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This article traces the interactions between Taiwan and China in the World Trade Organization with regard to Chinese concerns about Taiwan's sovereignty and the application of the "one China" principle. The analysis proceeds in three stages: first, both parties' simultaneous accession negotiations; second, continued sovereignty-related disputes after the accession; and third, Taiwan's accession to the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement. The article uses cost/benefit calculations to explain the Chinese and Taiwanese attitudes in their encounters within the WTO framework. The decision-making bodies in the WTO had decided that Taiwan could only accede after China, while agreeing that then Taiwan should become a separate member, independent from China. After this decision, China could have only stopped Taiwan's accession by letting go of the opportunity to become itself a WTO member. China needed to balance its own wish to join the trade body with its desire to block a Taiwanese entry on sovereignty grounds, therefore from China's perspective, opposition to Taiwan's WTO participation became a cost/benefit calculation. Once both Taiwan and China had entered the organisation, China's means to put pressure on the organisation improved, it could at a much lesser cost influence decisions on Taiwan's status within the organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]