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Intermediated voluntary disclosure is an emerging institution that addresses investor and other stakeholder demand for credible information on corporate policies and performance along dimensions of societal interest. Building upon substantial literatures on proprietary corporate voluntary disclosure, research has begun to rigorously document the antecedents and outcomes of intermediated disclosure. However, theory has remained largely silent on a new category of perverse incentives driving firm engagement with intermediated disclosure programs. Moreover, research has not definitively addressed the degree to which intermediated disclosures are verifiable or truthful and the associated significance for long-term institutional credibility. This study uses forensic analysis of detailed corporate disclosures to one prominent intermediary to develop and identify novel constructs that establish evidence of misleading disclosures. Findings demonstrate that firms routinely manipulate intermediary ratings methods to obtain endorsement, undermining institutional and societal goals. Results also identify several factors that may improve intermediary and stakeholder ability to differentiate substantive disclosures from symbolic. This study contributes to our understanding of firm incentives and strategies for engagement in voluntary institutions and the ability of those institutions to improve governance. It also identifies new opportunities for theoretical and empirical research and offers guidance for improved oversight of voluntary corporate disclosure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Voluntary environmental programs offer opportunities for policy-makers, corporate stakeholders, and firms themselves to improve environmental outcomes valued by the public without resorting to regulatory mandates. Prior research has addressed a range of antecedents for a broad array of voluntary programs, enhancing knowledge of how stakeholders engage firms on substantive issues of public importance, and clarifying how firms leverage program participation to enhance firm outcomes. However, adoption of programs by firms is dynamic, and stagnant or declining participation rates may threaten program longevity when firms do not realize the net benefits expected at time of adoption. While successful voluntary programs are often mutually beneficial for firms and stakeholders, we find that prior literature has not sufficiently addressed the factors that compel firms to drop out. This study uses survival analysis to determine the drivers of firm disengagement from a prominent voluntary environmental program. Findings indicate that firm transparency is a powerful commitment device driving sustained firm participation, and that evaluative ratings of the quality of participation motivates top performers in high-impact industries to maintain adoption. Our study contributes to theory on stakeholder management and voluntary program participation, while offering guidance on institutional design of programs for long-term performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding how information transparency influences stakeholder perceptions is an increasingly important topic for firms that face pressure to self-report on their social responsibilities. As external constituencies other than shareholders become an increasingly important mechanism for social control, understanding the way that stakeholders attribute motivations behind information disclosure will help firms to not only improve financial performance, but also to mitigate reputational reputations. Drawing on attribution and stakeholder theories, we develop theoretical rationale for why different stakeholder groups make heterogeneous attributions over different characteristics of corporate transparency, affecting not only the firm's market value, but also their reputation. Using datasets on corporate environmental disclosures (CDP) and performance (ASSET4), we find that not only do various stakeholders evaluate information disclosure differently, but stakeholder groups also respond differently to distinct characteristics of transparency. Furthermore, we show that these stakeholder responses are often nonlinear in nature, suggesting that transparency strategies in stakeholder management are more nuanced than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]