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Many philosophers think that given the choice between saving the life of an innocent person and averting any number of minor ailments or inconveniences, it would be better to save the life. How, then, should one compare the risk of an innocent person's life to such minor ailments and inconveniences? If lives are infinitely more important than insignificant factors then any risk cannot be outweighed, and that is untenable. An alternative approach seems more promising: let the values of such insignificant factors be bounded, as then there will be well-behaved tradeoffs between insignificant things and the risk to an innocent life. We argue, however, that bounding the values of insignificant factors poses myriad problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Comprendre: Revista Catalana de Filosofía is the property of Herder Editorial S.L. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Hermeneus is the property of Revista Hermeneus and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Colección is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With this study we analyze a practically unknown and controversial figure in the Contemporary History of Spain, Antonio Alcalá Galiano y Alcalá Galiano. Member of an outstanding family of the second half of the 18th century and especially of the 19th century, this jurist, councilor of the Treasury, parliamentarian of the Cortes of Cádiz and a scholar of law --he was given the name of afrancesado during the Peninsular war, although he defended his condition as a convinced patriot he assumed a significant role in public life during the transition from the Old to the New Regime as a high reformist official. Furthermore, he contributed a proposal for a transactional political organization between absolutism and liberalism in the framework of the confrontation between both systems. His biography and especially his thought with an illustrated root, which started from the republicanism and democracy of his youth to evolve to moderate liberalism and even came to support the absolute power of Ferdinand VII of Spain, are of enormous interest to understand the continuities and changes experienced in that axial moment of the birth of the Spanish contemporariness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Qohelet is one of the most fascinating books in the Hebrew Bible because it falls outside of the confides of what it is deemed as orthodox in terms of genre, literary components and theology. Considered in both antiquity and contemporary interpretations as Wisdom Literature, the book holds rich material to be interpreted and classified in a myriad of ways. It is no secret that Qohelet is an idiosyncratic scholar whose position is defined by unusualness, to define it as defiance would be extreme. As traditional renderings of liminality are often but not always limited to spatiality and time, here liminality is defined as an intellectual exercise. The decision to locate Qohelet as a liminal intellectual is informed by the epistemology encountered in the book if the consensus is that Qohelet existed in post-exilic Israel and that the book borders mostly around philosophical themes and ideas. The aim of this article is to outline and state how, when and why Qohelet becomes a liminal intellectual. This article subsequently borrows from the discipline of anthropology to illuminate how such a position is attainable and possible through a reading of Qohelet with an intersection of Arnold van Gennep's conception of liminality that traditionally speaks to the margins and structures of positions to how we use some of those tools of analysis to construct a liminality, which privileges knowledge production and encompasses so much more. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article details the degree to which the ideal of punishment proportional to desert forces changes in how we think of deontological morality. More specifically, the proportionality ideal forces us to abandon the simple, text-like view of deontological moral norms, and it forces us to acknowledge that those norms are not uniformly categorical in their force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this critical paper, we engage with a recent absolutist proposal to account for faultless disagreement — that of Jeremy Wyatt. We first introduce the phenomenon to be explained and briefly present Wyatt's account. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to spelling out objections to various aspects of the view, which are related to his adherence to semantic minimalism, the interpretation of the empirical data he relies on, and his construal of both faultlessness and disagreement. We end with a comparison of the proposal with other views on the market from the point of view of theoretical economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ever-increasing demands of war during the Renaissance caused rulers to continuously impose new taxes and exactions. One of the most unpopular exactions was billeting – the obligation to provide shelter to the king's troops. The fact that billeting could be enforced despite widespread hardship and discontent has been traditionally interpreted as evidence of absolutism. In contrast, opposition to billeting tends to be regarded as a form of resistance to 'despotism'. From this perspective, the ability of the monarchy to impose its demands in this matter and others is fundamentally reduced to a question of power dynamics between king and country. Some of the most popular sociological theories about the origin of the modern system of nation-states and their respective constitutional regimes base their conclusions on this type of assumption. Within this interpretative framework, an intrinsically anachronistic retrospective projection of the present paradigms of modernity can be found. This has led to the perpetuation of a stereotyped view of a complex topic. Billeting was not only dependent on strategic and material factors, but also on the inequality, hierarchy and legal compartmentalization that characterized pre-modern societies. The objective of this study is to discuss the importance of legal culture and social values for a proper understanding of the problematic practice of billeting and, more generally, power relations in pre-modern times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scanlonian contractualism rejects the consequentialist assumptions about morality, value, and rationality in virtue of which deontological constraints appear paradoxical. And yet, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard and Robert Shaver have claimed that it cannot succeed in defending the said restrictions. That is because they see Scanlon's tie-breaking argument as threatening to justify aggregation in paradox of deontology cases. I argue that this claim rests upon a failure to appreciate contractualism's relational character. Once we take this feature of the view into account, it becomes clear that the tie-breaking argument is ruled out in cases where the only way for us to prevent several killings would be to commit one ourselves. To show this, I provide a contractualist explanation of why our duty not to harm persons is stricter than our duty to help them when they are threatened with harm. I conclude by distinguishing two ways in which this defense of deontological restrictions might bring contractualism objectionably close to absolutism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory & Philosophy of Law is the property of Revus - European Constitutionality Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Aurora: Papeles del Seminario María Zambrano is the property of Seminario Maria Zambrano and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this article is to consider the philosophy of Hans Blumenberg as potentially pedagogical thought. Hans Blumenberg's way of questioning can be juxtaposed with the Heideggerian way of questioning (much more popular in the philosophy of education) that starts with the human being as an ontologically distinguished creature. Blumenberg, unlike Heidegger, does not pursue the question of being as such, he consciously limits himself to anthropology, i.e. the humanity of being. Consequently, his anthropology is not fundamentally ontological, but contingent and culture-oriented. Blumenberg's phenomenological description of humanity concentrates on the ways humans deal with different modes of the absolute (not only theological, but also natural and political). It is a consequence of Blumenberg's anthropological statement concerning the human being as an underprivileged creature which compensates its natural shortcomings with culture (i.e. myths, metaphors, science, etc.), being able to make the absolute less predominant or rigorous, mitigating it in a way. This has humanistic and pedagogical import: the greater distance between us and absolute realities, the more space there is for human creativity and self-creativity, foremostly in the field of education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article studies the discourse and material culture of absolutism in two conversations from Madeleine de Scudéry's Conversations nouvelles sur divers sujets (1684). Read together and against each other, ‘De la magnificence et de la magnanimité’ and ‘De l'ennui sans sujet’ present the transition from an economy of representation and display that elicits awe and admiration to an exchange of goods that promises personal satisfactions and pleasures. I argue that Scudéry effects a literary and material ‘downsizing’ of absolutism in her description of a court entertainment at Marly that combined gambling with the pleasures of consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste (PPT) have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative,absolutistanalysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism (also called realism or invariantism) due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on an account of faultless disagreement that improves upon a recent proposal due to Karl Schafer. In amending Schafer’s proposal, I put forward an empirically informed view of our beliefs regarding matters of personal taste, as well as an account of our assertions concerning such matters. I also argue that absolutists should take disagreement about these matters to be conative, rather than doxastic, in nature. The anticipated result is an independently compelling account of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste that fits naturally with absolutism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common-sense morality includes various agent-centred constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily and breaking a promise. However, it's not always clear whether, had an agent ϕ-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her ϕ-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory (that is, a theory that includes such constraints) to say about whether it would have been permissible for her to have ϕ-ed? In this paper, I canvass various possible approaches to answering this question and I argue that teleology offers the most plausible approach—teleology being the view that every act has its deontic status in virtue of how its outcome (or prospect) ranks, relative to those of its alternatives. So although, until recently, it had been thought that only deontological theories can accommodate constraints, it turns out that teleological theories not only can accommodate constraints, but can do so more plausibly than deontological theories can. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper I criticize a view of functional localization in neuroscience, which I call 'computational absolutism' (CA). 'Absolutism' in general is the view that each part of the brain should be given a single, univocal function ascription. Traditional varieties of absolutism posit that each part of the brain processes a particular type of information and/or performs a specific task. These function attributions are currently beset by physiological evidence which seems to suggest that brain areas are multifunctional-that they process distinct information and perform different tasks depending on context. Many theorists take this contextual variation as inimical to successful localization, and claim that we can avoid it by changing our functional descriptions to computational descriptions. The idea is that we can have highly generalizable and predictive functional theories if we can discover a single computation performed by each area regardless of the specific context in which it operates. I argue, drawing on computational models of perceptual area MT, that this computational version of absolutism fails to come through on its promises. In MT, the modeling field has not produced a univocal computational description, but instead a plurality of models analyzing different aspects of MT function. Moreover, CA cannot appeal to theoretical unification to solve this problem, since highly general models, on their own, neither explain nor predict what MT does in any particular context. I close by offering a perspective on neural modeling inspired by Nancy Cartwright's and Margaret Morrison's views of modeling in the physical sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“Trust” is not usually considered a Hobbesian concept, which is odd since it is central to the definition of a covenant. The key to understanding Hobbes’s concept of trust is to be found in his account of conquest— “sovereignty by acquisition”—which is a heavily revised adaptation of the Roman justification of slavery. Hobbes introduces a distinction between servants, who are trusted with liberty, and imprisoned slaves. The servant/master relationship involves mutual trust, an ongoing exchange of benefits (protection for service and obedience), and performance monitoring. In contrast to Quentin Skinner’s and Philip Pettit’s shared concentration on the contrast between slavery and freedom, I argue that the salient analogy is between servants and subjects.The trust relationship between subjects and the sovereign involves defined roles, limited absolutism, and accountability in the early-modern form of licensing subjects to switch political allegiance should a regime fail. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This essay closely examines the highly contested but widely employed historiographical category ‘absolutism’. Why are scholars so divided on whether it is even legitimate to use the term and, if they agree to do so, why are they still much at odds in explaining what it is? What are the main historiographical currents in the study of absolutism? Is it the same thing to speak of absolutism in regard to the practices of early modern European monarchies and with reference to the political ideas of so-called absolutist theorists? By addressing these questions through the methodology of intellectual history, this essay provides a comprehensive account of debates on absolutism and, at the same time, suggests that further work needs to be carried out on its theoretical aspects. In this respect, the author will propose a series of key ideas and principles which are meant to encapsulate the core of an early modern doctrine of absolutist monarchical sovereignty. It will also be argued that, when studying political thought, the term ‘absolutism’ might be abandoned in favour of the plural ‘absolutisms’ as a better way of understanding the past, its languages, opinions, people. In so doing, a thorough analysis of what political absolutism(s)iswill be set forth, and a series of more general considerations on history-writing will also be advanced. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The doctrine of impermanence can be called the most salient feature of the Buddha's teaching. The early Buddhist doctrine of impermanence can be understood in four different but interrelated contexts: Buddha's empiricism, the notion of conditioned/constituted objects, the idea of dependent arising, and the practical context of suffering and emancipation. While asserting the impermanence of all phenomena, the Buddha was silent on the questions of the so-called transcendent entities and truths. Moreover, though the Buddha described Nibbāṇa/Nirvāṇa as a 'deathless state' ('amataṃ padam'), it does not imply eternality in a metaphysical sense. Whereas the early Buddhist approach to impermanence can be called 'phenomenal', the post-Buddhist approach was concerned with naumena (things in themselves). Hence, Sarvāstivāda (along with Pudgalavāda) is marked by absolutism in the form of the doctrines of substantial continuity, atomism, momentariness, and personalism. The paper also deals with the approaches to impermanence of Dharmakīrti and Nāgārjuna, which can be called naumenal rather than strictly phenomenal. For Dharmakīrti, non-eternality was in fact momentariness and it was not a matter of experience but derivable conceptually or analytically from the concept of real. Nāgārjuna stood not for impermanence, but emptiness (śūnyatā), the concept which transcended both impermanence and permanence, substantiality and non-substantiality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper reports the results of a questionnaire sent to 573 officers practicing public relations in higher education institutions in eight countries–officers from different cultures. The officers were asked to state their opinions on how ethical or unethical were the 25 hypothetical practices used in the study. Based on the findings, difference of culture produced differences in the officers’ ethical judgments. The results of the study enhance the idea of cultural relativism and this is seen as a challenge to globalizing public relations ethics. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]