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The aim of this article is to analyze the influence of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's nationalist stance on Japan's policy towards China from a neoclassical realist perspective. It is argued that the extent to which Abe's ideological leaning exerted impact on foreign policy making depended on external stimuli, as well as Abe's domestic political interests. Prime Minister Abe generally perceived China as a threat to Japan, and remained assertive towards it, but he also pragmatically displayed flexibility in such areas as history issues, security policy, and territorial dispute. This article analyzes these complex developments in light of the changes in international environment and domestic politics, examining three periods: Abe's first administration (2006–2007); the escalation of diplomatic disputes with China (2012–2014); and gradual rapprochement with China (since 2014). It is concluded that the nationalist beliefs of decision makers affect foreign policy to the greatest extent whenever they are in line with other kinds of variables, such as external pressures and domestic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the characteristics of contemporary Japanese nationalism. Topics covered include the role of revisionist myth making since the 1960s in contemporary right wing identity politics, moral and patriotic education initiatives of Prime Minsiter Shnizo Abe and the view that Abe aims to overcome the reforms during the U.S. Occupation which debilitated Japan's political, social and educational systems.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the different dimensions of nationalism in Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, public discourse on divisive war memories, and New Right transformation of Japanese politics.

The severe deterioration in South Korea-Japan relations under Abe Shinzo and Park Geun-hye seems paradoxical given that Abe's grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, and Park's father, Park Chung-hee, were "close friends" who helped forge Japan-South Korea normalization in 1965. However, Abe and Park are better understood as operating within the nationalist conservative logic that brought their families together but now drives their countries apart. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China-Japan standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has unleashed a top-down information war that has cemented the two governments' positions over their territorial dispute. Under the Abe administration, Tokyo has stood up to an assertive China and drummed up nationalistic narratives of a virtuous Japanese "Self " ("us") pitted against an aberrant and aggressive Chinese "Other" ("them"). It has done so along a markedly realist logic in order to (1) cement domestic resolve in direct response to China's assertiveness and heated rhetoric; and (2) legitimize a swift passage of the contested security bills to enhance deterrence. Yet, while Japanese popular anxieties have echoed top-down instrumentalist narratives of an assertive China, they have also signaled a clear fear of entanglement in provocations of Tokyo's making. This paper will provide evidence of the Japanese government's active reconstruction of China's assertiveness in the public discourse—with an eye on the realpolitik of Sino-Japanese relations. It concludes that the Japanese government needs also to cater more to grassroots sensitivities, something that has been a clear limit to Abe's security agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan today is widely portrayed as on the verge of a significant identity shift that could lead to dramatic new security policies. Yet, Japan's first formal national security strategy, adopted in December 2013, proclaims repeatedly Japan's long-standing ‘peace-loving’ policies and principles. Why does a conservative government with high levels of popular support not pursue policies more in line with views widely reported to be central to its values and outlook? The answer lies in Japan's long-standing security identity of domestic antimilitarism, an identity under siege to a degree not seen since its creation over 50 years ago, but – as evidenced in Japan's new national strategy document – one that continues to shape both the framing of Japan's national security debates and the institutions of Japan's postwar security policy-making process. Relational approaches to identity construction illuminate challenges to Japan's dominant security identity, but a focus on domestic institutions and electoral politics offers the best course for modeling identity construction and predicting its future resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article talks about Japan's new approach to nationalism, national defense, and its Constitution. Topics include the rise and fall of Japan's economy, the effect of a resurgent China on Japan's economy and politics, and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party led by Mr. Abe Shinzo. Other topics include reforms in Japan's political system since the Allied Occupation in 1945-52, Japan's Peace Constitution and the National Security Council, and the relaxed constraints on Japan's Self Defense Forces.

This article explores the role of nationalism in domestic politics in Japan since 2005 by contrasting the Koizumi and the Abe administration of 2012/2013. It argues that the Koizumi and Abe administrations have exploited nationalism as a means to consolidate political power, move away from faction-based politics toward populism-based politics to weaken factions within the political system with entrenched interests that are counter to or prevent bolder, necessary economic reforms to propel Japan out of 20 years of economic stagnation. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that while each politician has used nationalism to mobilize popular support for their respective administrations, Koizumi's use of nationalism was to achieve an economic agenda while Abe's use of nationalism has been used to achieve his political agenda which includes constitutional reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paradigmatic case in which an almost permanent impasse exists in coming to terms with a difficult war past and ‘normalizing’ its international relations is that of Japan. Although successive Japanese governments have apologized over the last few decades, these have been countered by periodic episodes within Japan revolving largely around history textbooks, the remembrance of war dead and the quest by nationalists to restore national pride in the past. Regional relations were especially strained during the premiership of Koizumi Juni’chirô and his immediate successor, Abe Shinzô. They improved under Fukuda Yasuo, a moderate on war memory issues, and remained steady under Asô Tarô. Japan’s latest prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, appears determined to address Japan’s war past more openly and critically than previous LDP figures, no doubt with an eye to improving Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours. But whatever line he pursues, contestation over war memories will remain an issue. They are driven by deep divisions within Japan at the same time that political leaders seek a more prominent identity for Japan as a ‘normal’ actor in international affairs. This article analyses key aspects of the politics of Japan’s war memories, using insights from collective memory studies and constructivist IR theory. We suggest that the quest for ‘normality’ has generated a set of tensions and contradictions over the issue of war memories, both domestically and internationally, for which there is no resolution in sight. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the growing influence of self-righteous nationalism under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe and informs that self-righteous nationalism is encouraging rightwing extremists as well as threatening civil liberties. It presents the views of Nakano Koichi, professor at Sophia University, Japan, on the same. It mentions that academic freedom must be sacrosanct. It also mentions threat posed by Japan's cyber-terrorists.

The article explores the state of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan in a global context in 2014. Topics covered include the foreign relation priorities of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the economic policies of Japan under the Abe administration and his management of Japan's dispute with South Korea over the Takeshima/Dokdo islets. Also discussed is the emergence of nationalistic sentiment and patriotism in Japan.

The article reports on the recurrence of the nationalism issue against apanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo as of 2013. It says that the controversy emerged during Abe's first election as prime minister in 2006 and resurfaced during his second regime in December 2012. It notes the problems associated to the re-labeling of Abe's nationalism which include the idea of classifying nationalism into an ethnic and civic type and the prime minister's political rhetoric.

The article assesses the impact of Japan's neonationalism and neoliberal austerity economics on its political image. The economic transition started after the victory of Abe Shinzo as Prime Minister during the general election on December 19, 2012, contributing to the restoration of power of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Shinzo and his LDP have assured Japanese to adopt anti-populist, neoliberal policies despite the disapproval of voters and growing prevalence of poverty and insecurity in the country. Information on Shinzo's Cabinet, the Constitution and economic program is provided.