6 results on '"Segal-Halevi, Erel"'
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2. Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited.
- Author
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Segal-Halevi, Erel and Suksompong, Warut
- Subjects
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CHORES , *CAKE , *METAPHOR , *FINITE, The , *ALGORITHMS - Abstract
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource. Recently, it was shown that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, it is possible to partition the players into groups of any desired size and divide the cake among the groups so that each group receives a single contiguous piece and every player is envy-free. For two groups, we characterize the group sizes for which such an assignment can be computed by a finite algorithm, showing that the task is possible exactly when one of the groups is a singleton. We also establish an analogous existence result for chore division, and show that the result does not hold for a mixed cake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division.
- Author
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Aigner-Horev, Elad and Segal-Halevi, Erel
- Subjects
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BIPARTITE graphs , *ENVY , *ALGORITHMS - Abstract
A matching in a bipartite graph with parts X and Y is called envy-free, if no unmatched vertex in X is a adjacent to a matched vertex in Y. Every perfect matching is envy-free, but envy-free matchings exist even when perfect matchings do not. We prove that every bipartite graph has a unique partition such that all envy-free matchings are contained in one of the partition sets. Using this structural theorem, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an envy-free matching of maximum cardinality. For edge-weighted bipartite graphs, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maximum-cardinality envy-free matching of minimum total weight. We show how envy-free matchings can be used in various fair division problems with either continuous resources ("cakes") or discrete ones. In particular, we propose a symmetric algorithm for proportional cake-cutting, an algorithm for 1 -out-of- (2 n - 2) maximin-share allocation of discrete goods, and an algorithm for 1 -out-of- ⌊ 2 n / 3 ⌋ maximin-share allocation of discrete bads among n agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. Fair multi-cake cutting.
- Author
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Segal-Halevi, Erel
- Subjects
- *
POLYGONS , *ALGORITHMS - Abstract
In the classic problem of fair cake-cutting, a single interval ("cake") has to be divided among n agents with different value measures, giving each agent a single sub-interval with a value of at least 1 ∕ n of the total. This paper studies a generalization in which the cake is made of m disjoint intervals, and each agent should get at most k sub-intervals. The paper presents a polynomial-time algorithm that guarantees to each agent at least min (1 ∕ n , k ∕ (m + n − 1)) of the total value, and shows that this is the largest fraction that can be guaranteed. The algorithm simultaneously guarantees to each agent at least 1 ∕ n of the value of his or her k most valuable islands. The main technical tool is envy-free matching in a bipartite graph. Some of the results remain valid even with additional fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. Besides the natural application of the algorithm to simultaneous division of multiple land-estates, the paper shows an application to a geometric problem — fair division of a two-dimensional land estate shaped as a rectilinear polygon, where each agent should receive a rectangular piece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
5. Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences.
- Author
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Segal-Halevi, Erel, Hassidim, Avinatan, and Aziz, Haris
- Subjects
RANKING ,STOCHASTIC dominance ,POLYNOMIALS ,ALGORITHMS ,SIMULATION methods & models - Abstract
Ranking alternatives is a natural way for humans to explain their preferences. It is used in many settings, such as school choice, course allocations and residency matches. Without having any information on the underlying cardinal utilities, arguing about the fairness of allocations requires extending the ordinal item ranking to ordinal bundle ranking. The most commonly used such extension is stochastic dominance (SD), where a bundle X is preferred over a bundle Y if its score is better according to all additive score functions. SD is a very conservative extension, by which few allocations are necessarily fair while many allocations are possibly fair. We propose to make a natural assumption on the underlying cardinal utilities of the players, namely that the difference between two items at the top is larger than the difference between two items at the bottom. This assumption implies a preference extension which we call diminishing differences (DD), where X is preferred over Y if its score is better according to all additive score functions satisfying the DD assumption. We give a full characterization of allocations that are necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption. Based on this characterization, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a necessarily-DD-proportional allocation whenever it exists. Using simulations, we compare the various fairness criteria in terms of their probability of existence, and their probability of being fair by the underlying cardinal valuations. We find that necessary-DD-proportionality fares well in both measures. We also consider envy-freeness and Pareto optimality under diminishing-differences, as well as chore allocation under the analogous condition | increasing-differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms.
- Author
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Nitzan, Mor, Nitzan, Shmuel, and Segal-Halevi, Erel
- Subjects
SOCIAL choice ,ALGORITHMS ,CULTURAL assumptions ,INFINITY (Mathematics) ,DECISION making - Abstract
Level-1 consensus is a recently-introduced property of a preference-profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists a preference relation which induces an ordering of all other preferences such that frequent preferences are those that are more similar to it. This is a desirable property, since it enhances the stability of social choice by guaranteeing that there exists a Condorcet winner and it is elected by all scoring rules. In this paper, we present an algorithm for checking whether a given preference profile exhibits level-1 consensus. We apply this algorithm to a large number of preference profiles, both real and randomly-generated, and find that level-1 consensus is very improbable. We support these empirical findings theoretically, by showing that, under the impartial culture assumption, the probability of level-1 consensus approaches zero when the number of individuals approaches infinity. Motivated by these observations, we show that the level-1 consensus property can be weakened while retaining its stability implications. We call this weaker propertyFlexible Consensus . We show, both empirically and theoretically, that it is considerably more probable than the original level-1 consensus. In particular, under the impartial culture assumption, the probability for Flexible Consensus converges to a positive number when the number of individuals approaches infinity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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