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Republic of Korea (ROK) lobbying in the United States during the 1970s, which blew up into the Koreagate scandal, is a widely known but understudied episode in US-ROK relations. Utilizing declassified documents from the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this article argues President Park Chung Hee was pressured by Congressional condemnation of his human rights abuses and he sought to tame criticism through lobbying. To this end, ROK diplomats actively lobbied Congress in an attempt to guide the narrative of human rights hearings, temper legislation to cut military aid and force withdrawal of US troops from Korea, and silence critics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a significant response to the war in Ukraine on the part of the European Union (EU). Particularly noteworthy is its support for Kyiv via measures in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and especially in the defence field. It has provided substantial assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility (EPF); the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the EDIRPA common procurement instrument; and its military assistance mission (EUMAM Ukraine). These initiatives show how, in the wake of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the CSDP has made unprecedented, yet still only partial steps to allow the EU to progress towards moving beyond its traditional status as a small power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a negotiated decolonisation and a steadfast friendship between Félix Houphouët-Boigny and General Charles de Gaulle, Côte d'Ivoire, which had become independent, maintained excellent relations with France, its former colonial power. These close relations allowed it to benefit, within the framework of the Franco-Ivorian cooperation agreements, from French military assistance in setting up its armed forces. With this help, the Ivorian Army and Gendarmerie were thus taking their first steps under France's military leadership. But divergences appeared at certain levels and the question of extra-military tasks or, more precisely, the importance granted to them in the missions of the Ivorian Armed Forces was the subject of heated debates between the two partners. The crux of the issue was the establishment and development of the Ivorian Civic Service, for which Abidjan had turned to Israel in the belief that this would not jeopardise French influence in the Ivorian defence establishment. This article revisits this issue by highlighting the intricacies and challenges in the creation of the Ivorian Civic Service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Cold War tensions rose, Soviet aid was offered to the nascent Somali government in pursuit of broader geopolitical machinations that were seen to supersede Somali interests, laying the groundwork for a decades-long mismatch between local intentions and Cold War superpower objectives in the Horn of Africa. Vast quantities of materiel and training were provided to Somalia from 1960 onwards, and by 1976 Somalia boasted a 22,000-man army and was the fourth most heavily armed nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, largely due to Soviet largesse. One year later, the Soviets were expelled and the assistance ceased, having left Somalia with an unsustainable, corrupt, and repressive security structure as a direct result of high levels of foreign assistance that were not well coordinated with host nation sustainment capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rulers of Byzantium and England are well known for their centralized nature and their active approach to diplomacy. Both powers often utilized treaties to bolster their military forces, and to undermine those of their foes. Of course, allegiance was not always clear-cut, with many powers having complex relations with their neighbours and the treaties catering to the conflicting obligations of those involved. This article focuses on the treaties of two of the most bureaucratic powers of the medieval world who have comparable treaty corpuses, utilizing the theme of military service to show that treaties were primarily pragmatic documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain has long provided military assistance to help develop and support the local armed forces of its dominions, colonies and other parts of its Empire. This was not done out of benevolence but as part of Britain's efforts to encourage its partners to be responsible for their own security. This article describes an unusual case of such assistance, which was provided to help establish Abu Dhabi's air force in the 1967–1971 period. The Abu Dhabi ruler's decision to only engage contract officers, rather than seconded officers, had a profound effect on the shape of the military assistance provided by Britain. Unlike most training, advising, assisting and mentoring missions, Britain provided no training nor mentoring, and only limited advice. Its greatest contribution was assistance with the recruitment for Abu Dhabi of both soon-to-retire and already retired British officers. These findings have relevance for current British doctrine on military assistance, notably in relation to the more effective use of contract officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Reflexión Politica is the property of Universidad Autonoma de Bucaramanga, UNAB and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of the College Of Basic Education is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

George II Rákóczi entered the Polish- Swedish conflict, which began in 1655, in January 1657 at the request of the Swedes. In return for military assistance in Transylvania, he wanted the Polish royal title, the seats of the Polish kings, Krakow and Warsaw, and the rich salt mines. In return, he offered the King of Sweden not only the armed forces of his own principality, but the alliance of the Cossack hetman Khmelnytsky and the arms of the Cossacks, as well as his diplomatic network, the favours of Turkish Porte and the Crimean Tatar Khan. Rákóczi set out with an army of 18,000 men, and was initially successful, but was eventually defeated. On 22 July 1657, George II Rákóczi asked for peace at Czarny Ostrów from the commanders of the Polish army pursuing him. The Poles imposed more than humiliating conditions: in addition to the justifiable political and military conditions, Rákóczi was obliged to pay 1,200,000 Polish gold pieces as military compensation. A large part of the Transylvanian army was captured by the Crimean Tatars, and the return of the prince to Transylvania was greeted by a nationwide uproar. The Porte ordered his dismissal, and first Francisc Rhédey and then Ákos Barcsay were appointed in his place. Rákóczi did not want to resign but chose armed resistance against the Turkish-Tatar armies invading Transylvania. The years 1657-1658 marked the beginning of a period of power crisis, which would not end until 1660, resulting in severe devastation and territorial loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the prospect of transforming the Philippine-U.S. alliance into a security partnership. In the past, the Philippines doubted the U.S.'s often-repeated commitment to assist its ally because the 1951 Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) merely stipulated consultation rather than an automatic armed response in case of an armed conflict. In mid-2011, the Aquino Administration asked for an unequivocal U.S. guarantee to defend the Philippines and its naval/air units deployed in the Spratlys. The Duterte Administration, however, has expressed its uncertainty over America's willingness to back the Philippines militarily in any confrontation with China over the disputed maritime territory. Early this year, President Rodrigo Duterte commented that an armed clash in the South China Sea would crush the Philippines because the involvement of American forces would make the conflict spiral out of control. This development, along with his decision to abrogate the 1997 Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), has generated a crisis in the alliance. To avert any break-down in their overall security relations, the two allies can explore the possibility of downgrading their alliance to a security partnership. In conclusion, the article argues that should the Philippines consider this option, it must take into account the following: the consequence of losing the deterrence effect of a defence treaty with the world's most powerful nation; the impact on Philippine defence spending; on the ongoing Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP's) modernisation program; and whether or not the Filipino nation will support this move. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2017, the Egyptian armed forces conducted airstrikes against non-State targets in the neighbouring State of Libya in response to a series of attacks perpetrated against groups of Coptic Christians on Egyptian territory, killings later claimed by the self-styled Islamic State. In justifying its use of armed force, resort to which is generally impermissible in international law, Egypt purports to rely upon two exceptions to this general rule, namely: (i) authorisation on the part of the United Nations Security Council; and (ii) self-defence, while also invoking the doctrine of military assistance on request (or intervention by invitation). This article tests the legality of Egypt's airstrikes—which have yet to be subjected to scholarly attention—in light of the three foregoing justifications. In so doing, the article evaluates the implications of this use of force for the jus ad bellum, particularly the law regulating resort to force by way of response to an armed attack for which not another State, but a non-State actor, is responsible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und Vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung is the property of Leipziger Universitaetsverlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Training other countries' armed forces is a go-to foreign policy tool for the United States and other states. A growing literature explores the effects of military training, but researchers lack detailed data on training activities. To assess the origins and consequences of military training, as well as changing patterns over time, this project provides a new, global dataset of US foreign military training. This article describes the scope of the data along with the variables collected, coding procedures, and spatial and temporal patterns. We demonstrate the added value of the data in their much greater coverage of training activities, showing differences from both existing datasets and aggregate foreign military aid data. Reanalyzing prior research findings linking US foreign military training to the risk of coups d'état in recipient states, we find that this effect is limited to a single US program representing a small fraction of overall US training activities. The data show comprehensively how the United States attempts to influence partner military forces in a wide variety of ways and suggest new avenues of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines key aspects of security relations in the framework of the Canada-Ukraine dialogue in 2014-2017. With the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict in 2014, Ukraine has significantly deepened its security policy and military-technical cooperation with a number of leading countries in the world, including Canada. Therefore, since 2014, the Government of Canada has repeatedly provided material assistance to the Ukrainian army: ammunition, bulletproof vests, helmets, individual diets and first aid kits, night vision devices, walkie-talkies, drones, armored vehicles, ambulances, mobile hospitals and others. Moreover, Ottawa is actively assisting Ukraine in reforming its Armed Forces and achieving their compatibility with NATO forces. To this end, the Government of Canada has extended for another two years the UNIFIER military training mission, which provided for the ongoing training of Ukrainian soldiers and officers by Canadian instructors until 2019. As part of the previous UNIFIER operation (2015-2017), Canadian instructors conducted 140 training courses for more than 5,580 Ukrainian servicemen. Despite the Kremlin’s considerable efforts to quarrel with Ukraine and its South Atlantic allies, Canada remains Ukraine’s strategic partner in both the security and economic and socio-political dimensions. The aim of the study is to analyze the features and vectors of cooperation between Canada and Ukraine in the security field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Il Diritto Dell'unione Europea is the property of Giappichelli Editore srl and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Southern Somalia has attracted substantial military aid and assistance for decades. As the state disintegrated in the late 1980s, clan dynamics became more critical, warlords emerged, and power bases shifted. Since 2008, the number of foreign military forces and advisors (including private military contractors) has substantially increased, as has the creation of numerous Somali security units. Such actions are symptomatic of broader trends concerning multilateral attempts to rebuild security forces in fractious states, where security assistance activities lack unity or common national interests. This has resulted in various Somali military forces with different loyalties (domestic and international), capabilities, and priorities in each Federal Member State (FMS). Uneven foreign military training programs in the context of survival politics fuels the fragmentation of various security forces. Locally appropriate military forces in each FMS potentially appear to be more effective at resisting Al-Shabaab. However, locally appropriate military forces contribute to further fragmentation, as security donors bypass the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to directly assist these localized forces. This accelerates devolution of military forces outside of FGS control. These assessments are based on fieldwork and interviews with security officials in East Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on innovative conceptual definitions to capture the various terms and ideas that abound concerning the delivery of military assistance, aid, and training in fragile states, often subsumed under the term security force assistance (SFA). It highlights different Kurdish militias and units within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to demonstrate inherent problems with any SFA program. We conduct a conceptual, theoretical, and empirical analysis to evaluate variations, concluding that in these contexts the definition of success and military effectiveness is contextual, often deviating from what the providers, such as the U.S. and other nations, may desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, military assistance in southern Somalia focused on building up a central state army. This reflects standard patterns of Western assistance worldwide. Yet the nature of Somali society and clan, greatly affected by the winnowing process of more than 30 years of conflict, means that most sub-clan groupings are more militarily effective than centralised forces deployed to unfamiliar areas. The centralised Somali National Army remains riven by clan itself, thoroughly politicised, and ineffective (with the exception of the Danab special forces). Based on fieldwork and interviews with military personnel who work in Somalia, Colin D Robinson and Jahara Matisek argue that these locally appropriate forces deserve assistance, albeit with some caveats, in the continuing struggle against Al-Shabaab.◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hileya: Scientific Bulletin / Gileya is the property of GILEYA Publishing and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article discusses the myths surrounding Russia's A2/AD capabilities and the risks associated with the current counter A2/AD efforts among NATO countries. It offers recommendations for investing in a stronger defense of the Baltic states and Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issue regarding the desirability of dual preparedness which refers to an ability to engage limited wars without superbomb and its ability to retaliate. This issue began due to the conflict regarding the preference for supreme concentration deterrent and strategic bombers and missiles at the other forces expense. In addition, the issue is affected by the question about the availability of military force total resources and the weakening of supreme deterrent through a diversion of funds to military capabilities. Furthermore, it is still believed that dual preparedness is still more expensive since total military budgets, added bombers and missiles are suffering disadvantages.

Despite its reputation for global democracy promotion, the United States has developed substantial long-term military partnerships with several African countries that have less than stellar human rights records. While in some instances the United States has chosen to rebuke countries for human rights abuses, it has also elected to continue security partnerships with others in the face of similarly credible accusations. To explain this seeming inconsistency, this article analyzes U.S. security partnerships with six African countries: Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya, finding that a combination of intensity of interest and magnitude of the violation explains when the United States chooses to censure those countries, when it does not, and the intensity of the rebuke. Countries where the United States has significant interest are most often exempted from censure. The comparative weight of interests to values determines the U.S. response to norm violations. Constructivist principal-agent theory explains this finding in terms of a struggle within the U.S. security establishment in which those who believe offending African militaries can be improved through continuous engagement and training wield more influence in security assistance policy than those who assert that the United States should disengage from those militaries and sanction them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mandatory Palestine’s military landscape was shaped during World War II in accordance with British imperial interests. After the 1948 Arab‒Israeli war, military spatial patterns and landscapes were transformed to conform to Israel’s national interests and needs. This article deals with the transformation of the British military spatial heritage following the takeover of former British bases by the Israeli armed forces and civil institutions and its impact on the organisation and building of both the Israeli military system and the spatial, social and cultural structures of the evolving Israeli society during the 1950s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exchange of ideas, views and mutual benefit from the experience o f the traditions that prevailed in Central Europe in the Jagiellonian era also embraced the military area. Similarly, today the European Union, and especially NATO, unknowingly still refer to the Jagiellonian idea. It is certainly done by Poland, actively involved in the process of building a security and democracy zone in Central Europe. Actions called Military Assistance, which will be discussed in this article, are an important element o f these activities in the area of security [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]