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This article discusses why EU economic (competition and internal market) law is hospitable to and can be enriched by socio-legal and critical insights about the instability of the economic/non-economic distinction, the unavoidable plurality of market arrangements as shaped by legal regulation, as well as the distributive effects of the said arrangements. The proneness of EU economic law to critical insights can be ascribed to: its subject matter, as law in this area maps upon everyday market experiences; the casuistic development of EU law; the wide scope of EU economic law, which interferes with arrangements understood as non-economic; the non-outcome-determinative character of EU law. Through discussion of two CJEU decisions - a competition decision dealing with selective distribution (Coty) and an internal market decision on the regulation of AirBnb (Cali Apartments) - I illustrate how more explicit deployments of socio-legal and critical approaches can enrich EU economic law and specifically its teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional, price-focused antitrust tools for assessing dominance under Article 102 TFEU and merger control are challenged by the business models and features of multisided digital platforms. This article demonstrates the importance of data in digital markets and how data enable the utilization of network effects and economies of scale in a manner that challenges the traditional dominance evaluation. Based on this, the article systematizes the solutions to the challenges caused by decreased accuracy of price-based tools through an analysis of various approaches to the issue. It is argued that potential competition should be emphasized more strongly throughout the dominance assessment and that different approaches can be chosen based on the case at hand. Thus the article contributes to the development of the dominance analysis for digital markets with a thorough overview of possible solutions and ties it to the proposed renewal of the Market Definition Notice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Super League case has been widely discussed by EU regulators, football associations, clubs, players, supporters and legal practitioners. This article intends to explore the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice regarding the intervention of EU competition law in football governance in this case. This article accordingly analyses the interpretation of the rules and exemptions stipulated in Articles 101 (1) and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and gives comments on the antitrust assessment by the Court of Justice regarding the common rules of prior approval and sanctions. It follows that the Court of Justice stressed the importance of transparent, objective and non-discriminatory procedures in the rule-making of football associations and saw this as a significant condition for the enforcement of EU competition law and antitrust exemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the right to access one's file in competition proceedings, as part of the right to fair trial provided by European legal instruments, in relation to limitations of this access imposed by competition legislation in the European Union (EU) and Western Balkan (WB) countries. Pursuant to their aspirations to become Member States in the EU, they must align their legislation with the EU's Acquis while ensuring the protection of rights, as established by the ECHR. The methodology used to answer the research question combines desk review and two-level comparative study methodologies. The desk review is applied in this paper to answer the research question, focusing on a careful examination of the EU legal framework, while comparative approach, seeks to identify similarities and differences in the provisions related to the right to access the competition file in the EU, Albania, and other WB countries such as Kosovo, North Macedonia and Montenegro. Additionally, the study presents the interpretations of the right to access the file, as part of the administrative and/or trial proceedings in the case law of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights from a human rights perspective. The findings of this study indicate that the right to access the file is restricted by public enforcement of competition law, only in specific cases where limitation pursues a legitimate aim, is proportionate and does not jeopardise the party's situation. The European human rights instruments mandate that the EU institutions, Member States and Candidate Member States must carefully regulate the clash between human rights and competition law. The WB countries have adopted the EU standards regulating access to the competition file. However, each jurisdiction has its own specifications, challenges and domestic factors shaping the national rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disagreement abounds on what exactly constitutes an 'abuse' within article 102 TFEU, EU competition law's prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position. This situation is highly undesirable, given the important role this prohibition is expected to play in alleviating concerns about substantial market power and its use in important sectors, typified by actions against 'Big Tech'. This article responds to this problem by analysing and synthesising the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its evolution to establish the constituent elements of an exclusionary 'abuse'. The article corrects crucial legal misconceptions, including the putative dichotomy between violations 'by object' and 'by effect'; the assumed disparate legal tests for pricing and non-pricing conduct; and the lost distinction between the 'as efficient competitor test' and the 'as efficient competitor standard'. This critical inquiry allows one to draw concrete predictions on the future development of this challenging, yet vital, area of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combining historical, conceptual, and empirical approaches, this article studies one of the most fundamental, yet underexplored, questions surrounding Regulation 1/2003: What limits European Union (EU) competition law places on the adoption and application of national competition and other laws? The relationship between EU competition and national laws was supposedly settled with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. There are two exceptions to the rule in Article 3(1), under which national competition authorities and courts must apply EU competition law when applying their national competition laws, with primacy for EU provisions: Article 3(2) leaves room for 'stricter' national competition rules on unilateral conduct, and Article 3(3) for national rules pursuing a 'predominantly different objective'. The solution offered by Article 3 is not workable. Through a historical study of the political discussions preceding Article 3's adoption, a conceptual analysis of potential interpretations, and a systematic content analysis of French and German practice, this article reveals the lack of a dividing line between the notions of national competition laws and other laws. It calls for reform of Article 3 to ensure that conduct that should be governed by EU law is not assessed under national rules and standards that differ from one Member State to another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should companies that have been fined for EU antitrust infringements be allowed to recover such fines from their (former) directors or employees? On the basis of an analysis of the EU Treaty provisions, legislation and case law on antitrust fines, as well as of the economic nature of antitrust infringements and the economic rationale of fines on undertakings/companies, this paper argues that it would appear contrary to EU law to allow undertakings/companies that have been fined by the European Commission or by a national competition authority(NCA) for infringements of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU to recover such fines from the companies’ (former) directors or employees, as such recovery would significantly impair the full effectiveness of those fines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1989, the Court of Justice of the European Union has recognised a privilege against self-incrimination for undertakings subject to public enforcement procedures on the basis of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. That privilege forms part of the fundamental rights of the defence. Over time, the privilege has been read into Article 6 ECHR and has gained ground in other domains of EU law as well. Against that background, the question arises as to whether the CJEU's original case law in the field of EU competition law needs to be updated. This paper revisits that case law by comparing it with developments in the context of the ECHR and in other domains of EU law. It argues that, in light of those developments, a case law update may indeed prove necessary. However, such an update alone would not sufficiently address the practical difficulties currently surrounding the application of the privilege in practice. For that, more coordinated legislative action would be warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The CK Telecoms judgement shed the light on the difficulties to apprehend unilateral effects, aka insufficient individual rivalry, in the context of a merger. This paper examines the overall European competition law framework applicable to these effects. After underlining the difficulties related to their apprehension by the competition authorities, the adequacy of the solely ex ante-based European competition regime will be assessed as well as the use of the New Competition Tool as an option to solve the identified drawbacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the way in which the large football clubs are increasing their dominance, and whether this is compatible with EU competition law. Various insights from the economic and legal literature have been combined to give a new interpretation of EU competition law. The number of clubs with a realistic chance of winning important prizes has declined in many national markets. As a result, the economic competition has diminished and prices have increased to the detriment of welfare. This development has been reinforced by the joint actions of the top European clubs, such as threatening to start a Super League. Consequently, UEFA has implemented policies that have been particularly helpful for the top clubs. But, the clubs' actions are incompatible with EU competition law, as is the actual creation of a European Super League. If the EU were to enforce the law, the power of the big clubs would be reduced, and UEFA's policies could be based more on the old democratic principles, again. This would lead to more sporting successes for small clubs and to lower prices for the fans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Google Saga, the General Court (GC) has confirmed the Commission's decisions in Google Shopping and Google Android and dealt a severe blow to Google's strategy, which was aimed at strengthening its market power throughout its ecosystem. Although in both cases, Google was essentially favouring its own services in adjacent markets to the detriment of competitors, the Commission and the GC based their decisions on different theories of harm. In Google Shopping, the GC considered Google's conduct abusive pursuant to a novel category of abuse prohibiting self-preferencing conduct. In Google Android, instead, Google was held to have engaged in abusive forms of tying. Interestingly, in both cases Google's conduct resembles instances of constructive refusal to give access to an input, which require evidence that the input is indispensable in order to be considered abusive. However, the Commission managed to circumvent the application of the high threshold posed by the indispensability criterion. This might have the effect of inappropriately lowering the standard of proof in cases of refusal to access, paving the way for an over-enforcement of competition rules in digital markets. This article is aimed at evaluating the potential impact that the Google judgments may have on the scope of application of the indispensability requirement, and whether there is still life for the latter after the Google Saga. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) in the European Union assumes that all large "core platform service" providers pose similar threats to competition and to fairness and thus imposes identical obligations on all of them. The alternative "New Competition Tool," that would have allowed the European Commission (EC) to conduct fact-intensive investigations of markets to design bespoke remedies, has been largely abandoned. The approach adopted contradicts the basic principle that competition policy should be concerned with evidence of adverse effects. The proponents of the adopted form of the DMA argue that ex ante action is required to forestall irreversible harm to competition, but that same logic also implies assessing the risk of harm from excessive regulation—and the DMA contains no mechanism to do so. Given the different underlying economics of different kinds of platform services, including the way some support digital ecosystems involving many firms, a different approach is needed. The EC missed the opportunity to introduce a market investigation tool. The rigid and static framework of the DMA seems like the wrong solution, given the economics of digital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EU competition law potentially has a role to play in the pursuit of sustainability goals and the fight against climate change. The need to interpret the EU competition law provisions in a manner consistent with the sustainability objectives that the EU is committed to - the sustainable development goals (SDGs), and the EU Green Deal and derived policies - is emphasised in this article. While agreements between competitors are generally prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, cooperation agreements among market actors pursuing sustainability objectives (sustainability agreements) might in certain situations fall under the cartel exception of Article 101(3) TFEU. In recent years, there have been numerous calls to clarify conditions under which sustainability agreements can be allowed under EU competition law, especially under Article 101(3) TFEU, and there is a heated debate among academics, national competition authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission. After questioning whether the objectives and measures of the agreements are being properly assessed with the current trends (for example, with the willingness-to-pay method), this article will add to the debate another possibility involving a broad interpretation of Article 101(3) TFEU under which the pursuit of sustainability agreements will be facilitated. Such a possibility will largely depend on the objectives of the agreements themselves and may allow a proper consideration of the objectives of a sustainability agreement for certain cases, by focusing on agreements that pursue pre-established objectives derived from international or national standards or concrete policy objectives that are not previously mandatory for the companies involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'competition' is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU's very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations. The paper first reviews the history of the notion in both common-usage language and in legal-economic thinking. It exposes the emergence of three parallel, partly conflicting, imaginaries influencing the notion in EU competition law: Keynesian, ordoliberal, and neoliberal. After demonstrating that no single imaginary was adopted by EU primary, secondary, or soft laws, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to the Commission's annual reports on competition (1971-2020) in search for the meaning of competition. The paper reveals that the notion of competition had acquired one meaning in 'hard' contexts of the enforcement (scope of the prohibition of competition; exceptions or justifications for allowing otherwise anti-competitive behaviour), and another meaning in 'softer' contexts (mandates of the competition rules, and to a lesser extent - selection of enforcement priorities). While the 'hard' contexts have experienced a transformation from Keynesian and ordoliberal imaginary of competition to a neoliberal notion; the 'soft' contexts still invoke a broader notion reflecting influences from all three theories. Finally, the paper argues that although the lack of a clear definition for competition undoubtedly raises challenges relating to the rule of law, legal certainty, and uniformity, its ambiguity also serves as a powerful tool in safeguarding the durability and legitimacy of competition as an economic imaginary. It allows tailoring the notion of competition to changing legal, economic, and social conditions without a Treaty amendment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Professor Peter Whelan has published a comprehensive study on parental liability in EU competition law, specifically addressing the controversial proposition that parent entities should be held accountable for infringements committed by their subsidiaries. The book examines the legitimacy of parental liability from a normative standpoint, considering factors such as enforcement objectives, effectiveness, fairness, and legality. The author presents arguments for and against parental liability in a rational and balanced manner, ultimately proposing reforms to address identified deficiencies. The book offers a thorough analysis of this complex aspect of EU competition law and invites readers to critically evaluate its logic and implications. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Selcuk Law Review / Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Selcuk Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The main reasons why the importance of Legal Professional Privilege ('LPP') has been emphasised in present times are as follows: protection of confidentiality is considered to be closely related to the rights of defence of the undertaking and administrative due process. The protection of LPP is also beneficial not only to a privilege holder but also to the general public and the competition authorities. LPP in EU competition investigations has to evolve, because EU competition enforcement has been affected by the rapidly changing world. Even the European Courts have been forced towards the gradual broadening of the scope of LPP accordingly. However, even these efforts do not keep pace with the developments in the modern society. The general trend has been towards a gradual harmonisation of competition laws and the treatment of LPP in competition law should not be excluded. In some jurisdictions, it is protected as a fundamental right, but in others, a client's right legitimately protecting confidentiality over communications with a lawyer does not exist. The protection of LPP is actually dependent on the laws or customs of each country and culture. However, I believe that gradual global harmonisation of LPP is not impossible, and that LPP in EU investigations is capable of becoming a global standard with substantial amendments to the current scope. In particular, it is necessary to broaden the current scope, taking into consideration various problems actually found in and outside the EU. In my contribution, I would like to make specific proposals for these amendments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addresses the role market definition can play for EU competition practice in the platform economy. The focus is on intermediaries that bring together groups of users whose decisions are interdependent, which therefore are commonly referred to as 'two-sided platforms'. We address challenges to market definition that accompany these cross-group network effects, assess current practice in a number of competition cases, and provide guidance for adapting practice to properly account for the economic forces shaping markets with two-sided platforms. We ask whether and when a single market can be defined that encompasses both sides. We advocate a multi-markets approach that takes account of cross-market linkages, acknowledges the existence of zero-price markets, and properly accounts for the homing behaviour of market participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes two broad ways to conceptualise EU competition law. EU competition law could be viewed as 'autonomous law' ('AL'), namely as a closed normative system a technocratic tool consisting in a set of rules that prohibit undue restraints of trade. Or, EU competition law could be viewed as 'responsive law' ('RL'), namely as a relatively open normative system and an interpretive practice that oscillates between openness and integrity. The responsiveness approach offers a compelling conceptualisation as it explains certain endogenous features of EU competition law: its fuzzy mandate, conceptually elastic vocabulary, and use of rules and standards. In addition, the responsiveness approach can clarify the role economics plays in EU competition law. It views economics as an 'ideological science', which, even though it cannot insulate this legal field from value disagreements and make it 'autonomous', it can provide a source for positive and normative interpretive statements. On this basis the responsiveness approach maintains that EU competition law is by design open—ie conceptually elastic and factually sensitive—and that its openness can enhance, but also undermine its integrity—ie its capacity to realise its objective in a rule of law compatible manner. These conflicts between openness and integrity are the cause of EU competition law's relative indeterminacy. To deal with the problem of indeterminacy, the RL approach proposes a tripartite legal-institutional modus operandi consisting in constructive interpretation, responsive enforcement, and catalytic adjudication. Hence, considering EU competition law as a form of responsive law has three major implications: first, it offers a new way for understanding how this legal field works and changes; second, it suggests a strategy for dealing with EU competition law's indeterminacy, and third it proposes a new framing for the discursive practices of EU competition law's epistemic community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade, EU competition law reached a major turning point in its history. Anti-competitive object became an elusive and unpredictable rule, which boosts the risk of false positives and has a significant chilling effect. This article analyses this metamorphosis and the social damages it is causing, and proposes an alternative conception. The article demonstrates that the emerging new concept of anti-competitive object erroneously conflates 'contextual analysis', which has been part of the object-inquiry from the outset, and 'effects-analysis', which has no role to play here. It submits that both doctrinal and policy reasons confirm that anti-competitive object should be a category-building principle of 'judicial rule-making' ('definition of the definition') and not applicable to individual arrangements directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates what role fundamental rights can play in the interpretation of EU antitrust law, in particular Art. 102 TFEU. It spells out the difficulties that derive from the fact that antitrust law and fundamental rights are of equal ranking in the EU legal order. It concludes that nevertheless as a matter of systemic and teleological interpretation, EU antitrust law is open for fundamental rights considerations. However, recourse to fundamental rights should be taken only when companies possess regulatory power. This approach sheds light on social media platforms' recent increased engagement in content moderation. It suggests that for dominant platforms with regulatory power, any discrimination based on political beliefs is prima facie abusive behaviour under Art. 102 TFEU. However, such conduct may be justified by the pursuit of legitimate goals and companies should be granted a wide margin of appreciation in that regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between competition law and regulation is a perennial question in competition policy. This article considers what happens when we apply competition law within markets already subject to a degree of alternative regulatory intervention - and, more specifically, how the presence of regulation can inform the antitrust assessment exercise. First, it asks why we might need, but also be reluctant, to apply competition law to market problems arising in regulated sectors. It then examines the potential impact of regulation within the task of competition law assessment from three overlapping perspectives: (1) where regulation forms an integral part of the 'legal and economic context'; (2) where a regulatory standard is applied to set the boundaries of competition on the merits; and (3) where competition intervention functions as a means of 'course correction' to the underlying regulatory regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims at analysing activities of the European Commission and the national competition authorities of the Member States of the European Union in response to the Covid-19 outbreak. This analysis is carried out in the light of the objectives of EU competition law. The specific research question of this article is whether the competition law framework is sufficiently resilient to the current COVID-19 crisis and allows for the inclusion of public or non-economic interests, particularly with regard to the application of Article 101 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. With a view to answering this question, the temporary framework that has been adopted because of the pandemic will be assessed in the light of the framework for the application of Article 101 TFEU. Then the actions of competition authorities undertaken EU-wide will be analysed against the background of the current debate on the goals of EU competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Nisu is the property of Law Faculty in Nis and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper addresses the issue of excessive price abuse under Article 102(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by drawing inspiration from a recent stream of cases (developed first at the national and then at the EU level) involving pharmaceutical companies marketing off-patent drugs. In particular, the two 'most advanced' cases are analysed: Aspen in Italy and Pfizer/Flynn in the United Kingdom. This new-found attention towards exploitative practices in the form of excessive and unfair pricing by dominant undertakings that have traditionally been subject to a cautious antitrust scrutiny seems worth exploring for a number of reasons, as illustrated in the paper. Ultimately, it is argued that this further 'interference' of competition law into the realms of regulation may be actually justified, albeit subject to precise conditions for enforcement, and may pursue policy objectives in the wider context of EU health law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The advent of big data analytics has favoured the emergence of forms of price discrimination based on consumers' profiles and their online behaviour (i.e. personalised pricing). The paper analyses this practice as a possible exploitative abuse by dominant online platforms. The paper argues that, in view of its "mixed" effect on consumers' welfare, personalised pricing requires a case-by-case assessment under EU competition law and thus it should not be banned a priori. However, in view of the recent case law of the European Court of Justice on price discrimination, the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission would face a high burden of proof to sanction this conduct under Art. 102(c) TFEU. Finally, the paper argues that, due to its case-by-case approach, competition law seems more suitable than omnibus regulation to tackle the negative effects that personalised pricing could have on consumers' welfare. In particular, an NCA/the European Commission could negotiate with online platforms different kinds of behavioural commitments: transparency requirements, limits on data collection/user profiling, rights to opt out of personalised pricing and the obligation to share customers' data with competitors could significantly tame the risks of personalised pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to highlight the need for a new understanding of what constitutes "procedural justice" in EU competition law enforcement. This is done via an exploration of the concept of procedural justice, followed by a synthetization of this concept with the conceptual underpinnings of EU competition law. The modern realities of EU competition law are then examined, with a particular focus on the Commission's approach to Google. The general thrust of the argument presented is that considering the nature of the problems facing the Commission, it is not necessary, as a matter of justice, to consider large tech firms as being endowed with a huge panoply of procedural justice rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by Case C-435/18 Otis and Others, this article examines central issues raised in Otis and Others, such as who can claim compensation, what harm is genuinely relevant, and the issue of causation. The Court of Justice of the European Union relies on the principle of full effectiveness of EU competition law to ensure that all causally relevant harm is actionable, and thus achieves a very broad protection of the right to full compensation. As a result, in cases involving both competition law and other legal areas, such as contract law and tort law, EU law and CJEU caselaw apply instead of national law and national caselaw. The increasing and problematic dependence on the principle of full effectiveness may develop damages actions for competition law infringements as an independent category of tort governed by a highly specialized set of rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital economy is deeply and irreversibly changing markets' structures and global competitiveness. This paper deals with the suggested adoption of an additional legal framework as a supplement of EU competition law in digital markets. A co-regulatory and legally binding code of competitive conduct will be signed by undertakings that have a Strategic Market Status. A new-born Digital Markets Unit at the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission will be in charge of the elaboration and enforcement of the code, together with undertakings having a Strategic Market Status and relevant stakeholders of the industry. The code will target behaviours considered to be especially harmful for the consumers in digital markets such as self-preferencing practices by vertically integrated companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the EU competition framework has been under strain because of the increasing market interconnectivity. Criticisms have increased regarding the EU competition enforcement model. In response, institutional debate and measures have focused on the enhancement of fairness in this area of EU law. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, another source of "fairness" in the enforcement of EU competition law is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 47 of the EU Charter is the most invoked provision in the context of EU competition litigation. Considered to reaffirm the EU general principle of effective judicial protection, this article constitutionalises the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. Although the existing literature has highlighted the overall influence of fundamental rights in the enforcement of competition law, the contribution of Article 47 of the Charter to the enhancement of fairness in EU competition policies, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, remains underexplored. The current article aims to fill this gap in the literature by offering a threefold input. First, the article situates the discussion on fairness in EU competition law in the broader philosophical debate regarding various conception(s) of fairness. Second, the article analyses the case law of the EU Court of Justice on Article 47 of the EU Charter in EU competition litigation. Finally, the article discusses what kind of "fairness" Article 47 strengthens in the area of EU competition law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While European Union (EU) competition law has long been understood as a variety of public interest law, the extent to which the rules can be applied directly to advance noneconomic public interest-oriented goals is more contentious. This contribution considers whether and how such concerns can be accommodated within the framework of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It considers both the conventional approach to addressing public interest concerns within the analytical structure of the antitrust rules and also how broader public interest objectives have shaped recent EU-level enforcement efforts in three key sectors: the liberalizing public utilities markets, the pharmaceutical sector, and the digital economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudios de Traducción is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

EU Competition law has recently incurred main procedural reforms. Their basis must be found in Regulation 1/2003, decentralizing the control on the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, thus emphasising the role of National Competition Authorities and Courts. This system has proved to be far from complete and perfect, as the first part of this article aims at demonstrating. A new political wave has enabled to strengthen the enforcement of EU Competition Law under two strands: the private and the public enforcement. Directive 2014/104 harmonises parts of the national (civil) procedural law regarding damages actions. Powers and duties of National Courts are its focus. Its main features are recalled within this contribution. The long-awaited Directive 2019/1 aims at further reinforcing the role of NCAs, establishing a very detailed piece of legislation, whose main elements are briefly examined here. Since the two acts have been adopted in a quite short period of time, their coordination is analysed too. This exam can lead us to offer some remarks on the perspective role of EU Competition Law, both from the Member States perspective and the needs for reform, and the new Commission's approach to the consistent application of the new legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Română de Drept European is the property of Wolters Kluwer Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes the interaction of EU competition, consumer and data protection law in the digital economy. We compare the objectives, rules and enforcement structures of these legal regimes, and we discuss market failures that justify regulatory intervention in digital markets. In particular, the Facebook investigations in Germany and Italy are selected as a case study. The Bundeskartellamt's investigations are remarkable, being the first in which an exploitative abuse of dominance involving a digital platform has been decided under competition law. These we compare with their Italian counterpart, where the AGCM has recently sanctioned Facebook for behavior similar to that investigated in Germany. Yet, the Italian case has been decided under consumer, rather than competition law. This shows the regulatory dilemma faced by European antitrust authorities, which are currently struggling to find a solution to the market failures arising in digital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1990s, the European Commission embarked on a mission to bring EU competition policy more into line with contemporary economic theory. Over a period of ten years, it systematically revised key legal concepts of all three pillars of EU competition law. Most importantly, it adopted the consumer welfare aim, revised its understanding of competitive harm and countervailing effects accordingly, and committed itself to carrying out more in-depth assessments of the investigated conduct's effects instead of relying on form-based presumptions of illegality. Initially, many tenets of the more economic approach were in conflict with the case law of the European Court of Justice, which had a broader understanding of the aims of EU competition law. However, after a few initial set-backs for the Commission, several recent judgments in cases such as MEO, Intel, Post Danmark I, and Cartes Bancaires suggest that the Court's understanding of EU competition law is evolving and that it is willing to embrace at least a few of the Commission's revised principles. In particular, it is adopting a more effects-based approach to assessing business conduct and is cautiously curbing its former concept of harm in exclusionary situations. At the same time, however, it continues to adhere to many of its former freedom- and fairness-based principles, so that a number of uncertainties and inconsistencies remain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents three case studies relating to multisided markets which were handled by the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA). These include the market for online booking of hotel rooms, the market for online listings of properties, and the market for online orders of take away food. The case studies show how an analysis based on the more recently developed economic theory on platform markets allows for a successful application of existing competition law. Moreover, common predictions on the economic behaviour of platform markets, as can be found in the academic literature, are tested against the experiences drawn from the aforementioned investigations. In addition to providing a robustness check on common assertions made on the functioning of platform markets, the article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of such markets by adding to the debate on when these common assertions are likely to hold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of the current work is to delineate national judicial responses to Commission-issued competition soft law within two EU jurisdictions – the UK and the Netherlands. A comparative methodology is adopted and – in terms of theory – several hypotheses of possible judicial attitudes to soft law are established. In broad terms, it is ventured that courts can either recognize (agreement, disagreement, persuasion) or refuse to recognize (neglect, rejection) supranational soft law in their judicial discourse. While acknowledging that judicial refusal for recognition is a natural judicial response to legally non-binding instruments, the paper argues that competition soft law could and should become recognized by national courts of law because that would contribute positively to the enforcement system’s goals of consistency and the concomitant legal certainty and uniform application. The empirical picture that transpires, however, reveals a varied recognition landscape that could well pose challenges for consistent enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The EU Damages Directive came into force in December 2014. One of its objectives is to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by infringements of competition law can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation in the courts of the EU Member States. This paper looks closely at the Directive’s compensation goal and the key arrangements that are to encourage victims to seek redress in the national courts. The paper uses a simple framework to demonstrate that the legal measures in the Damages Directive are unlikely to foster compensation because they fail to create incentives for harmed individuals to seek redress. If Member States seek to encourage full compensation, they should devise a framework for private antitrust actions that goes beyond the Directive’s remit by, for example, allowing class actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article advances several reasons why EU competition policy on vertical restraints has been a failure. First, the distinction between price and nonprice restraints is inconsistent, since the economic effects of both practices are similar. Second, EU competition law creates a number of inefficiencies that cause a negative impact on social welfare; an example is the ban on absolute territorial protection that does not allow a full protection from free-riding. Third, it is doubtful that the inefficiencies of EU competition law can be justified by the market integration goal, since the rules may turn out to be ineffective in reaching this objective. Fourth, EU competition law on vertical restraints has created negative side effects: it has put an end to experimentation and innovation of competition rules at the member-state level and induced private interests groups to spend a lot of effort in lobbying national regulators. The example of resale price maintenance for books serves as an illustration of the latter problem. Several of the above pitfalls have been indicated by Richard Markovits in his treatise on U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law. These criticisms are supported in this paper and further expanded by a discussion of additional errors that have made the EU competition rules on vertical restraints a policy failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chicago Revolution has transformed antitrust into a highly complex, impenetrable if not impracticable area of law, all but extinguishing its traction with the public at large. Under the pretense of scientificity, furthermore, its efficiency-based mantra appears to be, under scrutiny, more a product of ideology than anything else. Not to mention a rather striking volte-face with respect to the political origin and the judicial history of US antitrust as it had developed till then: a path where the emphasis on rivalry was motivated also by the desire to protect the democratic process from the reach of big business. In the European framework, where antitrust derived more from US pressure than any internal political debate, while the European Commission has at times tried to embrace the new US-style approach, the Court of justice has maintained its emphasis on competition and rivalry per se, sometimes indirectly referring to ordoliberal ideas and concerns. In the meantime, however, antitrust has become a training field for another roughly 120 jurisdictions all over the globe. Briefly reviewing enforcement in such countries, with particular focus on BRICS, reveals that an emphasis on rivalry as such and a close attention to the non-efficiency-based goals actually seem to be key in such up-and-coming legal systems. Having completed a review of the legal approach in such three different areas, the article first suggests new enforcement priorities as, e.g., in the areas of mergers and monopolisation, divestiture remedies, and oligopolies. Finally, it reviews the massive collateral benefits that a rivalry-based, politically non-oblivious antitrust enforcement may carry on innovation, economic and social growth, and inclusive institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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