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This paper explores the economic impacts of two related tracks of China's expected transformation—economic slowdown and rebalancing away from investment toward consumption—and estimates the spillovers for the rest of the world, with a special focus on Sub-Saharan African countries. The paper finds that an average annual slowdown of gross domestic product in China of 1 percent over 2016–30 is expected to result in a decline of gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa by 1.1 percent and globally by 0.6 percent relative to the past trends scenario by 2030. However, if China's transformation also entails substantial rebalancing, the negative income effects of the economic slowdown could be offset by the positive changes brought along by rebalancing through higher overall imports by China and positive terms of trade effects for its trading partners. If global supply responds positively to the shifts in relative prices and the new sources of consumer demand from China, a substantial rebalancing in China could have an overall favorable impact on the global economy. Economic growth could turn positive and higher on average, by 6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5.5 percent globally, as compared with the past trends scenario. Finally, rebalancing reduces the prevalence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa compared with the isolated negative effects of China's slowdown, which slightly increase the incidence of poverty. Overall, China's slowdown and rebalancing combined are estimated to increase gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa by 4.7 percent by 2030 and reduce poverty, but the extent of this varies by country.

Income growth in emerging economies has often been cited as a key driver of the past decade’s com-modity price boom—the longest and broadest boom since World War II. This paper shows that income has a negative and highly significant effect on real food commodity prices, a finding that is consistent with Engel’s Law and Kindleberger’s thesis, the predecessors of the Prebisch-Singer hypothe-sis. The paper also shows that, in the long run, income influences real food prices mainly through the manufacturing price channel (the deflator), hence weakening the view that income growth exerts strong upward pressure on food prices. Other (short-term) drivers of food prices include energy costs, inventories, and monetary conditions.

Since we introduced the term “middle-income trap” in 2006, it has become popular among policy makers and researchers. In May 2015, a search of Google Scholar returned more than 3,000 articles including the term and about 300 articles with the term in the title. This paper provides a (non-exhaustive) survey of this literature. The paper then discusses what, in retrospect, we missed when we coined the term. Today, based on developments in East Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe during the past decade, we would have paid more attention to demographic factors, entrepreneurship, and external institutional anchors. We would also make it clearer that to us, the term was as much the absence of a satisfactory theory that could inform development policy in middle-income economies as the articulation of a development phenomenon. Three-quarters of the people in the world now live in middle-income economies, but economists have yet to provide a reliable theory of growth to help policy makers navigate the transition from middle- to high-income status. Hybrids of the Solow-Swan and Lucas-Romer models are not unhelpful, but they are poor substitutes for a well-constructed growth framework.

Ethiopia has experienced a growth acceleration over the past decade on the back of an economic strategy emphasizing public infrastructure investment and supported by heterodox macro-financial policies. To analyze the country’s growth performance during 2000–13, the paper employs a neoclassical cross-country System Generalized Method of Moments regression model. The analysis finds that accelerated growth was driven by public infrastructure investment and restrained government consumption, and supported by a conducive external environment. Macroeconomic challenges arising from declining private credit, real currency overvaluation, and relatively high inflation held back some growth. The model accurately predicts Ethiopia’s growth over the period of analysis and is robust to country-specific parameter heterogeneity and alternative infrastructure variables. Looking ahead, model simulations under alternative policy scenarios are indicative that growth may decelerate in the coming decade, making it challenging for Ethiopia to attain its middle-income country target by 2025. Although simulated growth rates do not vary much by policy scenario, the paper discusses some of the emerging risks associated with a continued reliance on the current infrastructure financing model and potential future adjustments.

Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has averaged roughly 5 percent per year over the past decade, improving living standards and bolstering human development indicators across the continent. Stronger public institutions, a supportive, private sector focused policy environment, responsible macroeconomic management, and a sustained commitment to structural reforms have greatly expanded opportunities for countries in SSA to participate in global markets. In recent years, many countries in the region have benefited from an increasingly favorable external environment, high commodity prices, and an especially strong demand for natural resources by emerging economies, particularly China. Over the longer term, leveraging Chinese investment to support broad-based growth will require policies designed to boost the competitiveness of sectors in which China s economic rebalancing may create a comparative advantage for SSA. To date, few African countries have been able to benefit from large-scale Chinese investment outside the resource sector. However, as China s growth slows and its economy shifts toward a more consumption-driven model, it is likely that global demand for resource imports will slow as well. Countries with the most heavily concentrated export mix, particularly in the mineral and oil sectors are the most vulnerable to China s economic rebalancing and should be ready to adopt measures to mitigate the impact of negative terms-of-trade shocks. By contrast, as wage rates in China continue to rise and firms refocus their attention on domestic demand, countries in SSA will be well positioned to exploit emerging opportunities for investment in export-oriented manufacturing. Ethiopia provides an instructive example, as its inexpensive yet relatively skilled labor force, coupled with the government s proactive efforts to court Chinese investors, have enabled Ethiopia to attract substantial investments in labor-intensive industries. Infrastructure enhancement, workforce development, and good-governance reforms offer a promising strategy for many countries in the region. Although the establishment of industrial zones has yielded mixed results, several salient success stories warrant careful attention. This report discusses how Africa could take advantage of the untapped opportunities offered by China s progressively intensifying investment and trade ties with SSA. It is hoped that this analysis will enrich the ongoing dialogue between policy makers, private firms, and civil society regarding China s increasingly important role in the growth and development of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Since 2004 (Ethiopian Fiscal Year (EFY) 1997), Ethiopia has experienced strong and generally broad-based real economic growth of around 10.6 percent on average between then and 2011. Growth over the last nine years was far beyond the growth rates recorded in aggregate terms for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which on average only reached 5.2 percent, less than half of Ethiopia's average real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate during that period. Inspired by the East Asian experiences for a comparison of selected indicators and policies of Ethiopia and China/Korea), growth was induced through a mix of factors including agricultural modernization, the development of new export sectors, strong global commodity demand, and government-led development investments. The initial double digits growth rates have now manifested slightly lower but remain at high single-digit levels. The economy is expected to stabilize at around seven to eight percent in 2012, largely owing to improved performance in the agriculture sector. GDP growth is likely to stay around that margin up until 2016 (EFY 2008) driven by rising foreign investment and exports (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). High inflation persists, but is on a slightly decreasing trend. Economic growth brought with it positive trends in reducing poverty, in both urban and rural areas. Ethiopia follows a strategy of increasing exports to facilitate growth. This is appropriate given the currently limited size of its domestic market and it is consistent with the development experience of some of the recently successful countries, particularly in East Asia. Export of goods growth is to a good extent driven by volume growth across a variety of product groups, which indicates that this growth is a result of recent efforts to increase and diversify the export base. Overall export and import developments result in a significantly increased trade deficit by 43 percent, up from US$5.5 billion in 2010/11 to US$7.9 billion.

The Double Burden of Malnutrition (DBM) is the coexistence of both under nutrition and over nutrition in the same population across the life course. 'Across the life course' refers to the phenomenon that under nutrition early in life contributes to an increased propensity for over nutrition in adulthood. The DBM affects all countries, rich and poor, and is a particular concern in countries with high stunting rates. The consequences of the DBM are enormous; early life under nutrition is an underlying cause associated with about a third of young child deaths. Among the survivors who become stunted during the first two years of life, their capacity to resist disease, to carry out physical work, to study and progress in school, are all impaired across the life course. Later in the life course, diet and nutrition, and especially obesity, are important underlying causes of many Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs), including hypertension, diabetes, cancer, stroke, and ischemic heart disease. The causes of the DBM are related to a series of changes occurring in the world called the nutrition transition, the demographic transition, and the epidemiological transition of countries. The variables associated with the nutrition transition and obesity epidemic can be grouped into four cross-cutting themes, which include: (i) the health/biological environment; (ii) the economic/food environment; (iii) the physical/built environment; and (iv) the socio/cultural environment. The solutions for the DBM problems are reasonably well recognized in each of its parts: under nutrition and over nutrition. However, the solutions have not been combined into an overarching policy and program framework, which together with raising awareness about the serious future implications for the low-and middle income countries is the aim of this paper.

Kenya's economy has been running on one engine. Kenya's strong engine is domestic consumption, which accounts for 75 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Kenya's weak engine remains its exports, which have been declining sharply in relative importance. Kenya's top four main exports do not earn enough to pay for oil imports, not to mention other imports. It will be very difficult for Kenya to achieve high growth over an extended period of time because of its existing economic imbalances. Kenya needs to increase its export competitiveness. It is clear that Kenya's trade performance is below its potential. The objective of this overview is to provide some of that analysis and to contribute to the policy dialogue on the role of exports Kenya's future growth. This paper focuses on five issues: 1) overall trade orientation and export growth; 2) merchandise export trends; 3) merchandise exports by sector; 4) merchandise exports by destination; and 5) diversification. The growth of merchandise exports has been slow and volatile. The average annual growth rate of merchandise exports has been only 10 percent. And while countries such as Vietnam have has a distinct export growth trajectory with steady growth in merchandise exports year after year, Kenya's pattern has been rather volatile with a few good years followed by major falls. Export growth has been driven primarily by existing products in existing markets. Overall there has been little new product/new market discovery.

Bridging the Atlantic is a descriptive study of Brazil's involvement with counterparts in Sub-Saharan Africa through knowledge exchange, trade, and investments. The objective of the study is to understand these relations better with the intent to forge concrete and mutually beneficial partnerships between Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa. Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa are natural partners, with at one point a shared geography and later a shared history. Since the turn of the twentieth century, Africa has become one of the major fronts of Brazil's international agenda. Africa is rapidly changing and Brazil has expressed growing interest in supporting and taking part in African development. The study includes a narrative of the shared history between Brazil and Africa, as well as a description of Brazilian foreign direct investment and trade with Africa. It ends with recommendations made by the World Bank to strengthen the cooperation between Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa.

This report is part of a series aimed at monitoring economic developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The main objective of these reports is to provide regular updates on key macroeconomic developments and reform initiatives. The reports focus on macroeconomic developments and key structural reforms that have both significant short and medium term impacts. This report presents a broad overview of macroeconomic, political and structural developments in the DRC up to January 2011 and the outlook for the remainder of 2011. DRC's constitution adopted in 2006 has been revised in January 2011 by Parliament. The main changes to the original texts include the election of the president by a majority in a single round vote. The Congolese authorities have maintained prudent fiscal policies under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program, which has achieved the main objectives of this program in 2010 with an inflation rate (end-of-period) below the target of 9.9 percent. The economy has registered, thanks to the dynamism of the mining sector, a solid growth rate of 7.2 percent compared to 2.8 percent in 2009. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for 2011 is projected to reach 6.5 percent. The country's external position has improved. The current account balance, including grants, improved from a deficit of 10.5 percent of GDP in 2009 to 6.8 percent in 2010. Favorable commodity prices on the world market contributed to this development.

Amid heightened global uncertainties, Russia is experiencing a bumpy recovery. Domestic demand is rising, but unemployment remains high, and credit and investment remain limited. The budget has benefited from higher oil prices, but fiscal consolidation remains important in the medium term. Crumbling infrastructure, especially in transport, could hamper the economy's competitiveness and longer-term growth prospects. The debt crisis in Western Europe sharpens the downside risks to global recovery and oil prices. But the effects on Russia are likely to be blunted by its stronger fiscal and debt positions and by limited trade and financial links with the affected countries. Russia is likely to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, followed by 4.8 percent in 2011, as domestic demand expands in line with gradual improvements in the labor and credit markets. Employment is expected to improve gradually, however, enabling some further reductions in poverty.

India's economic performance in FY2009/10 shows that the recovery from the slowdown during the global financial crisis is well underway. India's Gross domestic Product (GDP) growth in FY2009/10 has beaten expectations by reaching 7.4 percent compared with 6.7 percent in the previous year. In particular, agricultural sector growth was better than feared with a slightly positive growth rate despite the worst monsoon shortfall in three decades. Strong growth in the fourth quarter pushed annual GDP growth to 7.4 percent in 2009-10. Fourth quarter growth reached 8.6 percent (y-o-y), the highest quarterly growth rate since the end of FY2007/08. The industrial sector's robust recovery beat expectations. Growth in the last quarter of fiscal year FY2009/10 was an unexpectedly high 13.3 percent resulting in over 12 percent growth in the second half of year, nearly double the 6 percent growth witnessed in the first half. Higher inflation mars the bright picture, but there are clear indications of moderation. Inflation as measured by the wholesale price index (WPI) averaged 10 percent during February-May 2010. India's recovery after the slowdown seems well underway. Growth is projected to climb to 8-9 percent in the next two years. These growth rates are achievable without a renewed build-up of inflationary pressure as long as agricultural growth returns to trend, infrastructure constraints are alleviated, and international prices remain stable. Over the next year, sources of growth will shift from fiscal stimulus to manufacturing and, possibly a recovering agriculture.

Using the most recent estimates of agricultural price distortions, this chapter studies the economic, poverty, and income inequality impacts of both global and domestic trade reform in Argentina, with a special focus on export taxes. Argentina offers an interesting case study as the only large agricultural exporter that has, at many points in its history, applied export taxes to several of its agricultural products. The chapter combines results from a global economy-wide model (World Bank's linkage model), a national computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, and micro-simulations. The results suggest that liberalization of world trade (including subsidies and import taxes, but not export taxes), both for agricultural and non-agricultural goods, reduces poverty and inequality in Argentina. However, if only agricultural goods are included, indicators for poverty and inequality do not improve and even deteriorate somewhat. This is particularly the case if export taxes are eliminated. The chapter discusses the possible reasons for those results, offers some caveats, and suggests some lines for further research.

Using recent estimates of industry assistance rates, the effects of trade liberalization in the rest of the world and in Pakistan alone are analyzed using a global and a Pakistan computable general equilibrium (CGE) model under two tax replacement schemes: a direct income tax and an indirect tax replacement. The results indicate that the distributional and poverty effects in Pakistan of a unilateral liberalization of all traded goods are significantly greater than the effects of trade liberalization in the rest of the world. There is relatively higher increase in real income and larger decline in poverty incidence in poor households both in rural and urban areas. The effects of agricultural trade liberalization alone in both the rest of the world and in Pakistan are considerably smaller than those from trade liberalization involving all goods. In both the agricultural and all-goods trade liberalization scenarios involving direct income tax replacement, real household income is raised and the poverty incidence is lowered at varied rates across all household groups except for the urban non-poor. When an indirect tax replacement is used, where the burden of replacing tariff revenue is shared by all household groups depending on their consumption structure, there is reduction in household income for most of the groups and less reduction of poverty.

During the 1960s and 1970s most developing countries imposed anti-agricultural policies, while many high-income countries restricted agricultural imports and subsidized their farmers. Both sets of policies inhibited economic growth and poverty alleviation in developing countries, while doing little to assist small farmers in high-income countries. Since the 1980s, however, many developing countries began to reduce the anti-agricultural bias of sectoral policies, and from the early 1990s the European Union began to move away from price supports to more-direct forms of farm income payments. This paper summarizes a forthcoming book that seeks to explain this evolving pattern of distortions to incentives conceptually and econometrically by making use of new political economy theory and a new globally comprehensive and consistent set of estimates of the changing extent of annual distortions over the past half-century. The distortion estimates involve more than 70 products that cover around 70 percent of the value of agricultural output in each of 75 countries that together account for over 90 percent of the global economy, and they expose the contribution of the various policy instruments (both farm and non-farm) to the net distortion to farmer incentives. Such a widespread coverage of countries, products, years and policy instruments has allowed this collection of studies to test a wide range of hypotheses suggested by the new political economy literature, including the importance of institutions. As a set it sheds much new light on the underlying forces that have affected incentives facing farmers in the course of national and global economic and political development, and hence on how those distortions might change in the future - or be changed by concerted actions to offset political pressures from traditionally powerful vested interests.

This paper empirically explores the political-economic determinants of why governments choose to tax or subsidize trade in agriculture. The authors use a new data set on nominal rates of assistance (NRA) across a number of commodities spanning the last five decades for 64 countries. NRAs measure the effect on domestic (relative to world) price of the quantitative and price-based instruments used to regulate agricultural markets. The data set admits consideration of both taxes and subsidies on exports and imports. The authors find that both economic and political variables play important roles in determining the within-variation in the NRA data. Based on results the authors offer a number of data-driven exploratory hypotheses that can inform future theoretical and empirical research on why governments choose to tax or subsidize agricultural products an important policy question that is also one of the least understood by scholars.

This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries' agricultural price and international trade policies. The authors summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be drawn from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the attention of political economy theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in addressing such questions as the following: where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the pattern of distortions across not only countries but also industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of each country?

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the long history of national distortions to agricultural markets. It then outlines the methodology used to generate annual indicators of the extent of government interventions in markets, details of which are provided in Anderson and appendix A. A description of the economies under study and their economic growth and structural changes over recent decades is then briefly presented as a preface to the main section of the chapter, in which the nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents (NRA and CTE) estimates are summarized across regions and over the decades since the 1950s. These estimates are discussed in far more detail in the regional chapters that follow. A summary is also provided of an additional set of indicators of agricultural price distortions presented in chapter eleven that are based on the trade restrictiveness index first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005). In chapter twelve the focus shifts from countries to commodities, and all the various distortion indicators are used to provide a sense of how distorted are each of the key farm commodity markets globally. Then chapter thirteen uses the study's NRA and CTE estimates to provide a new set of results from a global economy-wide model that attempts to quantify the impacts on global markets, net farm incomes and welfare of the reforms since the early 1980s and of the policies still in place as of 2004. The chapter concludes by drawing on the lessons learned to speculate on the prospects for further reducing the disarray in world agricultural markets.

How hospitable will the global environment be for economic growth in the developing world as we come out of the present financial crisis? The answer depends on how well the author manage the following tension. On the one hand, global macro stability requires that we prevent external imbalances from getting too large. On the other hand, growth in poor nations requires that the world economy be able to absorb a rapid increase in the supply of tradable produced in the developing world. It is possible to render these two requirements compatible, but doing so requires greater use of explicit industrial policies in developing countries, which have the potential of encouraging of modern tradable activities without spilling over into trade surpluses. The 'price' to be paid for greater discipline on real exchange rates and external imbalances is greater use (and permissiveness) towards industrial polices.

This study on Latin America is based on a sample of eight countries, comprising the big four economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; Colombia and Ecuador, two of the poorest South American tropical countries; the Dominican Republic, the largest Caribbean economy; and Nicaragua, the poorest country in Central America. Together, in 2000-04, these countries accounted for 78 percent of the region's population, 80 percent of the region's agricultural value added, and 84 percent of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of Latin America. The key characteristics of these economies-which account for only 4.5 percent of worldwide Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but 7.7 percent of agricultural value added and more than 10 percent of agricultural and food exports. The table reveals the considerable diversity within the region in terms of stages of development, relative resource endowments, comparative advantages and, hence, trade specialization, and the incidence of poverty and income inequality. This means that these countries represent a rich sample for comparative study. Nicaragua's per capita income is only one-seventh the global average, while the incomes of Colombia and Ecuador are one-third of this average. By contrast, the per capita incomes of Argentina and Chile average just one-eighth below and that of Mexico is one eighth above the global average. Only Argentina, Brazil, and Nicaragua are well above the global average in endowments of agricultural land per capita; the Dominican Republic and Ecuador are well below this average; and Chile, Colombia, and Mexico are a little less than one-third above the average.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of economic growth and structural changes in the region since the 1950s and of agricultural and other economic policies as they affected agriculture before and after the various reforms, and in several cases fundamental regime changes, of the past half-century. It then summarizes new estimates of the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and the relative rate of assistance (RRA) to farmers delivered by national farm and nonfarm policies over the past several decades (depending on data availability), and of those policies' impacts on consumer prices of farm products. Both farmer assistance and consumer taxation is negative in periods where there is an anti-agricultural, pro-urban consumer bias in a country's policy regime. The final sections summarize what the author have learned and draw out implications of the findings, including for poverty and inequality and for possible future directions of policies affecting agricultural incentives in this part of Asia.

This paper reviews the linkages between urbanization and economic development. It articulates the relationship between urban density and potential increases in productivity, through specialization, complementarities in production, through the diffusion of knowledge and mimicry, and simply through size and scale. The factors limiting the efficient sizes of cities are analyzed. The paper reviews empirical knowledge, from underdeveloped countries as well as high-income industrial societies, about the importance and magnitudes of these productivity gains. The analysis documents the close link between gains in economic efficiency and the urbanization of populations in most parts of the world.

The paper examines the challenges that developing countries face in accelerating and sustaining growth. The cases of China and India are examined to illustrate a more general phenomenon which might be called model uncertainty. As a developing economy grows, its market and regulatory institutions change and their capabilities increase. As a result, growth strategies and policies and the role of government shift. Further, as the models of economies in these transitional states are incomplete and because models used to predict policy impacts in advanced economies may not provided accurate predictions in the developing economy case, growth strategies and policies need to be responsive and to evolve as the economy matures. This has lead governments in countries that have sustained high growth to be somewhat pragmatic, to treat the policy directions that emerge from the advanced economy model with circumspection, to be somewhat experimental in seeking to accelerate export diversification, to be sensitive to risks, and as a result to proceed gradually in areas such as the timing and sequencing of opening up on the current and capital accounts. The last is an area in which existing theory provides relatively little specific guidance, but in which there are relatively high risks that decline over time as the market matures.

Rapid growth since 1980 has transformed India from the world's 50th ranked economy in nominal U.S. dollars to the 10th largest in 2005. The growth of per capita income has helped reduce poverty. At the same time, evidence suggests that income inequality is rising and that the gap in average per capita income between the rich and poor states is growing. This paper reviews India's long term growth experience with a view to understanding the determinants of growth and the underlying political economy. The paper looks specifically at the political economy of India's growth transformation from a low-growth environment (pre-1980s) to a rapid-growth environment (post 1980s) and asks how sustainable is this transformation in view of concerns about regional disparity and income inequality. The paper concludes that the pledge that India's post-independence leadership had undertaken to abolish mass poverty remains only partially redeemed. Half the battle still lies ahead. Many more would like the fruits of the economic boom to come to them. The greatest challenge for India's policy makers today is to balance the growth momentum with inclusionary policies.

Nigeria's long-run growth performance has been extremely poor. Between 1960 and 2000, real income per capita grew at only 0.43 percent per year. The situation improved between 2001 and 2006 when real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent. This paper demonstrates that the superior growth performance during 2001-06 is largely attributable to the impact of better leadership and economic policy making. The improved performance of the economy after 2003 arose from implementing a comprehensive economic reform program focusing on four main areas: macroeconomic reform; structural reform; governance and institutional reform; and public sector reform. The reforms, backstopped by improved oil revenue management, monetary policy implementation, and debt management, improved overall macroeconomic policy making. This resulted in real GDP growth averaging 7.1 percent per year between 2003 and 2006, an inflation rate of 10 percent in 2006, foreign exchange reserves of US$45 billion in 2006, and total external debt of only US$5 billion in 2006. Clearly, between 1960 and 2000, Nigeria's policy choices were poor, and the reforms that sought to correct them were plagued by inconsistencies, policy reversals, and lack of coherence. In contrast, due to good leadership, the reforms adopted in 2003 were consistent and have been implemented in a coherent manner.

Spatial inequality is an important feature of many developing countries that seems to increase with economic growth and development. At the same time, there seems to be little consensus on the causes of spatial inequality and on a list of effective policy instruments that may foster or reduce spatial inequality. This paper examines the theoretical and empirical literature on spatial inequality to learn what we know and do not know about the causes of spatial inequality, to investigate what policies may or may not ameliorate spatial inequality, and to determine whether policy makers can identify and implement policies that promote or reduce spatial inequality.

Malaysia is a multiethnic, upper-middle-income country that has relied heavily on income from its natural resources to engineer successful diversification into manufacturing and sharply increased incomes for all ethnic groups. This paper examines the role of the policy-making process and national leadership in effecting this structural change and growth with equity. It discusses the government's role in transforming corporate ownership patterns while nurturing industrial enterprises into niche products within complex value-added chains. At the same time, the paper underscores the difficulties and costs of attempting to move into areas where an economy has no strong advantages, in this case heavy industries. Privatization is seen to have been a powerful tool for expanding private enterprise despite limited entrepreneurial skills, but it is questionable as a sustainable strategy; the aggressive formation of new firms seems to offer better long-term prospects. An appropriate regime of policy making and implementation is required, characterized by political determination, stability, high attention to growth with equity, experimentation, and an ability to learn through implementation, both at home and from the experience of others. These are key factors accounting for the relative success of Malaysia. Nothing in the Malaysian experience suggests that it is possible or desirable to undertake reforms serially; in fact, the evidence suggests that the "reform cluster" approach to policy implementation is more effective because it addresses several coordination problems at the same time.

Debates over the nature and direction of economic policy in Iran have intensified rather than abated after the tumultuous changes brought about by the revolution in 1979. In the span of these three decades, Iran has witnessed sweeping institutional changes and has been affected by significant economic and political upheavals. At the macroeconomic level, too, there have been a number of shocks ranging from oil booms and busts, to war (with Iraq), trade sanctions, and internal political strife. This paper uses Iran's experience to reflect on growth and development in the context of political upheaval and an uncertain institutional environment. It is a premise of the paper that Iran's recent past presents a rare, 'laboratory' like, case for the study of growth and development in a broad context. This paper examines post-revolutionary Iran's macroeconomic policies and performance in a comparative context, appraising it against Iran's past trends and real potential. It shows how recurrent cycles of populism and pragmatism have characterized this period. The paper argues that two sets of factors have conditioned Iran's performance and will continue to taint her prospects for sustainable growth into the future. These are: (i) Iran's limited economic diversification and continued dependence on the oil sector, and (ii) the institutional setting in which post-revolutionary economic policies have been formulated and implemented for much of the last three decades.

What are the underlying rationales for industrial policy? Does empirical evidence support the use of industrial policy for correcting market failures that plague the process of industrialization? This article addresses these questions through a critical survey of the analytical literature on industrial policy. It also reviews some recent industry successes and argues that public interventions have played only a limited role. Moreover, the recent ascendance and dominance of international production networks in the sectors in which developing countries once had considerable success implies a further limitation on the potential role of industrial policies as traditionally understood. Overall, there appears to be little empirical support for an activist government policy even though market failures exist that can, in principle, justify the use of industrial policy.

A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection.