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This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an “agreement” of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a case study of the major decision points taken by government officials during the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin, Germany, in 1948 and 1949. The article discusses the decision by former U.S. president Harry S. Truman to retain a U.S. presence in Berlin, the construction of diplomatic strategies, and the decision by the U.S. to conduct an airlift to attempt to thwart the blockade.