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41 results on '"Sokol, D. Daniel"'

4. Antitrust Compliance

Author

Sokol, D. Daniel, Hitt, Michael A., book editor, Jackson, Susan E., book editor, Carmona, Salvador, book editor, Bierman, Leonard, book editor, Shalley, Christina E., book editor, and Wright, Mike, book editor

Published
2017
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5. Agency objectives, organizational change, and optimizing enforcement.

Author

Sokol, D Daniel and Wickelgren, Abraham L

Subjects
ORGANIZATIONAL change, INTEGRITY, AGENT (Philosophy), ANTITRUST law, EMPLOYEE loyalty
Abstract

Keywords: Antitrust; FTC; Competition policy; K21; L40 EN Antitrust FTC Competition policy K21 L40 272 277 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. CONCEPTUALIZING AND OPTIMIZING CHANGE Institutional structure helps shape the nature of accountability.[1] Literature in economics,[2] political science,[3] finance,[4] and management[5] all utilize principal-agent models. The good news is that better alignment between agency leadership and staff (leadership needs to better listen to staff) and more respect for analytical tools can fix these problems. In the case of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, if Congress does not trust the Commission to listen to staff (we discuss below why that is a reasonable belief), then Congress has even less reason to trust the Commission. While many of the current leadership's most fervent supports have criticized antitrust policy as insufficiently accountable to the democratic process,[28] the FTC has assumed authority to make competition rules without explicit Congressional authorization (and indeed based on a broad reading of a case from the 1970s that certainly would not survive judicial scrutiny today).[29] Odder still is the selective textualism of the FTC. [Extracted from the article]

Published
2023
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11. Measuring the Antitrust Revolution.

Author

Sokol, D. Daniel, Bensley, Sara, and Crook, Maia

Subjects
*ANTITRUST law, *ECONOMIC research, *POLITICAL science, *LAW enforcement, *PUBLISHED articles
Abstract

Although antitrust always evolved with the economics of its time, economic analysis was not central to the antitrust enterprise until Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania. In doing so, the Court abandoned the multiple goals of the prior era to embrace a singular economic goal. With a singular goal, antitrust had become revolutionary. How to measure the antitrust revolution has been difficult. In this article, we focus on published case law, which provides a broad set of observations that includes government enforcement actions and private antitrust suits. We use the Caselaw Access Project database and its associated "Historical Trends" tool to track the usage of certain words and phrases in judicial opinions. This article is the first to measure antitrust terms in court cases that combine big data with data visualization techniques to better understand, based on the usage of common antitrust terms, the impact economics has had on decided cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2020
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12. Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions

Author

Ghosal, Vivek and Sokol, D. Daniel

Subjects
L13, L41, prosecutions, K21, L11, enforcement, business cylces, collusion, price-fixing, fines, Antitrust Amendments Act, leniency, jail terms, ddc:330, antitrust, ACPERA, politics, cartels
Abstract

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U.S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties imposed across the policy regimes. The more recent regimes are characterized by far fewer cartels prosecuted, but with substantially higher penalties levied on firms and individuals. While effective deterrence is one explanation for these patterns, we are more inclined to conclude that US cartel enforcement has seen an underlying shift away from focusing on smaller cartels to larger and multinational firms. In terms of political effects, our results reveal no clear inter-political party effect on cartel prosecutions, but there appear to be interesting intra-political party effects. We find that particular Presidencies matter for cartel prosecutions, and variation across Presidential administrations led to marked shifts in the total number of cartels prosecuted. Overall, the shifts in the number of cartels prosecuted and penalties levied portray changing policy priorities and a search for the optimal enforcement design to curtail one of the clearest sources of welfare loss, collusion.

Published
2015

35. Tying Arrangements

Author

Hovenkamp, Herbert, Hovenkamp, Erik, Blair, Roger D., book editor, and Sokol, D. Daniel, book editor

Published
2014
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39. Predatory Pricing

Author

Elzinga, Kenneth G., Mills, David, Blair, Roger D., book editor, and Sokol, D. Daniel, book editor

Published
2014
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41. Introduction

Author

Sokol, D. Daniel, editor, Cheng, Thomas K., editor, and Lianos, Ioannis, editor

Published
2013
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