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Strategic accounts of judges usually consider various aspects of dispensation of cases. We look beyond these traditional areas of study in judicial politics to examine whether state supreme court justices render strategic retirement decisions. More specifically, we posit a dual theory of strategic retirements conditioned upon the institutional arrangements in which elected and appointed justices make retirement decisions. Employing an event history framework that analyzes the duration of state supreme court justices' tenure and reason for departing the bench in the several selection and retention systems from 1980 to 2005, we show that elected and appointed justices engage in strategic retirement behavior but do so as a function of the diverse environments in which they operate. Our study implicates a number of theoretical, empirical, and normative issues regarding the selection and retention of state supreme court justices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The manner in which agenda change occurs demonstrates how institutional arrangements influence agenda priorities in the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals. A neo-institutional theoretic perspective is employed to examine the dynamics of agenda formation in these courts. The article finds that the Supreme Court's agenda choices influence the decisions of litigants, interest groups, and lawyers to appeal certain cases to the Courts of Appeals. While the Supreme Court's agenda primarily is influenced by internal factors, it is constrained by agenda changes in the appeals courts. Critically, it is shown that these federal appellate courts exist within an endogenous system with respect to agenda formation, as both courts respond to agenda changes made in the other over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have been intrigued by the abrupt change in the rate of nonconsensual opinions that the Supreme Court has published over time, which substantially increased beginning with the battles concerning the court's New Deal transition in the 1930s. Notwithstanding, none of the prior studies on this topic has made any link, whether theoretical or empirical, between the Supreme Court's issuance of these special opinions and the justices’ policy preferences. We utilize fractional cointegration to examine the relationship between consensus, agendas, and decisionmaking on the Supreme Court. We find that there is a systematic interrelation between the justices’ policy preferences and their issuance of nonconsensual opinions that is dependent upon the policy agenda before the court. In turn, this connection influences the court's policy outcomes, demonstrating that the justices’ behavior regarding nonconsensual opinion writing is a classic example of judicial policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do newly appointed justices experience acclimation effects upon their ascent to the Supreme Court? We contend that acclimation is a process, as justices' conformation to the doctrine of stare decisis is partly a function of tenure length. We find that precedent conformance is inversely related to tenure, with newcomers following legal precedents at rates significantly greater than more tenured colleagues; however, justices slowly but surely surrender to relatively unfettered judicial power at the Supreme Court, as attitudes increasingly dominate decisionmaking. While votes adhering to precedent are more prevalent for newcomers, all justices are overwhelmingly influenced by their own ideologies, confirming the inability of the legal model to influence or explain this aspect of judicial behavior. Our results also indicate that the proclivity of prior research to specify an express period of acclimation may be flawed. Instead, acclimation is a dynamic process, ever evolving over justices' entire duration of service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]