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We analyze effects of noneconomic damages caps and attorney fee limits (AFLs) on the ability of people injured by negligent physicians to retain qualified lawyers to represent them. We employ survey data from 965 plaintiffs' attorneys who reported likelihoods of accepting hypothetical meritorious cases described by scenarios. We estimate how willingness to accept such cases increases with the expected hourly fees associated with them, and the estimates suggest substantial effects and plausible tradeoffs. We conclude that caps and AFLs make it harder to retain counsel in various circumstances, and we present policy simulations elucidating how several factors combine to determine these effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some states use physicians' histories of medical malpractice payments to try to reduce the incidence of medical malpractice (and for other reasons). At least two types of policies fall into this category: using payments to decide which physicians will be investigated, and possibly sanctioned, by the state medical board; and making information about individual physicians' payment histories available to the public. Previous literature suggests that such policies will not be very effective because the link between medical malpractice and medical malpractice payments appears weak. Unlike previous researchers, we examine this issue directly and quantitatively. To do so, we develop a micro-simulation model of the random processes determining medical outcomes, claiming rates, and payment rates, using information from several strands of literature to calibrate its parameters. To examine sensitivity of our predictions to changes in assumptions, we also consider 14 alternative models. For each of the 15 cases, we simulate data for a population of 100,000 physicians and analyze the simulated data. We find that neither type of policy will substantially reduce the population rate of malpractice and that the policy of publicizing payment histories could, in principle, backfire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Media coverage of litigation may affect perceptions and thereby behavior of litigants, judges, juries, legislators and business decisionmakers. Their behavior influences various legal, social, political and economic outcomes. For product liability verdicts during 1983 to 1996 involving automobile manufacturers, we examine the amount of coverage in several dozen newspapers. We find almost no articles reporting on any of 259 verdicts for the defendant. Econometric analysis focuses on determinants of the amount of coverage of 92 verdicts for plaintiffs, 16 of which include punitive damages. Key determinants include the award amount, the nature of injuries, the vehicle's recall history, and especially the existence of a punitive component of damages regardless of its size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]