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INTRODUCTION: In 2019, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced a protocol to evaluate pilots with insulin treated diabetes mellitus (ITDM) for special issuance (SI) medical certification for first-/second-class pilots. The protocol’s aim is improved assessment of ITDM control/hypoglycemia risk and relies on continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) data. This study compares the characteristics of first-/second-class pilots with ITDM and certification outcome.METHODS: Data was collected retrospectively from the FAA Document Imaging Workflow System (DIWS) for pilots considered for a first-/second-class SI under the ITDM program between November 2019 and October 2021. Inclusion criteria required submission of information required for certification decision (SI vs. denial). We extracted data on demographics and CGM parameters including mean glucose, standard deviation, coefficient of variance, time in range (%), time > 250 mg · dl−1 (%), and time < 70–80 mg · dl−1 (%). We compared these parameters between pilots issued an SI vs. denial with Mann-Whitney U-tests and Fisher exact tests using R.RESULTS: Of 200 pilots with ITDM identified, 77 met inclusion criteria. Of those, 55 received SIs and 22 were denied. Pilots issued SI were statistically significantly older (46 vs. 27 yr), had a lower hemoglobin A1c (6.50% vs. 7.10%), lower average glucose (139 mg · dl−1 vs. 156 mg · dl−1), and spent less time with low glucose levels (0.95% vs. 2.0%).DISCUSSION: The FAA program has successfully medically certificated pilots with ITDM for first-/second-class. Pilots granted an ITDM SI reflect significantly better diabetes control, including less potential for hypoglycemia. As this program continues, it will potentially allow previously disqualified pilots to fly safely.Stanwyck LK, DeVoll JR, Pastore J, Gamble Z, Poe A, Gui GV. Medical certification of pilots through the insulin-treated diabetes mellitus protocol at the FAA. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2022; 93(8):627–632.

INTRODUCTION: Little has been studied to promote aviation health in South Korea. The aim of this study was to analyze the results of aviation medical examinations conducted in South Korea over the past 5 yr and, in doing so, provide evidence for establishing a health promotion, disease prevention plan.METHODS: Subjects of the study consisted of applicants who underwent aviation medical examinations from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2020.RESULTS: Over the past 5 yr, the total number of aviation medical examinations in South Korea has shown an annual increase of more than 10%. In the presence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the number of aviation medical examinations, both renewal and initial, for all types of licenses, except renewal aviation medical examinations for the ATCL, decreased. Disqualification rates were generally higher in initial examinations than in renewal examinations. The examination results for license renewal showed the ATPL disqualification rate to be the highest at 3.5 per 1000 pilots per year in their 50s, with cardiology cases being the most common reason for disqualification, followed by ophthalmology cases and psychiatry cases. Diagnostic categories for those disqualified after initial aviation medical examinations were similar, though ophthalmological causes were most common, followed by cases of psychiatry and neurology.CONCLUSION: Main causes of disqualification in airmen and air traffic controllers were identified as the presence of cardiovascular, ophthalmic, and psychiatric diseases. The results of this study provide evidence for improving health promotion activity plans to manage risk factors of such diseases for aviation workers.Kim JS, Han BS, Kwon YH, Lim J. A 5-yr analysis of aviation medical examinations in South Korea. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2022; 93(6):499–506.

INTRODUCTION: An aviation safety management system should consider and mitigate against all potential risks to flight safety. In addition to in-flight incapacitation, pilots falling below regulatory standards who are assessed as unfit may have represented a risk prior to that assessment. An analysis was undertaken of Class 1 certificate holders to determine factors correlated with unfit assessments.METHODS: Fitness assessments of pre-existing Class 1 certificate holders following medical examinations (to EASA Part-MED standards) or between medicals were studied between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2019. Assessments where the outcome was ‘fit’ (N= 99,406) were compared with those where the outcome was ‘unfit’ (N= 7925). Analyses for correlation between unfit assessments against age, declared coexisting medical conditions, and the number of days since last assessed as fit were undertaken using SPSS.RESULTS: Unfit assessment likelihood and age were strongly correlated; there is, however, evidence for the ‘healthy worker effect’, with a fall in unfit assessments between 60–65 yr of age. There was no association between coexisting medical condition declaration and the likelihood of becoming unfit. The time interval between a fit and unfit assessment was significantly lower when comparing 20–60 and 61–63 yr old individuals.DISCUSSION: The analysis of unfit assessments shows strong correlation with increasing age and the possible presence of the healthy worker effect among commercial pilots. The decreased time from a previous fit assessment to an unfit assessment supports the reduced certificate validity period of Class 1 applicants over 60 yr of age.Cairns MK. Unfit assessments of Class 1 Medical certificate holders. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2021; 92(12):945–949

BACKGROUND: The applicants’ self-declaration of medical history is crucial for safety. Some evidence indicates that under-reporting of medical conditions exists. However, the magnitude in a population of aviation personnel has not been reported earlier.METHODS: A total of 9941 applicants for medical certificate/attestation for aviation-related safety functions during the last 5 yr up to December 2019 were registered at the Civil Aviation Authority Norway. E-mail addresses were known for 9027 of these applicants, who were invited to participate in a web-based survey.RESULTS: Among the 1616 respondents, 726 (45%) were commercial pilots, 457 (28%) private pilots, 272 (17%) air traffic controllers, and the remaining were cabin crew or crew in aerodrome/helicopter flight information service (AFIS or HFIS, respectively). A total of 108 were initial applicants. The age group 50+ constituted the largest proportion of respondents (53%). Aeromedical certification in general was believed to improve flight safety “to a high” or “very high extent” by 64% of the respondents. A total of 188 individuals (12%) admitted having under-reported information related to one or more categories, including mental (3%) or physical health (4%), medications (2%), and drug use, including alcohol use (5%). Among these, 21 participants believed their own under-reporting “to some” or “to a high extent” affected flight safety. In total 50% of noninitial applicants reported that they knew colleagues who had under-reported information. Analyses revealed that being a commercial pilot showed a higher risk for under-reporting compared with other classes and the perception of aeromedical examiners in a supportive or authoritative role reduced the risk.CONCLUSIONS: Under-reporting of medical conditions could be significant in aviation. Further studies should be conducted to investigate the true extent of under-reporting and its impact on flight safety and what mitigating measures might be recommended.Strand T-E, Lystrup N, Martinussen M. Under-reporting of self-reported medical conditions in aviation: a cross-sectional survey. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2022; 93(4):376–383.

BACKGROUND: The risks posed by flight illusions impacting pilot spatial orientation have been determined as a safety concern from numerous past aviation accident investigations. Early demonstration of the adverse effects of flight illusions on spatial orientation would be desirable for all pilots, especially at the early training stages to deeply embed good practices for onset detection, flight correction, and response mitigation.METHOD: Simulated flights on a disorientation demonstrator were performed by 19 pilots for 3 conditions: no illusion, somatogyral illusion, and Coriolis illusion. An objective approach for assessing pilot performance degradation due to flight illusions can be done by using a defined flight profile: instrument landing system (ILS) flight trajectory during final instrument approach. Deviations to the standard ILS profile were recorded to measure and evaluate the influence of the demonstrated flight illusion on pilot performance.RESULTS: The results show the expectation that the smallest deviations from the ideal trajectory are caused by pilot tracking error (no illusion), and the greatest deviations are caused by the Coriolis illusion. Results demonstrated a statistically significant effect of illusions on performance. According to statements from pilots, training for flight illusion response is essential to complement training in aircraft regulations and aerodynamics.DISCUSSION: Measuring the influence of vestibular illusions on flight profile with a simulator allows assessment of individual differences and improvement of pilot performance under the conditions of no illusion, the somatogyral illusion, and the Coriolis illusion.Boril J, Smrz V, Blasch E, Lone M. Spatial disorientation impact on the precise approach in simulated flight. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(10):767775.

INTRODUCTION: Exposure to high G force is a known safety hazard in military aviation as well as civilian aerobatic flight. Tolerance to high G forces has been well studied in military pilots, but there is little research directed at civilian pilots who may have medications or medical conditions not permitted in military pilots.METHODS: In this case-control study, we identified 89 fatal high-G aerobatic accidents and 4000 fatal control accidents from 1995 through 2018 from the NTSB accident database and the FAA autopsy database. We retrieved medications and medical conditions from the FAA's pilot medical databases. Logistic regression models were used to explore the associations of drugs, medical conditions, height, and medical waivers with high-G accidents.RESULTS: Seven drugs (alprazolam, clonidine, ethanol, meclizine, phentermine, triamterene, and zolpidem) reached statistical significance in our models, but had such small case counts that we consider these findings to be uncertain, except for ethanol, which was found in seven cases. Of these, only triamterene was known to the FAA. Statistically significant medical predictors included only alcohol abuse (seven cases) and liver disease (only two cases).DISCUSSION: Our analysis found that the drug ethanol and the condition alcohol abuse are significantly associated with high-G accidents. Seven other factors were statistically significant, but should only be considered as hypothesis generating due to very low case counts. Our study does not suggest that restricting pilots with otherwise permissible medications or medical conditions from aerobatics is warranted.Mills WD, Greenhaw RM, Wang JMP. A medical review of fatal high-G U.S. aerobatic accidents. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(11):959–965.

INTRODUCTION: Spatial disorientation (SD) remains a leading cause of Class A mishaps and fatalities in aviation. Motion-based flight simulators and other research devices provide the capacity to rigorously study SD in order to develop effective countermeasures. By applying mathematical models of human orientation perception, we propose an approach to improve control algorithms for motion-based flight simulators to study SD.METHODS: The Disorientation Research Device (DRD), or the Kraken™, is the Department of Defense's newest and most capable aerospace medicine motion-based research device. We implemented an "Observer" model for predicting aircrew spatial orientation perception within the DRD, and perceptions experienced in flight. Further, we propose a framework that uses the model output, in addition to pilot control inputs, to optimize multiaxis motion control including human-in-the-loop control capability.RESULTS: A case study was performed to demonstrate the functionality of the framework. Additionally, the case study highlights both how limitations of human perception are crucial to consider when designing motion algorithms, and the challenges of effective flight simulation with multiple motion axes.DISCUSSION: We implemented a mathematical model for spatial orientation perception to improve the design of control algorithms for motion-based flight simulators, using the DRD as an example application. We provide an example of predicting perceptions, producing quantitative information on the efficacy of motion control algorithms. This mathematical model based approach to validating motion control algorithms aims to improve the fidelity of ground-based SD research.Dixon JB, Etgan CA, Horning DS, Clark TK, Folga RV. Integration of a vestibular model for the Disorientation Research Device motion algorithm application. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(10):901-907.

BACKGROUND: Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) helicopter aircrew get Helicopter Underwater Egress Training (HUET) using a Modular Egress Training Simulator (METS™) in order to be prepared for escaping the aircraft when ditching into water. In the current situation the retraining intervals are only chosen on an arbitrary basis for different backgrounds of the crew (maritime and regular flight crew). The frequency of refresher training depends on the expected degree of retention, but evidence-based research on required intervals between refresher courses is scarce. Ideally, training should be based on the amount of retention of acquired competencies.METHODS: Retrospective questionnaires were filled in by 132 helicopter aircrew who followed the HUET course(s) at the Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) school in Gilze-Rijen (Netherlands). They assessed themselves on competencies and gave their opinion on the preferred interval.RESULTS: Maritime crew report increasing competence levels with the number of refresher courses followed. According to the opinion of all aircrew, retraining intervals may take longer than 18 (first refresher) to 30 mo (fourth refresher). Maritime and regular flight crew differ in preferred retraining intervals (up to 22 mo and up to 33 mo, respectively).DISCUSSION: This study provides indications to reconsider the retraining interval and to differentiate between maritime and regular flight crew based on aircrew's opinions and self-assessments. As competence levels still increase with the number of courses followed, it is recommended to reconsider the current fixed intervals of once a year or once every 3 yr for maritime and regular flight crew, respectively.Bottenheft C, Oprins EAPB, Houben MMJ, Meeuwsen T, Valk PJL. Self-assessed preferred retraining intervals of Helicopter Underwater Egress Training (HUET). Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(9):800-806.

INTRODUCTION: Despite the large number of U.S. military members who conduct parachuting operations, its inherent safety risks, and the introduction of a new military parachute in 2010, little has been published in the last decade on U.S. military parachute fatalities.METHODS: Parachute fatality investigative records maintained by the U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center were reviewed for U.S. Army fatalities resulting from military parachuting operations from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2015. De-identified data on cases were collected, including causes, lethal injuries, and demographic, environmental, and missional factors. A descriptive analysis was performed.RESULTS: There were 13 cases which met study inclusion criteria. Most occurred during static-line operations and were jumps from a C-17 aircraft using a T-11 parachute. The two most common assigned accident codes were "improper or abnormal exit" and "unstable or improper body position," which combined accounted for 33% of cases. Also noteworthy at 11% each were "entanglement," "parachute malfunction," and "dragged on the drop zone," and at 6% each were "static line injury," "lost or stolen air," and "drop zone hazard." In 69% of cases blunt force trauma was the cause of death.DISCUSSION: Incident factors included human actions, equipment failure, and the environment. Death from blunt force trauma upon impact with the ground as the most frequent lethal injury was expected for parachute operations. This descriptive study provides awareness to military leaders of circumstances in which fatalities occur. Future investigations should include data on the total number of jumps to provide a more comprehensive analysis of risk.Johnson ES, Gaydos SJ, Pavelites JJ, Kotwal RS, Houk JE. U.S. Army parachute mishap fatalities: 2010-2015. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(7):637-642.

INTRODUCTION: Modafinil is a wakefulness-promoting stimulant that has been approved by the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) as a fatigue countermeasure medication since 2011. Each RSAF aircrew member must undergo a ground test to exclude operationally relevant adverse drug effects prior to consuming the medication for operational reasons. This study describes the RSAF's modafinil ground testing outcomes over a 7-yr period.METHODS: This is a retrospective case series of 243 RSAF aircrew members who underwent modafinil 100-mg test dosing over the 7-yr period from September 2011 to September 2018.RESULTS: The median age was 31 yr (range, 21-53 yr) and mean age was 31.7 yr ± 6.19 yr. Of the aircrew members, 234 (96.3%) were men and all were of Asian ethnicity. Of the subjects, 237 (97.5%) were medically cleared for the operational use of modafinil. Among the six (2.47%) who failed modafinil ground testing, headache (cumulative incidence, 1.65%), anxiety (cumulative incidence, 0.41%), diarrhea (cumulative incidence, 0.41%), and insomnia (cumulative incidence, 0.41%) were reported as the side effects experienced. None of the aircrew members experienced major adverse drug events.DISCUSSION: Our findings suggest a low occurrence of adverse drug effects among military aircrew members who undergo modafinil test dosing prior to using the drug operationally. To our knowledge, this is the single largest published case series of modafinil ground testing outcomes among Asian military aviators.Ooi T, Wong SH, See B. Modafinil as a stimulant for military aviators. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(5):480-483.

INTRODUCTION: This study explores the safety risk due to delayed detection of hazardous health conditions that would result from increasing the duration of U.S. first-class aeromedical certificates from 6 mo to 12 mo for pilots ages 40 yr old through 60 yr old.METHODS: All pilots who submitted a U.S. first-class application in 2014 with no electrocardiogram and with the previous exams 4.5 to 7.5 mo prior were selected from the FAA pilot medical database. Proportions of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) denial pathology codes and Aviation Medical Examiner (AME) deferrals were compared for these exams within and between age groups from 40 yr old through 75 yr old. The absolute incidence rates for delayed detection were calculated and relative incidence of these proportions was compared graphically.RESULTS: The relative risk between age groups for delayed identification of disqualifying medical conditions showed that the 56-60-yr-old group would be at about twice the risk as the 40-45-yr-old group. The absolute incidence for the 56-60-yr-old group was 0.46% for denial conditions and 0.60% for AME deferrals over 6 mo.DISCUSSION: Increasing FAA first-class medical certificate duration from 6 mo to 12 mo would put 56-60-yr-old pilots at double the currently accepted risk for delayed detection of significant medical conditions. The absolute risk for this 6-mo delayed identification for the 56-60-yr-old group would average 0.53%.Mills WD, DeJohn CA. Safety implications of 6-month vs. 1-year first-class aeromedical certificates. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(5):484-487.

BACKGROUND: From 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) permitted pilots who have had a heart transplant to be considered for recertification under special issuance at the third-class level. The objective of this study was to evaluate certification safety and determine if any adverse outcome occurred in this airman group as a consequence of this policy.METHODS: Methods involved collecting data from the FAA Document Imaging Workflow System to identify airmen undergoing cardiac transplantation since 2007, and examining medical and safety-related outcomes through the National Transportation Safety Board-related accident database and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Death Index.RESULTS: Included in the study were 36 airmen, with 16 recertified at the class 3 level and 20 denied certification. No aviation accidents or recorded deaths occurred in the group of 16 airmen undergoing recertification. Of these airmen, 13 underwent a second successful recertification and 6 underwent a third attempt, with 5 being successful. Two airmen have declared their intention to fly under BasicMed. Of the 20 airmen denied recertification, 16 were denied for failure to provide information. There were three deaths in this denied group.DISCUSSION: The policy allowing third-class heart transplant recipient recertification appears to be safe. Aviation safety is not being compromised by allowing these airmen to resume flying, with the exception that recertification should continue under the special issuance system and not through BasicMed.Norris A, Skaggs V, Kaye D, De Voll J, McGiffin D. Selective recertification of pilots who have undergone a cardiac transplant. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(9):732736.

INTRODUCTION: Loss-of-control (LOC) is the major cause of transport airplane mishaps. There have been many published reports and papers examining these accidents. While these studies did mention spatial disorientation (SD) as a cause or a factor, none of them analyzed it further. The present study uses transport and commuter airplane mishap data for a recent 35-yr period and examines the results of those mishaps involving spatial disorientation.METHOD: We identified LOC and SD accidents from five national aviation accident organizations and two independent groups. Only “normal” operations (air carrier, noncommercial transportation, ferry flights, and training) were considered. We reviewed transport and commuter airplane accidents using the published reports and identified 94 involving SD.RESULTS: We found the distribution of SD mishaps differs from LOC mishaps. During initial climb, there were relatively fewer SD mishaps (16%) than LOC mishaps (31%). During enroute climb SD has relatively more mishaps (18%) than LOC (11%). During go-around or missed approach phases, there were relatively more SD mishaps (21%) than LOC mishaps (4%). Perhaps the most significant observation was an increasing number of SD mishaps during the period reviewed.DISCUSSION: There are several possible reasons for the increasing numbers of SD mishaps over the study period from 1981 to 2016. Somatogravic illusion during go-around or missed approach accounts for only some of this increase. There is insufficient data to determine the reason for the remaining increase.Newman RL, Rupert AH. The magnitude of the spatial disorientation problem in transport airplanes. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(2):65–70.

Introduction The special issuance (SI) waiver is the primary mechanism for U.S. pilots who do not meet FAA standards to obtain a medical certificate. About 34,000 pilots possess an SI waiver, but there is a large gap in knowledge of the relationship of SI waivers to aviation safety. Methods All FAA pilot medical exams from 2002 through 2011 were matched to the National Transportation Safety Board accident database. The association of an SI waiver with accidents was explored using logistic regression models. Accident rates were also calculated using a novel technique based on pilots' reported flight times on their applications for medical certification. Results For third-class flight exams overall, the presence of an SI waiver is associated with 8.7% lower odds of an accident than regular issuance exams. The calculated overall accident rate was 6.6 per 100,000 h. For the first and second-class exams, there was no significant association of SI waivers with safety for the overall group. The oldest and youngest pilots in the third-class group and the younger pilots in the first and second-class groups had somewhat elevated accident odds. The significance of these higher odds is uncertain, especially for the younger pilots who have a probable flight time bias. Discussion The overall FAA program of special issuance waivers shows no detrimental effect on aviation accidents and enables a large number of pilots to safely continue their aviation pursuits in spite of failure to meet specific regulatory medical standards.Mills WD, Davis JT. The U.S. experience with special issuance waivers. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2018; 89(10):905-911.

In March 2015, a co-pilot flying Germanwings Flight 9525 deliberately pointed his airplane into a descent, killing himself, five other crew members, and 144 passengers. Subsequent investigation and review teams examined the incident and considered potential lessons to maximize air safety. In this article, aviation industry clinical leaders, including the U.S. Federal Air Surgeon and Chief Psychiatrist from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), along with a professional pilot and collaborating forensic psychiatrists, discuss suicide-by-plane, evolving themes related to public safety responsibilities for psychiatrists treating pilots, and forensic trends in pilot evaluation for medical certification from an aerospace psychiatric perspective. We explore how psychiatric aspects of pilot fitness and aviation safety are examined across perspectives, including unsafe acts, preconditions, organizational factors, and unsafe supervision. We explore practices for civilian pilots and offer information related to military pilot fitness. Lessons from Germanwings are presented, as is the need for increased support for pilots who might be concerned about revealing mental health challenges for fear of loss of medical certification and pilot employment. The Air Line Pilots Association Pilot Assistance Network is highlighted as one example of pilots supporting pilots to increase airway safety.

INTRODUCTION: The Statement of Demonstrated Ability (SODA) is a type of U.S. aeromedical waiver used for disqualifying conditions that are not expected to change. About 21,000 (2%) U.S. pilots possess a SODA waiver.METHODS: We matched all pilot medical exams from the FAA’s medical certification database from 2002 through 2011 to their respective accidents in the National Transportation Safety Board accident database. The association of SODA waivers and SODA conditions with the odds of an accident were explored using logistic regression techniques.RESULTS: For 3rd class flight exams, the presence of a SODA waiver was not associated with the odds of an accident. For the 1st and 2nd class exams, the accident odds ratio (OR = 1.45) was statistically significant. Crop dusting operations accounted for 17 of the 40 accidents where SODAs were present and returned a significant accident OR = 1.68. SODAs were not associated with the odds of accidents during other commercial operations. Six SODA conditions (amputation, internal eye, external eye, visual fields, bone and joint, and miscellaneous) were also found to have elevated ORs but were based on very small accident counts. NTSB investigators and the authors reviewed all accidents and none thought the SODA condition to be contributory.DISCUSSION: SODA waivers were not associated with increased accident odds except for crop dusting operations. Six specific SODA conditions also had elevated odds of an accident, but there was no evidence they contributed to the accidents. Overall, U.S. pilots with SODA waivers appear to have a satisfactory safety record.Mills WD, Davis JT. U.S. Statement of Demonstrated Ability aeromedical waivers. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(12):1034–1040.

INTRODUCTION: The value of aeromedical certification in reducing adverse medical outcomes is an especially important question for this era of increasing flight operations that do not require an FAA medical certificate. The study of this question has previously been thwarted by a lack of information about pilots when their medical certificates are not renewed.METHODS: We matched airmen in the FAA medical certification database to the U.S. Social Security Death Index to identify date of death for deceased pilots. Logistic regression models were used to explore associations of certification data with odds of death while holding a medical certificate and within 4 yr of expiration of a medical certificate.RESULTS: FAA aeromedical waivers were associated with 33% lower odds of death while holding a medical certificate and 35% increased odds of death within 4 yr after expiration of a medical certificate. Denial was associated with 21% increased odds of death in the next 4 yr. Only 13 of 47 medical conditions having significant associations were associated with increased odds of death during certification.DISCUSSION: We found that FAA aeromedical certification reduces the odds of death while holding a medical certificate compared to the 4 yr after certificate expiration. We believe this helps provide a positive answer to the question of whether medical certification reduces medically related events.Mills WD, Greenhaw RM. Association of medical certification factors with all-cause mortality in U.S. aviators. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(11):938–944.

Aviation and healthcare are complex industries and share many similarities: the cockpit and the operating theater, the captain and the surgeon. While North American commercial aviation currently enjoys a tremendous safety record, it was not always this way. A spike of accidents in 1973 caused 3214 aviation-related fatalities. Over the past 20years, the rate of fatal accidents per million flights fell by a factor of five, while air traffic increased by more than 86%. There have been no fatalities on a U.S. carrier for over 12years. Last year, there were 251,454 deaths in the United States owing to medical error. Pilots pioneered ways to address risks through crew resource management (CRM), and threat and error management (TEM). Both strategies, which are aimed at minimizing risk and optimizing safety, are applicable to surgery and the healthcare industry. These strategies as well as the Swiss Cheese Model, Checklists and the Normalization of Deviance will be reviewed in this article.

Though aviation is practiced in airplanes and anesthesiology in operating rooms, the two professions have substantial parallels. Both require readiness to manage a crisis situation, where lives are at stake, at a moment's notice and with incomplete information. The determinants of quality performance in both professions extend far beyond knowledge base and formal training. The science of human factors, a prominent cornerstone of the aviation industry, has not yet found the same place in medicine, but it could change the understanding and execution of medical decision-making in profound ways. This article reviews specific components of crisis management and root cause analysis in aviation that can serve as models for improving those same aspects within anesthesiology.

INTRODUCTION General aviation includes all civilian aviation apart from operations involving paid passenger transport. Unfortunately, this category of aviation holds a lackluster safety record, accounting for 94% of civil aviation fatalities. In 2014, of 1143 general aviation accidents, 20% were fatal compared with 0 of 29 airline mishaps in the United States. Herein, research findings over the past 30 yr will be reviewed. Accident risk factors (e.g., adverse weather, geographical region, post-impact fire, gender differences) will be discussed. The review will also summarize the development and implementation of stringent crashworthiness designs with multi-axis dynamic testing and head-injury protection and its impact on mitigating occupant injury severity. The benefits and drawbacks of new technology and human factor considerations associated with increased general aviation automation will be debated. Data on the safety of the aging general aviation population and increased drug usage will also be described. Finally, areas in which general aviation occupant survival could be improved and injury severity mitigated will be discussed with the view of equipping aircraft with 1) crash-resistant fuel tanks to reduce post-impact conflagration; 2) after-market ballistic parachutes for older aircraft; and 3) current generation electronic locator beacons to hasten site access by first responders.Boyd DD. A review of general aviation safety (1984-2017). Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(7):657-664.

Background Currently it is not unusual for general aviation pilots in the United States to continue to fly beyond the age of 70, even into their 80s and 90s. Pilots have regular examinations according to protocols which do not specify special or additional requirements for pilots over 70 yr of age. Additionally, the third class medical reforms passed by the U.S. Senate on 15 July 2016 could potentially result in even less stringent medical certification requirements for general aviation pilots. Methods Accident rates, medical parameters, autopsy findings, and toxicological findings from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) general aviation (GA) accident database were analyzed to assess potential risk factors with accident outcomes. Results During 2003-2012, there were 114 (113 men, 1 woman) general aviation fatal accidents involving pilots ages 70 to 92 yr. A combination of 3 or more drugs were found in 13 (13%) of deceased pilots. The most frequent drugs were first generation antihistamines and antidepressants represented the next highest proportion of possible performance-affecting medications. Conclusion This study indicates that there are critical medical factors that may contribute to fatal accidents among elderly pilots. Polypharmacy use should be taken into consideration, especially during periodic health examinations and fatal aviation investigations involving elderly pilots.Vuorio A, Asmayawati S, Budowle B, Griffiths R, Strandberg T, Kuoppala J, Sajantila A. General aviation pilots over 70 years old. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(2):142-145.

Background One of the most difficult challenges in aviation medicine is to diagnose, as early as possible, pilots with psychiatric disorders that may impair pilot performance and increase the risk of incidents and accidents. This diagnosis applies particularly to bipolar disorder (BD), where return to flying duty is not an option in the majority of cases. BD is a long-term mental disorder presenting remittent depressive, hypomanic, manic, or mixed episodes between low symptomatic or asymptomatic intermediate periods. Onset in most cases is in late teen or early adult years. Suicidal intentions and suicide risk are significantly elevated in individuals with BD compared to the general population. Methods A systematic literature search was performed of BD and aviation accidents and the National Transportation Safety Board database of fatal general aviation accidents was searched. One case report and two database reports of interest from 1994 to 2014 were identified. Results The findings set a minimum frequency of BD in general aviation fatalities to be approximately 2 out of 8648 (0.023%) in the United States. Discussion The reported incidence may underestimate the real number of BD cases for several reasons, including the fact that the medical history of pilots is not always available or is sometimes not the primary interest of a safety investigation. This study suggests that the demarcation of psychiatric disorder related to fitness to fly is an important step in safety.Vuorio A, Laukkala T, Navathe P, Budowle B, Bor R, Sajantila A. Bipolar disorder in aviation medicine. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(1):42-47.

INTRODUCTION: In this article an analysis is made of existing legal provisions and policies regarding medical confidentiality and the use of medical information on pilots, for the reporting of unfit pilots and for accident and incident investigation. An overview is given of the applicable international, European and several national legal frameworks in relation to this question. The applicable national legislation and relating policies of the Netherlands, the U.S., and Canada are compared on this subject. These three States (countries) are selected because of the differences between them in legal provisions when it comes to medical confidentiality of pilots' health information. The article will conclude with tools derived from this analysis, which can be used to find a balance between medical confidentiality vs. aviation safety.Schuite JM. Aviation safety vs. medical confidentiality: disclosure of health information for accident prevention and investigation. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(10):872-881.

INTRODUCTION: Paragliding is an emerging discipline of aviation, with recreational pilots flying distances over 100 km. It remains risky. Accidents typically relate to pilot error rather than equipment failure. We measured cognition and physiological responses during simulated flight, to investigate whether errors might be due to pilot impairment, rather than misjudgment.METHODS: There were 10 male paraglider pilots (aged 19-58 yr) who undertook a simulated flight in an environmental chamber from sea level (0.209 FIo₂) to 1524 m (0.174 FIo₂), 2438 m (0.156 FIo₂), and 3658 m (0.133 FIo₂), over approximately 2 h. They experienced normobaric hypoxia, environmental cooling and headwind, completing logical reasoning, mannikin, mathematical processing, Stroop Color-Word and Tower Puzzle tasks; as well as measures of risk-taking (BART), mood (POMS), and subjective experience.RESULTS: Results were compared to ten controls, matched by age, sex, and flying experience. Physiological measures were oxygen consumption, carbon dioxide production, ventilation, heart rate, oxygen saturation, rectal and skin temperatures, blood glucose, blood lactate, and urine production. There were no significant differences between pilots and controls at any altitude. Results were heterogenous within and between individuals. As altitude increased, oxygen consumption and minute volume increased significantly, while oxygen saturations fell (98.3% [baseline] to 88.5% [peak]). Rectal temperatures fell by a statistically (but not clinically) significant amount (37.6°C to 37.3°C), while finger skin temperatures dropped steeply (32.2°C to 13.9°C).DISCUSSION: Results suggest cognitive impairment is unlikely to be a primary cause of pilot error during paragliding flights (of less than 2 h, below 3658 m), though hand protection requires improvement.Wilkes M, Long G, Massey H, Eglin C, Tipton MJ. Cognitive function in simulated paragliding flight. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(10):851-859.

INTRODUCTION: Adverse weather and poor visual cues are common elements in night-time Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) operations contributing to spatial disorientation and fatal accidents. Pilots are required to make weather-related preflight risk assessments to accept or reject a flight. This study's aim was to develop predictive risk assessment tools based on historical accident data to assist the decision-making process.METHODS: We analyzed 32 single-pilot HEMS night-time visual flight rules fatal accidents to identify contributory risk factors. Logistic regression analysis was used to develop prediction nomograms for nonvisual meteorological conditions (non-VMC), cause and nonsurvivable accidents as dependent variables. Risk factors such as temperature dew point spread, elevation difference, and years of HEMS pilot experience, were entered as continuous variables. Flight crew composition, pilot DTE (domain task experience) and flight rule capability, primary missions, and temperature dew point spread were entered as categorical variables. A point scoring matrix transposed model probability to likelihood and consequence severity.RESULTS: The nomograms correctly predicted the likelihood of entering non-VMC, accident cause, and sustaining a nonsurvivable accident in 75%, 55%, and 94% of cases, respectively. Using data from a recent nonsurvivable HEMS accident, the nomogram estimated a 92% probability (Very Likely) of nonsurvivable accident if visual cues were lost.CONCLUSION: These nomograms can provide preflight information to predict the likelihood of adverse safety outcomes occurring during a planned HEMS mission. While further development work is needed, this approach has the potential to improve HEMS operational safety.Aherne BB, Zhang C, Chen WS, Newman DG. Preflight risk assessment for improved safety in Helicopter Emergency Medical Service operations. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(9):792-799.

BACKGROUND: Of all phases of flight operations, accidents during landings are the most frequent. Of these, poor speed management during landing has ramifications for injury severity since: 1) impact forces increase as a square of forward velocity; and 2) an aerodynamic stall, associated with inadequate landing speed, imparts high vertical G forces. Herein, the proportion of landing accidents involving deficient airspeed control and occupant injury severity was determined.METHODS: General aviation landing accidents (1997-2016) were identified from the NTSB database. An accident involving high-airspeed (high-energy) was one for which the NTSB cited airplane porpoising, multiple bounces, or floating, whereas an inadequate airspeed related (low energy) mishap was one citing this term or in which an aerodynamic stall occurred. An anonymous online survey of certificated pilots was used to inform landing technique. Statistical analyses used Poisson distribution and Chi-squared tests.RESULTS: Relative to the earliest period (1997-2001), the landing accident rate was undiminished for more recent years (2007-2016). Of 235 accidents, 38% involved high-energy, whereas 4% were inadequate airspeed-related. For the former, 17% resulted in occupants with fatal-serious injuries, twofold higher than for mishaps with no evidence of mis-speed. Of 1392 survey respondents, 73% selected a landing airspeed higher than required for an under-maximum weight airplane.CONCLUSION: For landing accidents involving airspeed mismanagement, those related to excessive energy predominate and are associated with more severe injuries. Two mitigating strategies are advanced: 1) pilot training should discuss landing airspeed adjustment for aircraft weight; and 2) installation of inflatable restraints for reducing injury severity should be encouraged.Boyd DD. Occupant injury severity in general aviation accidents involving excessive landing airspeed. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(4):355-361.

Objective To determine if using a parachute prevents death or major traumatic injury when jumping from an aircraft. Design Randomized controlled trial. Setting Private or commercial aircraft between September 2017 and August 2018. Participants 92 aircraft passengers aged 18 and over were screened for participation. 23 agreed to be enrolled and were randomized. Intervention Jumping from an aircraft (airplane or helicopter) with a parachute versus an empty backpack (unblinded). Main outcome measures Composite of death or major traumatic injury (defined by an Injury Severity Score over 15) upon impact with the ground measured immediately after landing. Results Parachute use did not significantly reduce death or major injury (0% for parachute v 0% for control; P>0.9). This finding was consistent across multiple subgroups. Compared with individuals screened but not enrolled, participants included in the study were on aircraft at significantly lower altitude (mean of 0.6 m for participants v mean of 9146 m for non-participants; Pv mean of 800 km/h; P Conclusions Parachute use did not reduce death or major traumatic injury when jumping from aircraft in the first randomized evaluation of this intervention. However, the trial was only able to enroll participants on small stationary aircraft on the ground, suggesting cautious extrapolation to high altitude jumps. When beliefs regarding the effectiveness of an intervention exist in the community, randomized trials might selectively enroll individuals with a lower perceived likelihood of benefit, thus diminishing the applicability of the results to clinical practice.

BACKGROUND: In September 2004 a new pilot certificate, sport pilot, was established, which enabled pilots to fly with a valid driver's license in lieu of a valid third-class medical certificate. In 2016 Mills and DeJohn published a paper in which they demonstrated that sport pilots had a higher accident rate than private pilots with Class 3 medical certificates. They concluded that this privilege should not be extended to a broader range of pilots due to the higher accident rate. They failed to investigate why these pilots crashed. This short communication aims to fill that gap.METHODS: The NTSB database was reviewed for the entire period that sport pilot has been available, and reasons for the accidents were determined, both for sport pilots and private pilots with Class 3 medicals.RESULTS: Sport pilot accidents were caused by medical incapacitation 3.7% of the time. Private pilots with Class 3 medicals had accidents that cited medical incapacitation 2.5% of the time.DISCUSSION: Medical incapacitation represents either a probable cause or contributing factor in aviation accidents less than 5% of the time. There is a slightly higher rate of this incapacitation among pilots not receiving regular aeromedical evaluations, but the difference was not statistically significant.Mulvey JR. Aviation accident causes among sport pilots as compared to Class 3 private pilots from 2004-2017. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2018; 89(11):1002-1004.

In the United States, between 1995 and 2013, night-time visual flight rules (VFR) Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) fatal accidents mostly encountered adverse weather, and pilots with6 yr of HEMS experience showed higher likelihood of a night operational accident. One adverse weather indicator is cloud-ceiling likelihood indicated by temperature dew point spread (TDPS). This study investigated the relationship between TDPS and HEMS pilot years of experience. It was hypothesized pilots with6 yr HEMS experience were associated with fatal outcomes encountered at lower TDPS.Between 1995 and 2013, 32 single pilot night VFR HEMS fatal accidents occurring in the United States, caused by controlled flight into terrain or loss of control, were analyzed. Using Federal Aviation Administration weather guidance, the 0-4°C TDPS was selected as an indicator of cloud ceiling. Each flight's TDPS was analyzed with pilots' HEMS domain task experience.There were 27 flights which entered the 0-4°C TDPS range; 20 (74%) were significantly associated with adverse weather. A significant negative linear relationship was found between TDPS of each mission and years of pilot HEMS experience (r = -0.423, P = 0.028). Pilots with6 yr of experience were significantly associated with fatal outcomes (P = 0.049).Pilots' incremental years of HEMS experience were associated with a TDPS decrement. Fatal outcomes were over nine times higher for pilots with6 yr of HEMS experience in night VFR operational accidents in those conditions. Interventions for6-yr pilots are recommended during experience building to prevent likelihood of operational accidents.Aherne BB, Zhang C, Chen WS, Newman DG. Pilot decision making in weather-related night fatal helicopter emergency medical service accidents. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2018; 89(9):830-836.

BACKGROUND Review of injuries resulting from aircraft accidents and analysis of their mechanisms have proved helpful in generating and implementing survival-related improvements. Ideally, such information should be correlated with seat belt type and use, as well as any brace position adopted. This information should be recorded and made publicly available to future researchers. METHODS Members of IBRACE have developed two questionnaires to assist accident / cabin-safety investigators to record this information in an integrated consistent manner. RESULTS One questionnaire relates to the survivors and one to the deceased. DISCUSSION IBRACE members hope that these questionnaires will assist the investigation of future aircraft accidents.Davies JM, Wallace WA, Colton CL, Yoo KI, Maurino M. Two aviation accident investigation questionnaires for passenger and crew survival factors and injuries. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2018; 89(5):483-486.

Introduction Until recently, glaucoma requiring treatment was disqualifying for U.S. pilots and required an aeromedical special issuance waiver. Since 2013 Aerospace Medical Examiners (AMEs) have been authorized to evaluate third-class pilots with mild glaucoma using similar protocols and issue medical certificates without a waiver if these criteria specified in the AME Guide are met. Methods The FAA's medical database was searched for pilots with glaucoma between 2005 and 2014. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database was then searched to determine which pilots with glaucoma had aircraft accidents during that period. The odds of accidents in the glaucoma pilots were compared with the overall pilot accident odds. Results Of 5000 pilots being treated for glaucoma, 78 were involved in aircraft accidents; however, glaucoma was not cited as the probable cause or contributing factor in any of the accidents. A logistic regression model adjusted for age showed that glaucoma had a protective effect on accident odds. The crude accident rate for third-class pilots with glaucoma was estimated to be 7.2 per 100,000 flight hours, with a fatal accident rate of 1.8 per 100,000. Although these point estimates were slightly higher than the estimated general aviation accident rates, the differences were not statistically significant. Discussion These findings suggest that third-class pilots with glaucoma are not at significantly greater risk of an accident than the U.S. general aviation community. It also indicates that FAA certification protocols for certifying and following pilots with glaucoma provide an adequate level of flight safety.DeJohn CA, Mills WD. Glaucoma in U.S. civil aviation: 2005-2014. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(12):1117-1122.

INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this investigation was to identify factors associated with Air Force aviators delaying ejection during in-flight emergencies. METHODS: The investigator reviewed all reports within the Air Force Safety Automated System describing mishaps that resulted in the destruction of Air Force ejection-seat equipped aircraft between 1993 and 2013. Crewmembers were classified as either timely or delayed ejectors based on altitude at onset of emergency, altitude at ejection, and a determination regarding whether or not the aircraft was controlled during the mishap sequence. Univariate analysis and multivariate logistic regression were used to explore the association between delayed ejection and multiple potential risk factors. RESULTS: In total, 366 crewmembers were involved in in-flight emergencies in ejection-seat-equipped aircraft that resulted in the loss of the aircraft; 201 (54.9%) of these crewmembers delayed ejection until their aircraft had descended below recommended minimum ejection altitudes. Multivariate analysis indicated that independent risk factors for delayed ejection included increased crewmember flight hours and a mechanical or human-factors related cause of the emergency versus bird strike or midair collision. DISCUSSION: This investigation provided quantitative assessments of factors associated with aviators delaying ejection during in-flight emergencies. Increased odds of delay among crewmembers with greater than 1500 total flight hours suggests that complacency and overconfidence may adversely influence the ejection decision to at least as great a degree as inexperience. Increased odds of delay during mechanical and human factors mishaps confirms previously reported hypotheses and reaffirms the importance of targeting these areas to reduce aviator injuries and fatalities. Miles JE. Factors associated with delayed ejection in mishaps between 1993 and 2013. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2015; 86(9):774-781. Language: en

BACKGROUND Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder with symptoms of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interfere with functioning and/or development. ADHD occurs in about 2.5% of adults. ADHD can be an excluding medical condition among pilots due to the risk of attentional degradation and therefore impact on flight safety. Diagnosis of ADHD is complex, which complicates aeromedical assessment. This study highlights fatal accident cases among pilots with ADHD and discusses protocols to detect its presence to help to assess its importance to flight safety. METHODS To identify fatal accidents in aviation (including airplanes, helicopters, balloons, and gliders) in the United States between the years 2000 to 2015, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database was searched with the terms ADHD, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and attention deficit disorder (ADD). RESULTS The NTSB database search for fatal aviation accidents possibly associated with ADHD yielded four accident cases of interest in the United States [4/4894 (0.08%)]. Two of the pilots had ADHD diagnosed by a doctor, one was reported by a family member, and one by a flight instructor. An additional five cases were identified searching for ADD [5/4894 (0.1%)]. Altogether, combined ADHD and ADD cases yielded nine accident cases of interest (0.18%). DISCUSSION It is generally accepted by aviation regulatory authorities that ADHD is a disqualifying neurological condition. Yet FAA and CASA provide specific protocols for tailor-made pilot assessment. Accurate evaluation of ADHD is essential because of its potential negative impact on aviation safety.Laukkala T, Bor R, Budowle B, Sajantila A, Navathe P, Sainio M, Vuorio A. Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and fatal accidents in aviation medicine. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(9):871-875.

INTRODUCTION This study explores the U.S. experience with waivers for insulin treatment for third-class medical certificates. From 1997 through 2014, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved an estimated 1500 waivers for insulin-treated diabetes with a total of 450 active waivers as of December 31, 2014. These pilots were involved in 25 accidents, but none were attributed to medical issues. METHODS Data for the insulin waiver group and control group were obtained from the FAA's aeromedical certification system and matching accident data from the NTSB database. A logistic regression model comparing accidents in this group to the overall population of third-class certificate holders adjusted for gender, age, and flight times was performed. A novel technique for calculating accident rates was also employed. RESULTS No statistically significant association between waivers for insulin treatment and accident risk was found by logistic regression. The overall accident rate for pilots possessing an insulin waiver was 7.0 per 100,000 flight hours and an estimate for all third-class pilots was also 7.0 per 100,000 flight hours. Only 8% of waivers for insulin treatment were later terminated for adverse changes related to the applicant's diabetes. Of these pilots, 8% also had coronary artery disease severe enough to require its own waiver. CONCLUSION Taken together, these findings suggest that pilots holding special issuance waivers for insulin-treated diabetes are not detectably less safe than other airmen with third-class medical certificates and most are able to successfully comply with the FAA's stringent medical certification protocol for insulin treated diabetes.Mills WD, DeJohn CA, Alaziz M. The U.S. experience with waivers for insulin-treated pilots. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(1):34-41.

BACKGROUND: Spatial disorientation is a significant factor in a large percentage of military Class A aviation mishaps. While previous studies have analyzed accident statistics, they often suffer from methodological flaws, which lead to questionable conclusions. METHODS: The current study relied upon the Air Force Safety Automated System to document U.S. Air Force Class A mishap investigations during the past 21 yr. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System codes were used to determine mishaps involving pilot spatial disorientation. The data were combined with data from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System to determine the accident rate per flight hour. RESULTS: There were 72 spatial disorientation (SD) mishaps analyzed, resulting in loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft since fiscal year (FY) 1993 for a total monetary cost of 2.32 billion. Class A mishaps involving spatial disorientation had a higher rate as a function of hours flown for helicopter and fighter/attack fixed wing aircraft than other aircraft. Additionally, mishap rates for F-16 fighter/attack aircraft were marginally larger than for other fighter/attack aircraft. Although SD mishaps at night had similar mishap rates to daytime SD mishaps when adjusted by flight hours, SD mishaps account for a larger percent of Class A mishaps during the night than during the day. DISCUSSION: SD mishaps were analyzed in terms of Class A mishaps per million flight hours. RESULTS indicate that future SD research should be focused on fighter/attack and helicopter platforms. Updates to the Air Force safety center database are recommended. Language: en

According to 40 yr of data, the fatality rate for a helicopter crash into water is approximately 25%. Does warning time and the final position of the helicopter in the water influence the survival rate?The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database was queried to identify helicopter crashes into water between 1981 and 2011 in the Gulf of Mexico and Hawaii. Fatality rate, amount of warning time prior to the crash, and final position of the helicopter were identified.There were 133 helicopters that crashed into water with 456 crew and passengers. Of these, 119 occupants (26%) did not survive; of those who did survive, 38% were injured. Twelve died after making a successful escape from the helicopter. Crashes with15 s warning had a fatality rate of 22%, compared to 12% for 16-60 s warning and 5% for1 min. However, more than half of fatalities (57%) came from crashes for which the warning time could not be determined.Lack of warning time and how to survive in the water after the crash should be a topic for study in all marine survival/aircraft ditching courses. Investigators should be trained to provide estimates of warning time when investigating helicopter crashes into water.

Our ageing society faces an ageing work force. The target of this systematic review was to analyse whether pilots have a measurable age-dependent increased risk of incapacitation due to medical reasons.Publications listed in PubMed, NCBI and EMBASE were identified using defined terms. Two independent raters analysed 2,342 retrieved publications by predefined criteria. Ten publications met the inclusion criteria.Four publications use a similar numerator (in-flight incapacitation) and identical denominator (flight hours) and show in-flight incapacitation of pilots happening 0.19-0.45 times/10(6) flight hours. Two of these studies did not analyse the possible correlation of incapacitation and age, and two did not use the denominator flight hours here. Age dependency of incapacitation is analysed in seven publications: Three analyse in-flight incapacitation and four analyse general incapacitation to fly. All but one--the only one including professional pilots older than 60 years--show an age-depending increase in incapacitation. The increase in in-flight incapacitation is far less than the increase in general flight incapacitation.Medical in-flight incapacitation is a very rare event. Whether the increase in in-flight incapacitation results in an increase in accidents or can be compensated for by error reduction through experience cannot be answered. A register of all pilots with a clear identification system to follow their career and health, their accidents and impairments, might help to reconsider the grounding of pilots over 60 and to define better criteria than mere age.

This paper reviews aeromedical decision-making in psychiatry. It explains the "one-percent rule", the general medical criteria for fitness for flying and how they are applied to psychiatric disorders.

INTRODUCTION: In the United States, accident and fatality rates in helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS) operations increase significantly under nighttime environmentally hazardous operational conditions. Other studies have found pilots' total flight hours unrelated to HEMS accident outcomes. Many factors affect pilots' decision making, including their experience. This study seeks to investigate whether pilot domain task experience (DTE) in HEMS plays a role against likelihood of accidents at night when hazardous operational conditions are entered. METHODS: There were 32 flights with single pilot nighttime fatal HEMS accidents between 1995 and 2013 with findings of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and loss of control (LCTRL) due to spatial disorientation (SD) identified. The HEMS DTE of the pilots were compared with industry survey data. RESULTS: Of the pilots, 56% had ≤2 yr of HEMS experience and 9% had >10 yr of HEMS experience. There were 21 (66%) accidents that occurred in non-visual flight rules (VFR) conditions despite all flights being required to be conducted under VFR. There was a statistically significant increase in accident rates in pilots with 10 yr HEMS DTE. CONCLUSION: HEMS DTE plays a preventive role against the likelihood of a night operational accident. Pilots with limited HEMS DTE are more likely to make a poor assessment of hazardous conditions at night, and this will place HEMS flight crew at high risk in the VFR night domain. Aherne BB, Zhang C, Newman DG. Pilot domain task experience in night fatal helicopter emergency medical service accidents. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2016; 87(6):550-556. Language: en

Background/Aim. Ejection injuries are the problem for air forces. The present risk for injuries is still too high, approximately 30-50%. This study was an effort to determine factors responsible for and contributing to injuries in the Serbian Air Force (SAF) in the last two decades. Methods. All ejection cases in the SAF between 1990 and 2010 were analyzed. The collected data were: aircraft type, ejection seat generation, pilots ? age and experience, causes of ejection, aeronautical parameters, the condition of aircraft control and types of injuries. For ease of comparison the U.S. Air Force Safety Regulation was used to define of major injuries: hospitalization for 5 days or more, loss of consciousness for over 5 min, bone fracture, joint dislocation, injury to any internal organ, any third-degree burn, or second-degree burn over 5% of the body surface area. Results. There were 52 ejections (51 pilots and 1 mechanic) on 44 airplanes. The ejected persons were from 22 to 46 years, average 32 years. Major injuries were present in 25.49% cases. Of all the ejected pilots 9.61% had fractures of thoracic spine, 11.53% fractures of legs, 3.48% fractures of arms. Of all major injuries, fractures of thoracic spine were 38.46%. None of the pilots had experienced ejection previously. Conclusion. Our results suggest to obligatory take preventive measures: magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan must be included in the standard pilot selection procedure and procedure after ejection. Physical conditioning of pilots has to be improved. Training on ejection trainer has to be accomplished, too.