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In this study, we explore gendered patterns of voting, and whether such patterns appear only after a critical mass of female justices is reached by analyzing the votes of justices in the Supreme Court of Canada. We employ a logistic regression model of the differences in the voting behavior of male versus female justices, using the universe of Supreme Court votes from 1982 through 2007. Our analysis supports the conclusion that women vote more liberally on civil rights, equality, and private economic cases, and more conservatively on criminal cases. However, we find no evidence that indicates a need for a critical mass of women justices for them to vote their sincere preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this analysis is whether a strategic perspective provides a useful approach that enhances an understanding of broad patterns of judicial decision making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The authors examine whether it is reasonable in the majority of cases for appeals court judges to modify their behavior when necessary to avoid reversal by the Supreme Court. This assessment utilizes statistical analyses and interviews from twenty-eight judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Based on a three-part argument, the authors conclude that a strategic perspective is not helpful in understanding the decision calculus of appeals court judges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study seeks to add to the current understanding of the political nature of the Supreme Court of Canada. We analyze a data set consisting of all nonunanimous published Supreme Court decisions for the period 1949 to 2000. A prior study by Tate and Sittiwong (1989) suggested a model of judge attributes for the period 1949 to 1985. We build on that analysis by extending the time period to 2000, which allows the impact of gender also to be assessed. We find that since the Court gained substantial docket control, the types of cases the Court hears has changed from the period studied by Tate and Sittiwong. In the more recent period, civil rights and liberties cases are much more substantial in number. We conclude some of the variables in the Tate and Sittiwong study may be time bound and we suggest a new model of attitudinal voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the effects of judge gender on decision making in state supreme courts in the United States. A variety of reasons have been offered to explain why female judges might appear to be more liberal than male, judges. First, the differences may be an artifact of the federal system: women may only be selected from liberal states and in those states, judges of both genders may tend to be liberal. Alternatively, the gender-specific socialization of judges may incline female judges to have more liberal attitudes than male judges. A third, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, possibility is that judicial selection process is different for males and females under consideration for the bench in ways that increase the likelihood that female judges will have liberal values. The results from studies of gender differences in the judiciary have been inconsistent in many ways. Some of the earliest analyses of the decision making of women judges on equality and women's rights issues produced mixed results. It is found that although women judges universally supported the women's position in women's issues, they were bipolar on criminal rights and economic liberties.

This investigation examines the success of various types of litigants appearing before the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1925 to 1988. The analysis parallels the earlier studies by Songer and Sheehan (1992) and Wheeler et al. (1987) that applied the core concepts introduced by Galanter's groundbreaking analysis of why the "haves" come out ahead to study litigant success on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and state courts of last resort. The findings suggest that repeat player litigants with substantial organizational strength ("haves") are much more likely to win in the federal courts of appeals than one-shot litigants with fewer resources. The "haves" win more frequently in published decisions, even after controls are introduced for the ideological makeup of the panel. The advantage in appellate litigation enjoyed by repeat player "haves" is remarkably consistent over time. In particular, the U.S. government has compiled an impressive record in these courts by dominating opposing litigants over the 64-year period of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies the effectiveness of court appeals' ability to ensure that administrative agencies exercise their discretion with deference to the rule of law. Relationship between agency success and political considerations; Judges' policy preferences as a factor in judicial oversight of the administrative agencies.

Presents a study which examined the response of the United States Courts of Appeals to changes in the labor and antitrust policies announced by the Supreme Court between 1950 and 1977. Review of related studies; Data and methods; Findings and discussions.

Explores the success of amici curiae appeals in state supreme court cases. Participation of interest groups on the judicial process; Assessment of correlation between amici support and litigant success; Positive nature of such correlation.

Presents findings of a study indicating that amicus curiae briefs filed in Supreme Court cases does not increase the chance of success of the litigants. Proliferation of amicus curiae briefs filed in supreme court cases; Success of interest groups in filing the briefs; Inexistence of a pattern suggesting the efficacy of the briefs in influencing court decisions.

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state “ownership” of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine factors that influence appellate supervision in the lower tiers of the federal judicial hierarchy. Drawing on the insights of agency theory, we develop a framework to assess the determinants of circuit panel decisions to affirm or reverse federal district court rulings. Our analysis of U.S. Courts of Appeals' published civil rights decisions over a 29-year period (1971–1999) offers support for several hypothesized relationships. As expected, the outcome of appellate review varied with the level of agreement between the preferences of the circuit (as principal) and the policy position of the trial court (as agent). In addition, we found that circuits were more likely to affirm trial court decisions that were contrary to the preferences of the federal district court judge, suggesting that circuit judges may rely on ideological signals when evaluating appeals before them. We also hypothesized that the monitoring activities of circuits would be influenced by individual circuits' relationship with their principal, the Supreme Court. Consistent with these expectations, panels were more likely to reverse district court rulings that were incongruous with the policy predisposition of the High Court. In addition, as Supreme Court scrutiny of a circuit increased, the likelihood of a circuit panel subsequently reversing a district court also increased. Although further inquiry is necessary to clarify the interpretation of this result, the finding does suggest that district courts are more likely to engage in decision making that deviates from circuit preferences when that circuit faces more intense supervision from the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]