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In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person perspective taking and allocentric stance (the other unrelated to the self) in higher order mentalizing tasks. However, no study has tested if verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by perspective-taking and centrism and identified the related anatomical correlates. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patients (allocentric, experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference in perspective-taking, suggesting that social cognition is not a necessary consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients more aware of their own motor paralysis (egocentric stance) when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no difference between perspectives. As predicted, deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, and white matter disconnections were more prominent with deficits in allocentricity. Behavioural and neuroimaging results demonstrate the intersecting relationship between bodily self-awareness and self-and-other-directed metacognition or mentalisation., (Copyright © 2022. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

Introduction : Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is a condition in which patients with paralysis are unaware of their motor deficits. Research into AHP is important for improving its treatment and providing insight into the neurocognitive mechanism of motor awareness. Unfortunately, most studies use assessments with widely recognized limitations., The study aims at developing a psychometrically validated assessment of AHP., Method : We developed a 40-item Motor Unawareness Assessment (MUNA) and administered it to 131 right-hemisphere stroke patients. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to identify the underlying factor structure. Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) analysis was used to determine diagnostic cutoffs, and Area Under the Curve (AUC) analysis used to assess these cutoffs. Relationships with demographic, clinical and neuropsychological variables were explored., Results : Five factors were identified: explicit motor awareness, implicit motor awareness, impaired sense of ownership, agency and illusory movement, and emotional reactions. Established cutoffs had excellent sensitivity and specificity. Clinical, neuropsychological and demographic variables did not predict overall MUNA score but were related to specific subcomponents., Conclusion : The MUNA can differentiate various facets of AHP and provides a detailed profile of (un)awareness. The MUNA can therefore provide robust assessment for research purposes and assist clinicians when developing targeted rehabilitation.

The syndrome of Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP) can provide unique insights into the neurocognitive processes of motor awareness. Yet, prior studies have only explored predominately discreet lesions. Using advanced structural neuroimaging methods in 174 patients with a right-hemisphere stroke, we were able to identify three neural systems that contribute to AHP, when disconnected or directly damaged: the (i) premotor loop (ii) limbic system, and (iii) ventral attentional network. Our results suggest that human motor awareness is contingent on the joint contribution of these three systems., Competing Interests: VP, CF, PJ, MS, SB, RA, AF, VM, MT No competing interests declared, (© 2019, Pacella et al.)

Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is informative about the neurocognitive basis of motor awareness. However, it is frequently associated with concomitant symptoms, such as hemispatial neglect and disturbances in the sense of body ownership (DSO). Although double dissociations between these symptoms have been reported, there is ongoing debate about whether they are manifestations of independent abnormalities, or a single neurocognitive deficit. We aimed to investigate the specificity of lesions associated with AHP by surpassing four, existing methodological limitations: (a) recruit a relatively large sample of patients (total N = 70) in a multi-centre study; (b) identify lesions associated with AHP in grey and white matter using voxel-based methods; (c) take into account the duration of AHP and concomitant neglect symptoms; and (d) compare lesions against a control hemiplegic group, patients suffering from AHP and DSO, and a few, rare patients with selective DSO. Results indicated that acute AHP is associated with a wide network, mainly including: (1) the Rolandic operculum, (2) the insula and (3) the superior temporal gyri. Subcortically, damage mainly involved the basal ganglia and white matter, mostly the superior corona radiate, arcuate fasciculus and the part of the ventral, superior longitudinal fasciculus. Persistent symptoms were linked with wider damage involving fronto-temporal cortex and long white matter tracts. A shift in the latero-medial direction (mainly involving the basal ganglia and surrounding white matter) emerged when DSO was taken accounted for. These results suggest that while bodily awareness is processed by areas widely distributed across the brain, intact subcortical structures and white matter tracts may be necessary to support basic feelings of owning and controlling contralateral body parts. An accurate and 'up-to-date' awareness of our motor abilities, however, may rely also on intact processing in cortical areas which presumably allow higher-order inferences about the current state of the body., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Following right-hemisphere damage, a specific disorder of motor awareness can occur called anosognosia for hemiplegia, i.e. the denial of motor deficits contralateral to a brain lesion. The study of anosognosia can offer unique insights into the neurocognitive basis of awareness. Typically, however, awareness is assessed as a first person judgement and the ability of patients to think about their bodies in more 'objective' (third person) terms is not directly assessed. This may be important as right-hemisphere spatial abilities may underlie our ability to take third person perspectives. This possibility was assessed for the first time in the present study. We investigated third person perspective taking using both visuospatial and verbal tasks in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia (n = 15) and without anosognosia (n = 15), as well as neurologically healthy control subjects (n = 15). The anosognosic group performed worse than both control groups when having to perform the tasks from a third versus a first person perspective. Individual analysis further revealed a classical dissociation between most anosognosic patients and control subjects in mental (but not visuospatial) third person perspective taking abilities. Finally, the severity of unawareness in anosognosia patients was correlated to greater impairments in such third person, mental perspective taking abilities (but not visuospatial perspective taking). In voxel-based lesion mapping we also identified the lesion sites linked with such deficits, including some brain areas previously associated with inhibition, perspective taking and mentalizing, such as the inferior and middle frontal gyri, as well as the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri. These results suggest that neurocognitive deficits in mental perspective taking may contribute to anosognosia and provide novel insights regarding the relation between self-awareness and social cognition., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Guarantors of Brain.)

The possible role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia (i.e., denial of motor deficits contralateral to a brain lesion), has long been debated between psychodynamic and neurocognitive theories. However, there are only a handful of case studies focussing on this topic, and the precise role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia requires empirical investigation. In the present study, we aimed to investigate how negative and positive emotions influence motor awareness in anosognosia. Positive and negative emotions were induced under carefully-controlled experimental conditions in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (n = 11) and controls with clinically normal awareness (n = 10). Only the negative, emotion induction condition resulted in a significant improvement of motor awareness in anosognosic patients compared to controls; the positive emotion induction did not. Using lesion overlay and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping approaches, we also investigated the brain lesions associated with the diagnosis of anosognosia, as well as with performance on the experimental task. Anatomical areas that are commonly damaged in AHP included the right-hemisphere motor and sensory cortices, the inferior frontal cortex, and the insula. Additionally, the insula, putamen and anterior periventricular white matter were associated with less awareness change following the negative emotion induction. This study suggests that motor unawareness and the observed lack of negative emotions about one's disabilities cannot be adequately explained by either purely motivational or neurocognitive accounts. Instead, we propose an integrative account in which insular and striatal lesions result in weak interoceptive and motivational signals. These deficits lead to faulty inferences about the self, involving a difficulty to personalise new sensorimotor information, and an abnormal adherence to premorbid beliefs about the body., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

How should stroke patients with poor motor awareness be managed? This question is important because unawareness (or anosognosia) is related to poor rehabilitation and prognosis. This narrative review provides a guide for clinicians and (applied) academics to understanding, assessing and managing anosognosia. Questions addressed are: What is anosognosia? What causes anosognosia? How can anosognosia be assessed? And how can anosognosia be managed? We suggest that anosognosia is a multifaceted disorder, with diverse neuroanatomical and psychopathological origins. Assessment should measure various aspects of awareness, and management should be multidimensional to address problems with motor function, awareness, and emotional/motivational disturbance.

The current study adds to the growing empirical research into the mechanisms underlying unawareness of paralysis following stroke (anosognosia for hemiplegia or AHP) by investigating action awareness for the non-paralysed limb in a single AHP patient. Visual feedback representing patient GG's goal-directed reaching movements was either modified by a computer or left unperturbed. Unlike healthy and brain-damaged controls, GG was unable to detect computer-generated visual perturbations as large as 20°. GG also failed to report awareness of the large on-line corrective movements that he made when compensating (often unsuccessfully) for the visual perturbations. These results suggest that the motor comparators implicated in AHP are functioning, but not at optimum levels. Moreover, because the current findings reveal a deficit in awareness for reaches with the unimpaired limb, it is suggestive of common right hemisphere networks for motor awareness in both limbs and that AHP may be a global deficit in motor awareness as opposed to a specific lack of awareness for a particular motor deficit., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is a lack of awareness about paralysis following stroke. Recent explanations use a 'forward model' of movement to suggest that AHP patients fail to register discrepancies between internally- and externally-generated sensory information. We predicted that this failure would impair the ability to recall from memory whether information is internally- or externally-generated (i.e., reality monitor). Two experiments examined this prediction. Experiment 1 demonstrated that AHP patients exhibit a reality monitoring deficit for non-motor information (i.e., perceived vs. imagined drawings), whilst hemiplegic controls without anosognosia (nonAHP) perform like age-matched healthy volunteers (HVs). Experiment 2 explored if this deficit occurs when AHP patients discriminate performed, imagined, or observed movement. Results showed impaired reality monitoring for movements in AHP and nonAHP patients relative to HVs. Findings suggest that reality monitoring processes not directly related to movement, together with a failure to reality monitor movements, contribute to the pathogenesis of AHP.

Following right-hemisphere damage, a specific disorder of motor awareness can occur called anosognosia for hemiplegia, i.e. the denial of motor deficits contralateral to a brain lesion. The study of anosognosia can offer unique insights into the neurocognitive basis of awareness. Typically, however, awareness is assessed as a first person judgement and the ability of patients to think about their bodies in more 'objective' (third person) terms is not directly assessed. This may be important as right-hemisphere spatial abilities may underlie our ability to take third person perspectives. This possibility was assessed for the first time in the present study. We investigated third person perspective taking using both visuospatial and verbal tasks in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia (n = 15) and without anosognosia (n = 15), as well as neurologically healthy control subjects (n = 15). The anosognosic group performed worse than both control groups when having to perform the tasks from a third versus a first person perspective. Individual analysis further revealed a classical dissociation between most anosognosic patients and control subjects in mental (but not visuospatial) third person perspective taking abilities. Finally, the severity of unawareness in anosognosia patients was correlated to greater impairments in such third person, mental perspective taking abilities (but not visuospatial perspective taking). In voxel-based lesion mapping we also identified the lesion sites linked with such deficits, including some brain areas previously associated with inhibition, perspective taking and mentalizing, such as the inferior and middle frontal gyri, as well as the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri. These results suggest that neurocognitive deficits in mental perspective taking may contribute to anosognosia and provide novel insights regarding the relation between self-awareness and social cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]