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The growing use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure delivery has rekindled the public versus private cost-of-capital debate. Early debate concluded that the social cost of public-sector capital is below that of private capital because risk can be spread across numerous taxpayers. Intervening research focused on the agency costs that arise due to increased separation between equity holders and managers and the various mechanisms to control those agency costs. We analyze differences in public versus private residual claims and their associated agency costs. We conclude that earlier discussions that omitted agency-cost analysis should be revisited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thanks to technological developments produced by scientists and engineers, franchising has grown to become a business model of choice for firm expansion in knowledge-intensive industries. We propose a formal model to explore to what degree franchisors should adapt their business practices or routines to successfully expand their franchises in newly targeted markets. By simultaneously considering the franchise's need to adapt locally in a new market and the level of business routine tacitness at the time of expansion, we integrate previously separate agency cost logics into one model. We offer refinements to the belief that expanding through a franchisee is the best when the business routines need adaptation, but expanding through a company-owned unit is best when these routines can be replicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the exclusion of non-profit-making entities from the right of freedom of establishment of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. It analyses the historical reasons for this exclusion. It is argued that the exclusion from freedom of establishment is no longer justified on the basis of two elements. Firstly, the development of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in the fields of competition law, free movement of capital and tax law makes such exclusion systematically no longer tenable. Secondly, a law and economics treatment of non-profit firms as organisations that efficiently provide services in alternative to for-profit firms weakens the reasons for the exclusion. The article proposes a uniform, European notion of non-profit entity based on a law and economics analysis of this type of firm for the purposes of Article 54 TFEU as opposed to possible different national notions. This is followed by a brief analysis of the hypothesis of regulatory competition among jurisdictions for the law regulating the corporate governance of non-profit entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]