to advancing technologies and artificial intelligence, arms-control policies of international organizations and top arms producers, and the risks of poor regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing scholarship examines the moral status of markets, identifying some markets as "noxious"—markets deemed morally objectionable due to the background conditions preceding exchange or the resulting consequences. This literature primarily focuses on market exchanges between private parties. We broaden the analysis to include government markets—markets involving exchanges where either the buyer or seller, or both, are government officials. We develop a general theoretical framework to understand the conditions under which government markets are likely to be more or less noxious. We then apply the framework to the international arms trade to demonstrate its usefulness for understanding noxious government markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms export control measures are an important tool to defend the universality of human rights, democracy and to prevent conflicts. The European Union (EU) has a long tradition of striving towards these goals. One of the most important outcomes regarding such is the 2008 Council Common Position (CP) defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment. This article focuses on the implementation and effectiveness of this CP. In particular, it investigates whether EU countries have applied and enforced human rights principles in arms export practices following the approval of the CP or whether a pro-market and pro-export approach have prevailed. In this way, it fills a lack of organic analysis on the impact of the CP. Secondly, for the first time, it compares EU-level regulation impact with that at the global level, in order to assess the 'net value' of the EU regulation at the international level also from a diachronic perspective. Lastly, a comparison with the national level offers suggestions for mutual reinforcing. By using quantitative methods, the research aims to offer empirical evidence concerning the EU arms export control regimes and their effectiveness and to contribute to the present debate about the means at the EU's disposal to defend the universality of human rights and promote democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Kingdom imposed an arms embargo on Chile in 1974 but not on Argentina after the 1976 coup, despite brutal military dictatorships in both countries. What explains this difference? What can this difference reveal about the determinants of government decisions regarding arms exports? Using mainly archival evidence, this article demonstrates that this difference is explained by a stronger advocacy network in the United Kingdom campaigning on Chile, which was largely due to a greater identification of the British left with the Chilean struggle. The hub of this network was the Chile Solidarity Campaign, which mediated the influence of the transnational anti-Pinochet movement on the UK government. These findings suggest that shared values or identities make transnational issues more likely to resonate with domestic audiences. Evidence also indicates the importance of activists' connections with gatekeepers, focus on specific arms deals, and demonstrated causal chains between arms exports and repression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International commerce can be determined by the political climate between the exporter and the importer. Arms transfers are a much complex process, where beyond economic factors, alliance ties, security perception and defence planning are also considered. Still, they might not be independent of political relations. This paper aims to capture the arms supplier-recipient relations between the Visegrád countries and Russia, the United States and Germany from 1999 to 2020. More specifically, how do the two factors affect each other: are good political relations necessary for arms deals? Or do arms deals facilitate a friendly political climate? Our conclusion is as follows. On the one hand, a cooperative political climate increases the probability of arms deals, but they are not a necessity, as mutual benefits and security perceptions can override the current political climate. On the other hand, however, arms transfers can deepen cooperation or alleviate the existing differences between the parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International commerce can be determined by the political climate between the exporter and the importer. Arms transfers are a much complex process, where beyond economic factors, alliance ties, security perception and defence planning are also considered. Still, they might not be independent of political relations. This paper aims to capture the arms supplier-recipient relations between the Visegrád countries and Russia, the United States and Germany from 1999 to 2020. More specifically, how do the two factors affect each other: are good political relations necessary for arms deals? Or do arms deals facilitate a friendly political climate? Our conclusion is as follows. On the one hand, a cooperative political climate increases the probability of arms deals, but they are not a necessity, as mutual benefits and security perceptions can override the current political climate. On the other hand, however, arms transfers can deepen cooperation or alleviate the existing differences between the parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the determinants of China's arms transfers by focusing on the roles of political factors and energy resource acquisition. Using Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data on China's arms exports during the period from 2001 to 2014, we find that China is likely to sell and transfer more arms to countries with less political freedom and more corrupt or more autocratic countries, implying that political considerations are hidden in arms transfers. The motivation for seeking energy resources is overall supported, suggesting that China's arms transfers are also motived by securing their need for energy and natural resources. That arms trade is a joint decision of both sides implies that political considerations also exist for autocratic regimes or resource-abundant low-income countries to acquire weapons from China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia sells arms primarily to enhance its influence abroad in key regions, e.g., the Middle East, East, and South Asia. Since the government is the primary customer for this sector's goods, this sector does not risk collapse even if arms sales decline though arms sales bring vital foreign currency. But, the intervening motive between seeking enhanced global influence and maintaining the defense sector is the acquisition of elite rents since the arms trade offers multiple opportunities for corruption. We then focus on the impact of arms production and sales on international security. First that means looking at how Russia's militarization and its increasing conversion into a mobilization state is affected by the ever growing importance of defense investment and production to the government and the economy. We then investigate the impact of arms sales on international security in Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a general presumption against arming outlaw states. But can that presumption sometimes be overturned? The argument considered here maintains that outlaw states can have legitimate security interests and that transferring weapons to these states can be an appropriate way of promoting those interests. Weapons enable governments to engage in wrongful oppression and aggression, but they also enable them to fend off predators in a manner that can be beneficial to their citizens. It clearly does not follow from the fact that a state is oppressive or aggressive that it will never be a victim of wrongful aggression itself, and while an outlaw state's primary aim in repelling such aggression will often be the preservation of its own power, its defensive manoeuvres will sometimes also serve its citizens' interests. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states may sometimes contribute to the protection of innocents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the politics of, and prospects for, contemporary weapons control? Human rights and humanitarian activists and scholars celebrate the gains made in the UN Arms Trade Treaty as a step towards greater human security. Critics counter that the treaty represents an accommodation with global militarism. Taking the tensions between arms transfer control and militarism as my starting point, I argue that the negotiating process and eventual treaty text demonstrate competing modes of militarism. Expressed in terms of sovereignty, political economy, or human security, all three modes are underpinned by ongoing imperial relations: racial, gendered, and classed relations of asymmetry and hierarchy that persist despite formal sovereign equality. This means human security is a form of militarism rather than the antithesis of it. Drawing on primary sources from negotiations and participant observation with actors involved in the campaign for the ATT, the argument challenges the idea that human security has scored a victory over militarism. It also complicates our understanding of the nature of the accommodation with it, demonstrating the transformation as well as entrenchment of contemporary militarism. The argument reframes the challenges for controlling weapons circulation, placing the necessity for feminist, postcolonial anti-militarist critique front and centre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the political implications of the arms trade and transfers related to the conflict in Yemen, wishing to emphasize the nature and the impact of arms exports to states involved in ongoing military conflict to both the outcome of the military intervention as well as to the international norms regulating arms exports. Labelled as 'the forgotten war', the conflict in Yemen has failed to raise sufficient international attention as to amount for the scale of the humanitarian and political disaster that encompasses the country and negatively impacts the evolution in the region. Although the legitimacy of the conflict has generated a considerable amount of legal and academic debate, which was doubled by the numerous international organizations drawing attention to the worsening humanitarian situation, these actions have failed to produce enough momentum such as to consistently alter national practices related to arms exports and to determine a collective response under UN auspices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is there a substitution effect between arms exports and military spending? Do arms producing countries use weapon deliveries as a means to affect their external security? Whereas free-riding in alliances is extensively discussed by researchers and practitioners, the literature has surprisingly neglected the effect of transfers in defense goods on domestic military budgets. We develop a formal theoretical framework that conditions a country’s budgeting calculus on its arms trade decisions. The general conclusion is that exports lead to domestic cuts in military spending—provided suppliers expect positive security externalities. We use an innovative measure for external security based on UN voting records and regime type to test our model predictions on data covering both the Cold War as well as the post-Cold War period. Our results strongly suggest that democratic and non-democratic countries behave very differently. We find a clear substitution effect only for arms transfers by democratic states to other aligned democracies during the post-Cold War years. No such effect can be found for the Cold War era. There is no evidence for a substitution effect in either period for non-democratic suppliers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role and capabilities of major weapon system transferred between 1950 and 2010 in Great Britain. Topics discussed include empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set that provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits; economic motivations for arm transfers such as foreign military sales for cash, and the arms are free ; and effect of human rights on U.S. transfers.

This paper argues that the influence of R2P can be seen in many subtle, yet significant, ways throughout the Arms Trade Treaty, from the language used to the obligations imposed on States Parties. The Arms Trade Treaty indicates that R2P is influencing decision making and contributing to the protection of populations from atrocity crimes by obliging States Parties to explicitly consider the consequences of their arms transfers. In addition, the Arms Trade Treaty has increased our understanding of R2P by confirming that R2P involves a range of measures and includes restraint by States in refusing to transfer arms in situations where atrocity crimes are being committed, which may temper concerns about R2P being rebranded as assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few factors have a greater impact on the international distribution of power than states' ability to develop and produce sophisticated weaponry. The Israeli and Swedish cases demonstrate the constraints and opportunities for small states' defense-industrial bases in a globalizing world. The changing nature of arms production-including mounting weapons costs, globalized supply chains and the rise of multinational defense corporations-forced governments to reevaluate their defense-industrial policies. In each case, governments abandoned the pursuit of defense-industrial self-sufficiency and adopted export-dependent defenseindustrial policies. National strategies differ, however, with Sweden embracing foreign direct investment (FDI) to support incremental innovation and Israel encouraging companies to tap venture capital in pursuit of disruptive innovations. After a decade of sustained growth, the Israeli and Swedish defense-industrial bases today arguably suffer from structural weaknesses rooted in the adaptation policies each state adopted in prior decades and, more particularly, how each encouraged exports and drew on new forms of investment capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development, use and control of military technology are characterised by serious inequality amongst states. Thomas Nash discusses how the development of new weapons remains largely unchecked, despite International obligations that exist and examines how - in the context of lethal autonomous weapons systems - this trend could have particularly serious consequences. The author examines the inequality in the production, transfer and Impact of conventional weapons and how this translates into the limited representation of lower income countries at multi-national forums. Nash concludes by calling for equal participation of states, the involvement of civil society and the development of mechanisms to ensure the meaningful participation of those states who have been most affected by the weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under its Common Foreign and Security Policy the European Union has adopted a series of criteria to guide Member States' decisions when deciding whether to grant an export licence, to minimise the evil effects of arms sales. The article reviews the history and substance of these criteria, their place within the unique EU constitutional structure, their implementation, possible enforceability at national and Union level and practical effectiveness. It advocates strengthening the criteria with specified additions and concludes, broadly, that the relationship between the central authority and the Member States, which is particularly complex and fluid in relation to matters coming under the CFSP, combined with countervailing economic and political considerations, have limited the effectiveness of the criteria, though not neutered them entirely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the recipients’ perspective, arms transfers have, through the use of offsets, technology transfers, and industrial participation, become an opportunity to receive not only advanced weapons, but also technologies not otherwise available. How important are friendly relations for securing a military export order? To what extent do buyers demand advanced military or commercial technology and how are these demands accepted by the supplier? How does this influence smaller producers in relation to major producers? These questions are addressed by studying (a) the Joint Strike Fighter/F-35 by Lockheed Martin, USA, and the JAS-39 Gripen aircraft by Saab, Sweden, (b) the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition in India for 126 combat aircraft, and (c) the Indian offset policy. In the final section, some long-term consequences are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The DPRK now trades in arms with the Middle East. However, in the October War (1973) the DPRK first began military cooperation with the Middle East by sending troops and providing unrequited military support. This switch was made to win support within the UN from these Middle Eastern countries, and so to counteract the US presence in the UN. Failing this, the DPRK withdrew from the UN in 1976. The DPRK then turned to arms trading both to build up its foreign currency reserves and to help liberate developing countries from US control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision-makers in all fields are often faced with diverse and contradictory policy options. Increasingly, decisions seem to be based on ideology and institutional interests rather than an honest assessment of the merits of each option. In some cases, the fact that future outcomes are rarely knowable is even used to justify poor decision-making processes. This paper offers a critique of an established foreign policy tool that is still widely used by the great powers, the sale or grant of conventional arms, solely in terms of the assumptions that underlie the practice. Identifying these assumptions, including deeply held beliefs about the nature of arms, security and political influence, offers the most effective avenue for challenging the continued use of this foreign policy tool. By specifically identifying a series of related assumptions which collectively constitute the policy tool, it is possible to offer a powerful and systematic assessment of the validity of current practices that goes beyond any of the analyses that critics currently offer. While this approach is not necessarily ground-breaking, the current political discourse tends to focus far too much on competing and unverifiable predictions of the future consequences of policy choices, and would benefit from a more rigorous analysis of the cognitive bedrock on which all policy recommendations rest. Investigating an area deeply enough to understand the ideas that lie at the heart of the various tools of choice offers insight into, for example, which are more or less situational, which are overly reliant on specific ideologies and which are best supported by historical data. As such, a study that focuses on identifying and analyzing the assumptions underlying this prominent foreign policy tool has much to offer other areas of public policy analysis, as well as the arms control and foreign policy communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms transfers are financed through a variety of means, including cash payments, barter trade, military aid and credit. The fiscal and economic effects of these various forms of arms transfer financing differ. Data on the flow of arms transfers, as provided by international sources on the arms transfers tell little about actual economic burdens. During the Cold War, military aid and credit financing had larger shares in overall funding of arms imports, particularly by developing countries. After the end of the Cold War, levels of military aid are sharply reduced. Little is known about credit funding. However, measured by an opportunity cost method, it seems that indebtedness due to arms imports did not increase as much during the 1990s as it had during the 1980s. This is another indicator that the arms trade has become more commercial, with customers needing to be able to pay for the imports. Less financially well-off customers have become less important for the producers of new weaponry, and instead import old weapons, or small arms. The differentiation according to financial criteria among customers in the military market increased in the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]