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The question of who wins and loses in appellate courts may be the most important question we seek to answer as judicial scholars. In fact, "Who gets what?" has traditionally been viewed as the central question in the study of politics generally. Therefore, understanding who wins in the courts is an essential component of a full appreciation of "the authoritative allocation of values" in society (Easton 1953). In this paper we examine the relationship between the status of litigants, especially the comparison of repeat player "haves" (RP) to one-shotters (OS) who are usually "have-nots," and their rates of success in top appellate courts in the common law world. A number of prior studies employing what is generally referred to as "party capability theory" have examined how the resources and litigation experience of litigants affect their chances for success. Using data from the highest courts of appeals across six countries we explore winners and losers in a comparative context. The results indicate that there is greater variation in who wins and who loses than party capability theory would suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the contingent attitudinal model, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Using data from the Judge Level State Supreme Court Database, we analyze the votes of individual judges in 1995 to determine whether their behavior is constrained by legislation. Our results indicate that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues. These results suggest a theoretically important way of thinking about judicial behavior. Rather than conceptualizing the legal model and the attitudinal model as competitors, the empirical evidence suggests that legal influences and ideological influences also work in tandem in among state supreme courts. These judges are influenced by the contingent attitudinal model and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision-making at the trial level? Stated another way, are district court judges constrained by the appeals courts, according to the tenets of principal agency theory? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using an original dataset of foreign policy cases from 1946-2000 and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework to analyze a formal model, I discover that the District Courts are not constrained by the anticipated responses of the Appeals Courts. Whether one examines District Courts in isolation from other tribunals or within a hierarchical structure, conclusions regarding ideological voting remain consistent: Democratic judges are more likely to rule in favor of civil liberties than their Republican colleagues. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary does not appear to be a significant constraint to the District Courts as it seemingly is for the Courts of Appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the literature on U.S. foreign policy and judicial decision making by focusing on the role of the federal appellate courts since World War II. Specifically, the paper addresses the question whether appeals court judges are defenders of civil liberties or champions of national security. Using an original dataset of 300 cases randomly selected from 1946-2000 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I test whether specific institutional characteristics, legal challenges or case issues significantly affect whether appellate judges rule in favor of federal government interests or civil liberties claims. The empirical results indicate that for a majority of cases appellate judges support the interests of the federal government to the detriment of civil liberties. However, certain institutional characteristics will induce the courts of appeals to curtail federal interests. If Democratic judges dominate an appellate panel or if the lower courts ruled in favor of civil liberties, then the appeals courts will render decisions against the interests of the federal government. However, if judges must resolve a threshold issue or contend with a national security defense then the ruling will most likely favor federal interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing theoretical debate within the literature concerning the extent to which lower court judges anticipate how their decisions might be reviewed by the Supreme Court on appeal. Beginning with Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994), and relying primarily on a principal-agent framework, scholars have produced conflicting evidence on whether the institutional structure of the judiciary impacts the decision-making process of lower court judges. We argue that one of the reasons for the theoretical disagreement is that previous analyses do not directly test whether lower court judges engage in strategic behavior. Our paper engages this discussion through the empirical test of a formal model depicting the relationship between the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court in a variety of issue areas. Using a dataset of appellate cases (from 1953 to 2002) that have been reviewed by the Supreme Court, plus a random sample of appellate cases that were not reviewed, we argue that the current literature on judicial hierarchies is limited because scholars have not modeled specifically the potential strategic interdependence between court levels. Our analysis borrows a statistical model from the IR literature on strategic anticipation and adapts it to the judicial hierarchy to demonstrate the impact of potential Supreme Court responses on the decision calculus of appellate judges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically tests a formal model of strategic interaction between judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]