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The year 2007 heralded a major advance in China's entry to the global economy's rules-based marketplace. Its Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 (AML 2007) taking inspiration from European Union (EU) antitrust concepts contained internationally familiar key antitrust prohibitions. It appeared to satisfy key benchmarks, which any credible antitrust enforcement system should exhibit, namely Legitimacy and Effectiveness. However, in this original contribution, analysing 14 years of leading case law, the authors identify several key persistent Legitimacy and Effectiveness issues which arise when private parties attempt antitrust enforcement through the courts. On key issues such as: (i) Compensation awards inadequacy; (ii) Lack of rights for indirect purchasers; (iii) Absence of a passing-on defence; and (iv) Limitations of collective litigation mechanisms, deficiencies arising in each of these four areas are identified and analysed. Pathways to reform are set out. Comparative analysis with the corresponding EU and US jurisprudence is undertaken throughout, to illuminate the contrast in treatment for antitrust litigants facing similar antitrust situations. Recently enacted reform legislation (AML 2022) does not remedy the antitrust protection concerns identified by the authors. Private parties seeking antitrust redress in China will therefore continue to have weaker remedies in antitrust enforcement cases, in contrast with their EU and US counterparts. The absence of comprehensive reform means that Legitimacy and Effectiveness deficiencies will continue to undermine legal protection for China's private antitrust enforcement litigants. Furthermore, the research demonstrates how norm adoption on its own cannot raise the propect of better outcomes, unless accompanied by corresponding evolution in the provision of more robust enforcement rights and remedies for antitrust litigants, as well as evolution in judicial interpretation to support antitrust norms acceptance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to provide a short overview of the 2023 US Draft Merger Guidelines and some interpretations of its impact on merger control practices. The US practice shows that merger control standards have been changed several times, in accordance with the need to increasingly consider economic efficiencies and the consequences of making wrong decisions, which could reduce innovation and other behaviours of undertakings that lead to an increase in economic efficiency and improve competition. Due to the fact that guidelines can influence how judges evaluate challenges to mergers, it remains to be seen how the final guidelines will enable the courts to understand and support the agencies' views on antitrust enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conclusion Current DOJ and FTC leadership claim the "core value"[42] of the agencies' antitrust agenda is the "rule of law".[43] FTC Chair Khan has characterized the FTC's antitrust philosophy as "fundamentally conservative" because it is 'deeply ground[ed] ... in statutory text, history, judicial precedent, and congressional intent'.[44] AAG Kanter has stressed antitrust enforcement has '... deviated too far from the will of Congress. 13 Press Release, FTC, 'Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Seek to Strengthen Enforcement Against Illegal Mergers." At the FTC and DOJ's Enforcers Summit on 4 April 2022, AAG Kanter stated that the DOJ will "not hesitate to enforce the law" if it determines that a s 2 criminal charge is warranted. [Extracted from the article]

The aim of this article is to provide a short overview of the 2023 US Draft Merger Guidelines and some interpretations of its impact on merger control practices. The US practice shows that merger control standards have been changed several times, in accordance with the need to increasingly consider economic efficiencies and the consequences of making wrong decisions, which could reduce innovation and other behaviours of undertakings that lead to an increase in economic efficiency and improve competition. Due to the fact that guidelines can influence how judges evaluate challenges to mergers, it remains to be seen how the final guidelines will enable the courts to understand and support the agencies' views on antitrust enforcement.

The US appears to lean towards the model of unconcentrated and distributed competition regulation agencies, instead of a single concentrated one. Aside from the states and private litigants, in practice, this model mainly runs through the Department of Justice (DOJ), via its Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)'s enforcement. Traditionally, under developments of the regulatory approach, the 'quasi-judicial' FTC could be understood to be a cornerstone of US antitrust law, particularly in its practical enforcement. However, it appears that the DOJ contributes far more policies on the specific regulation of mergers as well as consumption of merger remedies. By analysing the US model of 'inter-agency competition' under perspectives of merger control, this writing leads to proof that the DOJ is a dominant actor to some extent. More significantly, the DOJ's performances partially bring the FTC and others to the uniformity of stipulated mergers as well as approved remedy fashions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the term "competition" and perception of this notion given by various prominent economists. The evolution of understanding of the concept of "competitive market" has been considered. The article identifies the differences between the activities of anti-monopoly committees in countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Spain, and France. Particular attention was paid to the development of the legislative framework in these countries. The comparative characteristics of the responsibility areas of the antitrust agencies in the European Union and the United States of America has been provided. The study established that antitrust policy in the European Union is more liberal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The federal antitrust framework is formed - excepting The Sherman Act (1890) - of The Clayton Act (1914), The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) and The Hard-Scott-Rodino Act (1976). These Antitrust Laws codify what have become known as „per se" and „rule of reason" violations of the Sherman Act. According to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, a practice is an exclusionary conduct only if it is appreciated as an „unreasonable" restrain, but the Court hasn't explicitly defined this concept. However „reasonableness" inquiry focuses on how a challenge business practice affects competition. There exist two tests for demonstrate the anticompetitive characteristic of a practice: per se test and rule of reason test. Each test helps to identify a „per se" violation or a„,rule of reason" violation. The first test is applied to the violations of Section I of the Sherman Act and the second to the rest of them. Jurisprudence identifies as „per se" violations: price fixing, agreements among competitors to divide markets or allocate costumers, certain tying agreements and group boycotts. Under the application of „per se" test, a violation is treated as being so clearly anticompetitive as to be conclusively "unreasonable" and the plaintiff only has to demonstrate that the practice occurred. By contrast, „rule of reason" test was developed to analyze all the competitive and anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct before the determination of „unreasonableness ". The "rule of reason" violations are prohibited under the Section II of the Sherman Act. The extensive background and experience in the U.S. Antitrust Law demonstrated that the classification of a practice as „per se" or „rule of reason" violation wasn't always easy to do. A few horizontal restrains were said to be subject to an intermediate mode of analysis called the „quick-look" which appeared in the XX century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]