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We examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the formation of energy conservation routines. To do so, we use data from two nationwide surveys of German households, conducted before and during the pandemic. Across the two survey waves, we document a significant increase in the likelihood respondents report engaging in a variety of energy conservation routines, such as unplugging electronic appliances after use and switching off lights when leaving a room. To understand what drives this result, we provide evidence that observed energy saving actions reflect an increased attention devoted to energy consumption while staying at home, as opposed to income shocks experienced during the pandemic. We also rule out an increase in pro-environmental concern during the pandemic as driver of our results. Rather, we find evidence consistent with a 'finite pool of worry,' that might have even limited the impact of increased attention on the adoption of energy saving routines. In sum, our findings highlight the importance of consumer attention for the adoption of conservation routines to fight global climate change in a post-pandemic world.

With the increasing recognition of the use of reforestation measures as a complement to conventional carbon emissions avoidance technologies it is important to understand the market valuation of local forest carbon sinks for climate change mitigation. We conducted a framed-field experiment among a Germany-wide sample to provide a revealed preference study on the individual willingness to pay (WTP) for carbon sequestration through forests. Our particular focus is on the role of local co-benefits of climate protection activities. In addition, we add geo-data to our experimental data to analyze the impact of spatial variation on the individual WTP. We find that the WTP for carbon removal exceeds the WTP for mitigation efforts found in previous studies. While spatial distances does affect the likelihood to contribute to a local carbon sink, it does not affect the average amount given. Additional survey data finds that trust in forest measures is higher compared to mitigation via an emissions trading scheme, whichcould explain the comparably high WTP.

Is trade liberalization contributing to cleaner production amongst manufacturing firms? Theoretical predictions and empirical evidences are mixed. This study utilizes China’s dual trade regime and China’s WTO entry in 2001 to construct a unique micro dataset on manufacturing firms for China for the period 2000-2007, and performs a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to directly examine this issue. Specifically, normal exporters that saw tariff changes during the same period form the treatment group; while processing exporters that enjoy tariff-exemptions both pre- and post-WTO entry serve as the control group. Results show that China’s WTO entry contributed to a lower SO² emission intensity for normal exporting firms. We further examine the mechanism and show that the productivity channel accounted for the observed pattern. Specifically, more efficient normal exporters saw greater decline of SO² emission intensity than average normal exporters. This study contributes to a better understanding of the impact of trade on the environment, especially in developing countries. It also complements the literature in terms of providing China’s micro evidenceon the impact of trade liberalization on firm’s environmental performance.

How much information should governments reveal to consumers if consumption choices have uninternalized consequences to society? How does an alternative tax policy compare to information disclosure? We develop a price theoretic model of information design that allows empiricists to identify the welfare effects of any arbitrary information policy. Based on this model, we run a natural field experiment in cooperation with a large European appliance retailer and randomize information regarding the financial benefits of energy-efficient household lighting among more than 640,000 subjects. We find that full information disclosure strongly decreases demand for energy efficiency, while partial information disclosure increases demand. More information reduces social welfare because the increase in consumer surplus is outweighed by the rise in environmental externalities. By randomizing product prices, we identify the optimal tax vector as an alternative policy and show that sizable taxes on energy-inefficient products yield larger welfare gains than any information policy. We also document an important policy interaction: information provision dramatically reduces attention to pecuniary incentives and thereby limits the effectiveness of taxes.

Non-pecuniary incentives motivated by insights from psychology (“nudges”) have been shown to be effective tools to change behavior in a variety of fields. An often unanswered question relevant for public policy is whether these promising interventions can be scaled up. In cooperation with a large public utility in Germany, we develop an energy savings application for mobile phones that can be used by the majority of the population. The app randomizes a goal-setting nudge prompting users to set themselves energy consumption targets. The roll-out of the app is promoted by a mass-marketing campaign and large financial incentives. Results document low demand for the energy app in the general population and a tightly estimated null effect of the nudge on electricity consumption among app users. A likely mechanism of the null effect is unfavorable self-selection into the app: users are characterized by an already low baseline energy consumption and exhibit none of the behavioral biases that typically explain why goal setting affects behavior. We also find that the nudge significantly decreases the likelihood to use the app over time. Structural estimates imply that the average user is willing to pay 7.41 EUR to avoid the nudge and the intervention would yield substantial welfare losses if implemented nationwide.

We analyze the drivers and barriers that influence investments increasing the energy efficiency of firms' production processes or buildings in the German manufacturing sector based on microdata. In particular, we shed light on the relationship between financial barriers (e. g. credit constraints), information and knowledge (e. g. energy management practices), salience of energy-related topics, and the investments in energy saving technologies. A better understanding of firms' investment behavior regarding energy saving technologies is crucial to design efficient policy measures, which are necessary to achieve the imposed ambitious climate and energy policy targets. We use data from 701 structured telephone interviews in combination with commercial and confidential firm-level data. Our results suggest that energy management practices have a statistically significant positive relationship with investment decisions on energy saving technologies for production processes and buildings. Credit constraints are a barrier to investments in the energy efficiency of firms' production processes. Furthermore, high energy cost shares of heating or cooling, high energy intensity, energy self-generation and structured internal decision making processes influence the investments in energy efficiency positively.

From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the global mean temperature below 2êC above pre-industrial level as intended. The Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat climate change over time. Within this process, commitments heavily depend on what has been already achieved and this status-quo reflects an important reference point serving either as commitment advice or potential threat. We present an experimental study that is specifically designed to incorporate the effect of a status-quo via pre-existing contribution levels under endowment heterogeneity in a game in which participants make voluntary contributions to a public good. Our participants are sampled from the United Nations Youth Associations Network, representing participants from 51 countries. Members from developed and developing countries take decisions against the background of different initial levels of endowments and pre-existing contributions. Our analysis indicates that starting with ambitious pre-existing contribution levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. Falling behind this status-quo contribution levels by reducing the public good appears to be a strong behavioral barrier. These observations might provide support for the basic structure of the Paris Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to adjust them, even if a downward revision of national targets may not be precluded.

Increasing energy efficiency is one of the main goals in current German energy and climate policies. We study the determinants of energy efficiency in the German manufacturing sector based on official firm-level production census data. By means of a stochastic frontier analysis, we estimate the cost-minimizing energy demand function at the two-digit industry level using firm-level heterogeneity. Apart from the identification of the determinants of the energy demand function, we also analyze potential drivers of energy efficiency. Our results suggest that there is still potential to increase energy efficiency in most industries of the German manufacturing sector. Furthermore, we find that in most industries exporting and innovating firms as well as those investing in environmental protection measures are more energy efficient than their counterparts. In contrast, firms which are regulated by the European Union Emissions Trading System are mostly less energy efficient than non-regulated firms.

We investigate the effect of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on the economic performance of manufacturing firms in Germany. Our difference-in-differences framework relies on several parametric conditioning strategies and nearest neighbor matching. As a measure of economic performance, we use the firm specific distance to the stochastic production frontier recovered from official German production census data. None of our identification strategies provide evidence for a statistically significant negative effect of emissions trading on economic performance. On the contrary, the results of the nearest neighbor matching suggest that the EU ETS rather had a positive impact on the economic performance of the regulated firms, especially during the first compliance period. A subsample analysis confirms that EU ETS increased the efficiency of treated firms in at least some two-digit industries.

This paper reviews the literature on distributional effects of energy and carbon taxation with focus on microsimulation models. Most studies find that direct energy and carbon taxation tends to be regressive. Regressive effects occur mostly with respect to taxation of electricity or space heating. Taxation of transportation fuels show less regressive, neutral, or even progressive effects. Adequate revenue recycling often allows for neutralisation or full elimination of regressive effects so that energy and carbon tax reforms can be progressive. Some studies find evidence for the existence of a double dividend. There seems to be an efficiency-equity trade-off in revenue recycling, i.e. whether to foster growth or to assist low-income households. While a large number of studies on advanced economies are available, there clearly is a gap with regard to evidence for developing countries. Another gap relates to the lack of documentation on the challenges of incorporating macroeconomic models and long-term modelling perspectives in microsimulation. Both aspects can be of great importance with respect to the design of green growth policies. Thoughtful incorporation of social considerations, including aspects of poverty in modelling approaches could enhance the existing instruments of exante policy assessments since poverty is a tangible concept which is well-known, understandable, and openly observable for citizens and policy makers.

One of the most promising ways of meeting climate policy targets is improving energy efficiency, i.e. reducing the amount of scarce and polluting resources needed to produce a given quantity of output. This study undertakes an empirical exercise using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), a harmonized dataset comprising time-series of input-output tables along with environmental satellite accounts and socioeconomic information. The paper consists of two parts. In the first part we begin with an aggregated picture of EU27 energy intensity and its evolution between 1995 and 2009. Then we dig deeper and introduce sectoral detail to identify the economic changes that occurred during the same period. Finally, we disaggregate the EU27 into countries for regional analysis and perform a sectoral disaggregation for a fine-grained picture of energy intensity in Europe. In the second part of the study we take our findings from index decomposition analysis and subject them to panel estimations. The objective is to control for factors that may have shaped the evolution of energy intensity in the European Union. In particular, we investigate the impact of technological change, structural change, trade, environmental regulation and country-specific characteristics.

We estimate the impact of a feed-in tariff for renewable power on wind power investment in Germany at the county level from 1996-2010 controlling for windiness and access to the electricity transmission grid. After the Renewable Energy Law (EEG) was passed in 2000, the feed-in tariff became linked to wind power potential, such that more windy locations received a lower incentive per unit of output. We find that a 1 e-cent/kWh increase in the feed-in tariff rate would increase additions to capacity at the national level by 764MWper year from 1996- 2010 or 1,528 MW per year from 2005-2010. We analyze counterfactual scenarios, in which a uniform incentive is offered instead of the wind-dependent EEG incentive. Significantly more wind power plants are installed along the northern coastal counties in the uniform incentive scenario. We find that while the uniform incentive results in greater total wind power output per installed capacity, the EEG is ultimately more efficient by achieving 1% greater wind power output per euro and 3.7% greater reductions in power sector emissions per euro. In addition, we find a significant response from investors to an EEG provision that shifted the cost of transmission system upgrades from wind power developers to grid operators in 2000. The lack of a signal on scarcity of transmission capacity has likely resulted in a distribution of wind power plants that makes suboptimal use of existing infrastructure, necessitating investment in new transmission corridors.

We assess recent Chinese climate policy proposals in a multi‐region, multi‐sector computable general equilibrium model with a Chinese carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS). When the emissions intensity per GDP in 2020 is required to be 45% lower than in 2005, the model simulations indicate that the climate policy‐ induced welfare loss in 2020, measured as the level of GDP and welfare in 2020 under climate policy relative to their level under business‐as‐usual (BAU) in the same year, is about 1%. The Chinese welfare loss in 2020 slightly increases in the Chinese rate of economic growth in 2020. When keeping the emissions target fixed at the 2020 level after 2020 in absolute terms, the welfare loss will reach about 2% in 2030. If China’s annual economic growth rate is 0.5 percentage points higher (lower), the climate policy‐induced welfare loss in 2030 will rise (decline) by about 0.5 percentage points. Full auctioning of carbon allowances results in very similar macroeconomic effects as free allocation, but full auctioning leads to higher reductions in output than free allocation for ETS sectors. Linking the Chinese to the European ETS and restricting the transfer volume to one third of the EU’s reduction effort creates at best a small benefit for China, yet with smaller sectoral output reductions than auctioning. These results highlight the importance of designing the Chinese ETS wisely.

In this paper, we investigate both short- and long-term impacts of financial stimuli on public goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct a large-scaled field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of a bus ticket. We systematically vary the individual payoff structure by introducing different matching grants (1/3:1, 1:1, 3:1) and price rebates (r-25%, r-50%, r-75%). Our results show that price rebates are more effective than matching schemes in raising participation rates while matching grants induce higher contributions to the offsetting program. We suspect differences in the personal responsibility for the compensated emissions to drive this result. Analyzing repeated bookings, we find decreasing treatment effects for returning customers except for the case of 1:1 matching grants. The equal matching scheme is also the only intervention that increases net contributions of customers compared to the control group.

Given the vital and controversial debate on fairness concerns in international climate negotiations, the acceptance of a climate treaty may be fostered if the distribution of costs and benefits from global environmental protection is perceived to be “fair”. Since an agreement must be acceptable to all negotiating countries, it is likely that no single burden sharing concept will gain unconditional support from all parties. We have conducted a world-wide survey among participants in international climate negotiations to address the question whether negotiating weights for different fairness concepts may enlarge the bargaining space among heterogeneous agents and overcome the currently dominating self-interested use of fairness claims. Even though our empirical results confirm different positions on burden sharing among key regions, there is evidence that a broad majority favors allocations that are based on a variety of fairness rules. Turning the debate rather towards justice claims based on needs than towards culpability may serve as a fruitful starting point to depart from a purely egoistic use of equity rules in international climate negotiations.

Social norms can help to foster cooperation and to overcome the free-rider problem in private provision of public goods. This paper focuses on the enforcement of social norms by a self-introduced punishment and reward scheme. We analyse if subjects achieve to implement a norm-enforcement mechanism at their own expense by applying the theory of non-governmental norm-enforcement by Buchholz et al. (2014) in a laboratory experiment. Based on their theory without central authority and endogenously determined enforcement mechanism, we implement a two-stage public good game: At the first stage subjects determine the strength of penalty/reward on their own and in the second stage they decide on their contributions to the public good. We find that the mechanism by Buchholz et al. (2014) leads to a higher public good contribution than without the use of any mechanism. Only in a few cases groups end up with a zero enforcement mechanism. This result indicates that subjects are apparently willing to contribute funds for implementing an enforcement mechanism. Moreover, higher enforcement parameters lead to higher public good contributions in the second stage, although too high enforcement parameters lead to unreachable theoretical optima.

This paper investigates the extent to which the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of March 2011 has had an impact on the private demand for climate protection in Germany. Data are taken from two framed field experiments (Löschel et al. 2013a, b) conducted before and after the disaster. We find that the demand for climate protection in the experiment after the nuclear disaster is significantly higher than in the experiment before the disaster.

In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual perspective of existing revealed preference studies is relaxed. This is achieved in two treatments; first, we determine the information subjects receive about the demand revealed by other subjects in a similar decision making situation, second, collective action is implemented whereby all subjects are required to purchase the group’s median quantity at a given price. Participants in the experiment were offered the opportunity to contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Allowances purchased were withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In our experiment, information about other subjects’ behaviour has no treatment effect on the demand for climate protection. Under collective action however, the probability of purchasing allowances is higher compared to the reference treatment situation, an individual contribution mechanism. Furthermore, we observe a strong correlation between subjects’ demand and their expectations about other participants’ behaviour. When collective action is not available, subjects’ expectations are consistent with free rider behaviour.

Der deutsche Strommarkt ist im Umbruch. Strom aus erneuerbaren Quellen verdrängt solchen aus konventioneller Erzeugung. Die bestehende Marktordnung fördert zwar effektiv den Ausbau der erneuerbaren Elektrizitätserzeugung, geht aber mit hohen Kosten einher. Zudem entstehen regionale Ungleichgewichte zwischen Elektrizitätserzeugung und -nachfrage. Im Folgenden wird eine neue Marktordnung für den deutschen Strommarkt skizziert, die einen kosteneffizienten Ausbau der Erneuerbaren und die Stabilität der Netze gemeinsam berücksichtigt. Das zentrale Instrument für eine neue Strommarktordnung sind Knappheitspreise. Stromerzeuger müssen Anreize erhalten, ihr Verhalten an die Knappheit von Strom am Markt anzupassen. Dazu müssen die Preise widerspiegeln, wann und wo Elektrizität knapp ist. Die Kombination aus einer Marktprämie zur Förderung der Erneuerbaren und Market Splitting zum Management von Netzengpässen kann dies erreichen.

Current climate and energy policy has to operate under an ex-ante unforeseen economic crisis. An obvious consequence is the collapse of prices for carbon emission allowances as, for example, seen in the European Union. However, this price collapse may be amplified by the interaction of a carbon emission cap and supplementary policy targets such as the minimum shares for renewables in the power sector. The static interaction between climate and renewable policies has been discussed extensively. This paper extends this debate by analysing how uncertain differences in medium to long-run growth rates affect the efficiency and effectiveness of a policy portfolio containing an emission trading scheme and a target for a minimum renewable share. Making use of a simple partial equilibrium model we identify an asymmetric interaction of emissions trading and renewable quotas with respect to different growth rates of an economy. The results imply that unintended consequences of the policy interaction may be particularly severe and costly when economic growth is low and that carbon prices are more sensitive to changes in economic growth if they are applied in combination with renewable energy targets. Our main example for the policy interaction is the EU, yet our research also relates particularly well to the uncertainty of economic growth in fast growing emerging economies like China.

The new WIOD database allows for improved empirical analysis on a wide range of important environmental research questions. In this paper we demonstrate the scientific power of the WIOD database and analyze very urgent policy questions on the impacts of international trade and structural change on the environment. We apply recent econometric approaches to show the impact of international trade on the environment via its different channels as for instance to increase welfare and potentially affects environmental regulation as well as countries' sector. This approach has become known as the econometric structural decomposition method. In addition to this guidelines by the literature, an econometric panel data approach is offered to shed some light on the impact of structural change and international trade on environmental pressure, where we especially address and solve several endogeneity issues that add further complexity to the analysis. (Key words: Environmental and Climate Economics, Trade and the Environment, Structural Decomposition).

Der deutsche Strommarkt ist im Umbruch. Strom aus erneuerbaren Quellen verdrängt solchen aus konventioneller Erzeugung. Gleichzeitig wird immer mehr Elektrizität im Norden Deutschlands produziert und muss zu den Verbrauchern im Süden transportiert werden. Die bestehende Marktordung fördert zwar effektiv den Ausbau erneuerbarer Elektrizitätserzeugung, geht aber mit hohen Kosten einher. Zudem entstehen regionale Ungleichgewichte zwischen Elektrizitätserzeugung und -nachfrage. Einerseits durch den Ausbau erneuerbarer Stromerzeugung vor allem im Norden, anderseits durch den Rückgang konventioneller Kapazitäten im Süden. Es verwundert nicht, dass momentan zahlreiche Vorschläge zur Reform des Erneuerbaren-Energien- Gesetzes und des Netzausbaus entwickelt und diskutiert werden. Die meisten bestehenden Vorschläge betrachten entweder den Ausbau der Erneuerbaren oder der Netze, gehen aber nicht auf die Interaktion zwischen beiden ein. Wir skizzieren eine neue Marktordung für den deutschen Strommarkt, die einen kosteneffzienten Ausbau der Erneuerbaren und die Stabilität der Netze gemeinsam berücksichtigt. Eine Prämie auf den Börsenstrompreis fördert die Erneuerbaren, während die Aufteilung des deutschen Strommarktes in mehrere Preiszonen hilft, effzient mit regionalen Kapazit äts- und Netzengpässen umzugehen. Durch die gezielte Stärkung von zeit- und regionalspezifschen Preissignalen erwarten wir eine deutliche Kostensenkung, sowohl im Vergleich zum bisherigen System als auch zu Vorschlägen, die den Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien nicht mit Netzausbau und Rückgang an konventionellen Kapazit äten integrieren.

The assessment of climate change mitigation policies through economic modeling depends crucially on assumptions under which technological change has been incorporated in the model. Earlier climate-energy-economics modeling attempts heavily relied on the assumption of exogenous technological change. In this case, technological change is a function solely of time. However, such an approach seems insufficient, especially given developments in other fields of economic research that have helped to explain in more detail the process of technological change. A lot of research has been done hence on endogenizing technological change in large-scale models. The purpose of this paper is to summarize these efforts. We describe different model types and their treatment of exogenous technological change (autonomous energy efficiency improvements and backstop technologies) and endogenous technological change (including price inducement, learning-by-doing, investments in R & D and directed technical change). We conclude with some open questions and suggestions for future research.

Die neue Bundesregierung steht in der kommenden Legislaturperiode vor großen wirtschaftspolitischen Herausforderungen. Aus diesem Anlass hat das ZEW Handlungsempfehlungen für eine wirtschaftspolitische Agenda der kommenden Legislaturperiode erarbeitet. Die Empfehlungen konzentrieren sich auf Politikbereiche, in denen die Forschungs- und Beratungskompetenz des ZEW liegt. Das ZEW macht unter anderem Vorschläge wie ein institutioneller Rahmen für eine europäische Fiskalunion aussehen sollte, wie die Besteuerungsregeln im europäischen Binnenmarkt sinnvoll reformiert und das deutsche Steuersystem vereinfacht werden könnte. Darüber hinaus wird ein neues Strommarkt-Design vorgeschlagen, das einen kosteneffizienten Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien und die Stabilität der Netze gemeinsam berücksichtigt. Das Papier des ZEW lenkt den Blick auf Instrumente, mit deren Hilfe das deutsche Innovationssystem zukunftstauglich gemacht werden könnte. Schließlich stehen weiterführende strukturelle Reformen am deutschen Arbeitsmarkt im Fokus der Empfehlungen, etwa im Bereich geringfügiger Beschäftigungsverhältnisse sowie bei der Qualifizierung besonders gefährdeter Gruppen am Arbeitsmarkt.

We examine the incidence and extent of co-authorship and intellectual collaboration in the leading journal of environmental and resource economics: the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Previous studies of general economic journals have offered empirical evidence for the fact that intellectual collaboration is most prevalent in the field of environmental and resource economics. However, no previous study has examined this finding more carefully. This is a gap in the literature we hope to fill. Accordingly, we investigate all 1436 papers published in JEEM from 1974 until 2010 with respect to potential drivers of co-authorship. We start with a simple descriptive analysis in order to depict the most important trends in the past 36 years. We then employ empirical methods to test several hypotheses that are commonly used to analyze the structure of co-authorship. However, we do not stick to the commonly used hypotheses but investigate also other potentially relevant drivers of co-authorship as e.g. the acknowledgment of external funding, the gender of the authors or the geographical location. We find empirical support for the rising incidence of co-authorship with increasing complexity of the field of economics and the competition for external funding. As research has become more demanding in terms of both disciplinary and - especially in the field of environmental and resource economics - interdisciplinary skills, the likelihood of collaborative research and jointly written publications increased.

Global impact assessment of unilateral climate policies is commonly based on multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that are calibrated to consistent accounts of production, consumption, and bilateral trade flows. However, global economic databases such as GTAP treat energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries rather in aggregate, thereby missing potentially important details on the heterogeneity of these sectors. In this paper, we elaborate on the availability of data resources and methodological issues in disaggregating energy-intensive and tradeexposed sectors that receive larger attention in the public policy debate on unilateral emission regulation: non-ferrous metals, iron and steel and non-metallic minerals. Our sensitivity analysis revolves around three types of unobserved heterogeneity at the sub-sectoral level: trade elasticities, energy consumption and technology specifications. Drawing on the example of border tax adjustments, we find that for all given technology specifications and variation in energy shares, the biggest differences emerge from variations in Armington elasticities. Even moderate changes in Armington elasticities can alter the magnitude and the sign of the effects at the sectoral level. The implications of sub-sectoral disaggregation are not as pronounced for macroeconomic indicators and leakage as for sectoral indicators.

We carry out a detailed CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) analysis of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050 on a macroeconomic and on a sectoral level. Herein, we study a Reference scenario that implements existing EU policies as well as 3 unilateral and 3 global climate action scenarios. We identify global climate action with international emissions trading and the ful l equalization of CO2 prices across all (EU) sectors as a reasonable policy option to avoid additional costs of the Decarbonisation Roadmap to a large extent. This policy option may include CDM (Clean Development Mechanism in the sense of 'where'-flexibility) in an extended form if there are countries without emissions caps. Moreover, we identify diverse sectoral effects in terms of output, investment, emissions and international competitiveness. We conclude that the successful realization of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap probably requires a wise and joint consideration of technology, policy design and sectoral aspects.

This paper deals with designing emissions trading in practice. After a short introduction to the general idea of emissions trading, practical requirements for the introduction of an emissions trading scheme are considered, including the temporal and spatial dimension as well as administrative requirements and the role of markets. Historical developments regarding emissions trading are discussed. Currently, the largest trading scheme is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the European industry by 21 percent until 2020 compared to 2005 levels. Because of its prominent role, the basic design and the process of introducing the EU scheme are reviewed in more detail. Finally, the impact of the EU ETS on the regulated entities is analyzed based on an annual survey among German companies regulated by the EU ETS which is conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in a common project with KfW Bankengruppe.

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.

In making key decisions for the future phases of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), policy makers need to fully understand the competitiveness implications of these decisions on industrial sectors. In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of cost pass-through ability of producers of selected products within the sectors refineries, glass, chemicals and ceramics of the UK economy. Our results provide new insights into the debate on the ability of pass-through of costs generated by the EU ETS. They suggest that some of the sectors analysed have the ability to pass-through a portion of their carbon costs to the consumers: The UK sectors are not capable to completely pass-through their costs into output prices, with the exception of UK ceramic goods.

In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection. For this purpose we conducted a framed field experiment with a sample of the residential population in Mannheim, Germany. Participants were endowed with € 40 and given the opportunity to contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Purchased allowances were withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). While the median willingness to pay (WTP) for climate protection is zero the mean WTP is approximately € 12/tCO2. We analyse determinants of the observed individual demand behaviour and discuss the potential consequences, which result from the remarkably low WTP and its distribution for German climate policy.

Free riding and coordination difficulties are held to be the primary causes of cooperation breakdown among nonrelatives. These thwarting effects are particularly severe in the absence of effective monitoring institutions capable of sanctioning deviant behavior. Unfortunately, solutions to global environmental dilemmas, like climate change, cannot depend on coercion mechanisms, given the transnational effects of emissions. A further complication is that it yields 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. Such asymmetries in wealth and carbon responsibilities among the actors, and the ensuing issues of equity, might further impede cooperation. Yet, a growing literature stresses the importance of non-economic factors in explaining human behavior; therefore, instruments that go beyond the traditional incentives might prove effective in facilitating the task. Given the empirical nature of the problem, we address it by means of a controlled laboratory experiment: a framed threshold public goods game is used to investigate the degree of cooperation and coordination achieved by groups of six participants in combating simulated catastrophic climate change. While necessarily simple for the sake of tractability, the game is designed to incorporate key real-world issues, such as inequity and the impact of emergent institutions based on nonbinding 'pledge and review' mechanisms.

Ambitious unilateral EU environmental policy has raised concerns about adverse competitiveness implications for European energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors. We analyze the economic and environmental implications of two different measures to address these concerns in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS): border tax adjustments (BTA) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model of the global economy demonstrate that alternative BTA regimes are suitable to alleviate adverse competiveness implications of unilateral European climate policy on energy-intensive and export-oriented industries. The regulatory protection of these industries via subsidies for EU exporters and tariffs for non-EU importers goes, however, at the expense of sectors which are excluded from the EU ETS. We show that the choice of alternative benchmarks (i.e. carbon intensities) for the level of BTA substantially affects these competitiveness implications. The simulations further indicate that limited access to low-cost emission abatement via the CDM in the EU ETS alleviates adverse competitiveness impacts to a comparable extent as the most ambitious BTA scheme. Increasing “where-flexibility” of emission abatement thus represents an attractive market-based alternative to the application of border tax adjustments in unilateral climate policy.

This paper analyses the employment consequences of policies aimed to support biofuels in the European Union. The promotion of biofuel use has been advocated as a means to promote the sustainable use of natural resources and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions originating from transport activities on the one hand, and to reduce dependence on imported oil and thereby increase security of the European energy supply on the other hand. The employment impacts of increasing biofuels shares are calculated by taking into account a set of elements comprising the demand for capital goods required to produce biofuels, the additional demand for agricultural feedstock, higher fuel prices or reduced household budget in the case of price subsidisation, price effects ensuing from a hypothetical world oil price reduction linked to substitution in the EU market, and price impacts on agro-food commodities. The calculations refer to scenarios for the year 2020 targets as set out by the recent Renewable Energy Roadmap. Employment effects are assessed in an input-output framework taking into account bottom-up technology information to specify biofuels activities and linked to partial equilibrium models for the agricultural and energy sectors. The simulations suggest that biofuels targets on the order of 10-15% could be achieved without adverse net employment effects. In diesem Papier werden die Beschäftigungswirkungen der Förderung von Biokraftstoffen in der Europäischen Union untersucht. Die Förderung von Biokraftstoffen wird mit der nachhaltigen Nutzung natürlicher Ressourcen, der Reduktion von Treibhausgasemissionen im Transportsektor und der Verminderung der Erdölabhängigkeit und damit einhergehender erhöhter Energiesicherheit in Europa begründet. Bei der Quantifizierung der Beschäftigungseffekte der Biokraftstoffförderung in Europa wurden verschiedene Effekte berücksichtigt: gesteigerte Nachfrage nach Agrarerzeugnissen und Kapitalgütern zu Herstellung von Biokraftstoffen, höhere Kraftstoffpreise, Preisrückgänge auf dem Rohölmarkt infolge der Substitutionseffekte des Biokraftstoffeinsatzes und Preissteigerungen bei Agrarprodukten und Lebensmitteln. Dazu wird ein Input-Output Modell um die Biokraftstofferzeugung erweitert und mit Partialmodellen des Agrar- und Energiesektors gekoppelt. Als besonders wichtige Faktoren für potentielle Beschäftigungseffekte haben sich die Entwicklung einer auf den Weltmärkten führenden EU Biokraftstoffindustrie und der abschwächende Effekte der Biokraftstoffe auf den Ölpreis erwiesen. Die Simulationen legen nahe, dass sich die verschiedenen positiven und negativen Effekte weitgehend kompensieren und ein Biokraftstoffanteil von 10 ? 15 Prozent ohne signifikant negative Beschäftigungseffekte erzielt werden kann.

In the absence of an international agreement on climate policy, unilateral carbon abatement creates two problems: It tends to have a detrimental effect on domestic competitiveness, and it leads to an increase in carbon emissions abroad (leakage). This paper analyses two policies that have recently been proposed to mitigate these problems: Border tax adjustments (BTA) and integrated emission trading (IET). The former policy levies a quantity-based, the latter an emission based duty on imports from non-abating countries. In a stylised two-country model we demonstrate that the policies address both problems. However, BTA protects domestic competitiveness more effectively, while IET achieves a greater reduction in foreign emissions. A computational general equilibrium analysis of the unilateral abatement policy adopted by the European Union confirms our theoretical insights for the sectors covered by the offsetting measures. However, the implications for the competitiveness of noncovered sectors are negative. These two effects constitute the central trade-off in the implementation of both policies.

This paper studies implications of uncertainty about the arrival date of a competitive CO2 backstop technology for the design of cost-effective CO2 emission trading schemes. For this purpose, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that captures empirical links between CO2 emissions associated with energy use, the rate and direction of technical change and the economy. We specify CO2 capture and storage (CCS) as the backstop technology whose competitiveness is anticipated or not. We find that the discounted welfare loss associated with the environmental target is lower if CCS is not anticipated and that CO2 shadow prices are then relatively high in the years before CCS is competitive. By not simply postponing the implementation of an emission reduction strategy until CCS is competitive, one relies more on economy-wide technical change and its welfare-enhancing technology externalities, thus allowing for a higher steady state. Dieses Papier untersucht die Implikationen von Unsicherheit bezüglich der Verfügbarkeit einer kompetitiven Technologie zur Kohlenstoffabscheidung und ?speicherung auf die Ausgestaltung kosteneffektiver CO2 Emissionshandelssysteme. Zu diesem Zweck wird ein dynamisches rechenbares allgemeines Gleichgewichtsmodell entwickelt, welches den empirischen Zusammenhang zwischen CO2 Emissionen, Rate und Richtung des technischen Wandels und wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten berücksichtigt. Kohlenstoffabscheidung und ?speicherung wird als sogenannte Backstop-Technologie modelliert, deren Wirtschaftlichkeit antizipiert wird oder eben nicht. Die Simulationsergebnisse zeigen, dass die diskontierten Wohlfahrtsverluste der Klimapolitik niedriger sind, wenn die Technologie zur Kohlenstoffabscheidung und ?speicherung nicht antizipiert wird. In diesem Fall sind die Preise für CO2 Emissionszertifikate vor der unerwarteten Einführung der Backstop-Technologie relativ hoch. Es wird nicht einfach auf die Wirtschaftlichkeit der Kohlenstoffabscheidung und ? speicherung gewartet. Vielmehr wird ohne die Berücksichtigung von Kohlenstoffabscheidung und ? speicherung ein strikterer Politikpfad zur Erreichung der klimapolitischen Ziele implementiert, der die Internalisierung von technologischen Externalitäten und somit ein höheres Wohlfahrtsniveau ermöglicht. Die Umweltpolitik sollte gegeben der großen technologischen Unsicherheiten vorsichtig sein, Vermeidungsanstrengungen zu verschieben und auf eine Wunderwaffe zu Lösung des Klimaproblems im Energiesektor zu warten.

The 'Climate action and renewable energy package' proposed by the European Commission in the beginning of 2008 suggests auctioning as basic principle for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that runs from 2013 to 2020. Overall, it is estimated that at least two third of the total quantity of allowances will be auctioned in 2013, to be increased to 100 % by 2020. In this paper, we emphasize the importance of a properly chosen auction design as the significantly higher auction share, compared to the past and current trading phase, is expected to yield a thin secondary market for CO2 allowances. We elaborate main criteria that a viable auction design is supposed to fulfil and propose a specific auction design for the third trading phase. The auction we recommend is a simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction. Die Europäische Kommission hat in ihrem 'Klima- und Energiepaket' vom Januar 2008 eine Weichenstellung für den europäischen Emissionshandel vorgeschlagen. Bislang wurden die Zertifikate an die betroffenen Unternehmen aus den energieintensiven Sektoren kostenfrei vergeben. Nach den Plänen der Kommission sollen Stromproduzenten ab 2013 alle benötigten Zertifikate ersteigern müssen. Unternehmen aus anderen energieintensiven Branchen sollen zunächst nur 20 % ersteigern, in 2020 dann 100 %. Da insgesamt mindestens zwei Drittel aller Zertifikate versteigert werden, ist zu erwarten, dass der freie Markt für Zertifikate ab 2013 deutlich dünner sein wird als dies bisher der Fall ist. Aus diesem Grund gewinnt das Design der Auktion an Bedeutung, denn vom Auktionspreis, der die Knappheit an Zertifikaten signalisieren soll, werden wichtige Investitionsentscheidungen in CO2-arme Technologien abhängen. Eventuelle Fehler im Auktionsdesign können, wenn die Zertifikate überwiegend versteigert werden, nicht mehr durch einen liquiden freien Markt 'geheilt' werden.

This paper puts forward equity as an important structural element to understanding negotiation outcomes. We first advance bargaining theory to incorporate the self-serving use of equity. Agents are predicted to push equity principles which benefit them more than other parties, in particular those which are disadvantageous to parties with large bargaining power. Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we then study how participants assess the support of the equity criteria by major parties in the climate negotiations. Comparing these results with cost estimates from a POLES model, we find that the perceived equity preferences of the respective countries or groups of countries are in general consistent with our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria and thereby lend support for our theoretical model. While this self-interest is recognized by the participants of our survey for the positions of the USA and the G77/China as well as Russia, the EU manages to be seen as choosing (self-serving) equity arguments out of fairness concerns and in order to facilitate the negotiations.

The objective of our analysis is to find out whether an increase in working time without pay compensation can be considered an adequate policy to reduce unemployment. From the perspective of economic theory the outcome is in general ambiguous: On the one hand, as the increase in working time raises labour productivity per employee, conditional demand for labour will increase (substitution effect) and conditional demand for intermediate inputs will decline. Since, on the other hand, workers do have a longer working time anyway, no positive effect on the number of persons employed can be expected. However, output of the manufacturing industry, and thus unconditional demand for labour, capital and intermediate goods, will increase (output effect). In order to sell the additional output, firms have to lower prices. Depending on the price elasticities, revenues and hence profits will change. We quantify the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly normal hours in Germany on the basis of a CGE model using an input-output framework for all sectors of the economy. Our simulation results support the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when we recycled the higher tax revenues from GDP growth to lower the contribution to social security, then we have been able to support the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created.

This paper studies energy bias in technical change. For this purpose, we develop a computable general equilibrium model that builds on endogenous growth models. The model explicitly captures links between energy, the rate and direction of technical change, and the economy. We derive the equilibrium determinants of biased technical change and show the importance of feedback in technical change, substitution possibilities between final goods, and general-equilibrium effects for the equilibrium bias. If the feedback effect is strong, or the substitution elasticity large, or both, our model tends to a corner solution in which only technologies are developed that are appropriate for production of non-energy intensive goods.

Impure public goods represent an important group of goods. Almost every public good exerts not only effects which are public to all but also effects which are private to the producer of this good. What is often omitted in the analysis of impure public goods is the fact that – regularly – these private effects can also be generated independently of the public good. In our analysis we focus on the effects alternative technologies – independently generating the private effects of the public good – may have on the provision of impure public goods. After the investigation in an analytical impure public good model, we numerically simulate the effects of alternative technologies in a parameterized model for climate policy in Germany.

We present a decomposition approach for integrated assessment modeling of climate policy based on a linear approximation of the climate system. Our objective is to demonstrate the usefulness of decomposition for integrated assessment models posed in a complementarity format. First, the complementarity formulation cum decomposition permits a precise representation of post-terminal damages thereby substantially reducing the model horizon required to produce an accurate approximation of the infinite-horizon equilibrium. Second, and central to the economic assessment of climate policies, the complementarity approach provides a means of incorporating second-best effects that are not easily represented in an optimization model.

Implementation of an EU-wide emissions trading system by means of National Allocation Plans is at the core of European environmental policy agenda. Member States are faced with the problem of allocating their national emission budgets under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement between energy-intensive sectors that are eligible for international emissions trading and the remaining segments of their economies that will be subject to complementary domestic emission regulation. The country-specific segmentation of national emission budgets between trading sectors and non-trading sectors will determine the cost efficiency of the EU emissions trading system and the gains for each Member State vis-?-vis domestic abatement policies. We present an interactive simulation model where users can specify the design of National Allocation Plans for each EU Member State and then evaluate the induced economic effects. Our numerical framework is based on marginal abatement cost curves for (emissions) trading and non-trading sectors of the EU-15 economies. Illustrative simulations highlight the importance of a coordinated design of National Allocation Plans in order to avoid substantial excess costs of regulation and drastic burden shifting between nontrading and trading sectors.

We investigate the importance of "what"-flexibility on top of "where"- and "when"-flexibility for alternative emission control schemes that prescribe long-term temperature targets and eventually impose additional constraints on the rate of temperature change. We find that "what"-flexibility substantially reduces the compliance costs under alternative emission control schemes. When comparing policies that simply involve long-term temperature targets against more stringent strategies that include additional constraints on the rate of temperature increase, it turns out that the latter involve huge additional costs. These costs may be interpreted as additional insurance payments if damages should not only dependent on absolute temperature change but also on the rate of temperature change.

Global warming has received growing attention during the last decade. The accumulation of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere is likely to lead to significant climate changes. In order to avoid potentially larger adverse impacts, GHG emissions - most notably carbon dioxide (CO2) released from fossil fuel use - must be drastically reduced in the future. An economic assessment of climate change has to weigh the benefits from avoided undesirable consequences of global warming against the costs of greenhouse gas emission abatement. Given complete information, cost-benefit analysis could tell policymakers how much greenhouse gas emissions should be abated, when and by whom. However, neither costs nor benefits of GHG abatement are easy to quantify. In particular, there are large uncertainties in benefits of protecting against the negative effects of climate change. The chain of causality - from GHG emissions to ambient concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to temperature increase to physical effects such as climatic and sea level changes - is highly complex. Hence, more attention is given to analyzing the costs rather than the benefits of climate change policy. Rational climate policy decision-making requires quantitative assessment, i.e. the use of analytical models that mimic the potential economic impacts of alternative emission reduction policies. A large number of models has been developed to investigate climate change policies that aim at achieving GHG emission trajectories suggested by natural science in a precautionary approach. In assessing alternative GHG abatement strategies the magnitude as well as the distribution of the associated adjustment costs is of major policy relevance. Because of the potentially large costs of ambitious climate change strategies, cost-effective implementation is essential in gaining broader acceptance. Besides efficiency in terms of overall abatement costs, equity in terms of a 'fair' distribution of these costs across countries, sectors or agents for alternative policy strategies is crucial. This thesis contains a selection of essays dealing with the quantitative economic impact analysis of climate change policy. It comprises detailed modeling of the economic adjustment to GHG emission constraints and provides valuable information to make rational policy choices. Different quantitative approaches are employed to warrant the appropriate analysis of selected policy aspects: computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling, partial equilibrium modeling and econometrics. The thesis is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 2 briefly discusses central issues in the economics of climate change. It motivates CGE modeling as a powerful tool to assess these issues in a consistent economy-wide framework and demonstrates its usefulness along illustrative calculations of the potential economic consequences induced by exogenous emission reduction constraints. The following chapters substantiate specific problems of climate policy. This requires extensions of the core CGE model as well as the additional use of partial equilibrium and econometric approaches. Chapters 3 and 4 investigate how the implications of emission constraints change when switching from the conventional perfect competition paradigm to the more realistic assumption of imperfect competition on good and permit markets. Chapters 5 and 6 present alternative modeling approaches to joint implementation (JI), which involves cross-border investments by industrialized countries to meet part of their domestic emission reduction targets through abatement activities of developing countries. Chapters 7 and 8 address methodological challenges for the model-based assessment of adjustment costs to emission regulation: the choice of costing concepts and the appropriate representation of technological change. Each chapter of the thesis is an independent piece of work and can be read separately. The different chapters contain an introduction that motivates the issues under investigation, relates them to the literature, and highlights the contributions made.

Despite of the apparent failure of the Kyoto Protocol with respect to environmental effectiveness, it has established a broad international mechanism that might be able to provide a global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions during a second commitment period. In this paper we investigate the likely future of post-Kyoto policies. Our primary objective is to identify policy-relevant abatement scenarios and to quantify the associated economic implications across major world regions. Based on a cross-impact analysis we first evaluate an expert poll to select the most likely post-Kyoto climate policy scenarios. We then use a computable general equilibrium model to assess the economic implications of these key scenarios. We find that post-Kyoto agreements are likely to cover only small reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions with abatement duties predominantly assigned to the industrialized countries while developing countries do not make any commitments, but can sell emission abatement to the industrialized world. Equity rules to allocate abatement duties are mainly based on the sovereignty principle or ability-to-pay. Global adjustment costs arising from post-Kyoto policies are very moderate but fuel exporting countries are likely to face quite considerable costs because of adverse terms-of-trade effects on fossil fuel markets.

International climate policy has assigned the leading role in emissions abatement to the industrialized countries while developing countries remain uncommitted to binding emission reduction targets. However, cooperation between the industrialized and the developing world through joint implementation of emission abatement promises substantial economic gains to both parties. In this context, the policy debate on joint implementation has addressed the question of how investment risks to project-based emission crediting between industrialized countries and developing countries affect the magnitude and distribution of such gains. In our quantitative analysis, we find that the incorporation of country-specific investment risks induces rather small changes vis-à-vis a situation where investment risks are neglected. Only if investors go for high safety of returns is there a distinct decline in the overall volume of emission crediting and the associated total economic benefits. While the welfare effects of risk incorporation for industrialized countries are unequivocally negative, the implications across developing countries are ambiguous. Whereas low-risk developing countries attract higher project volumes and benefit from higher effective prices per emission credit compared to a reference scenario without risk, the opposite applies to high-risk countries. Sensitivity analysis with respect to higher risk estimates show that shifts in the comparative advantage of emission abatement against high-risk countries may become dramatic as only very low-cost mitigation projects will be realized, driving down the country’s benefits from emission crediting to the advantage of low-risk developing countries. This result is supported by empirical evidence on regional imbalances of activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase of the Kyoto Protocol.

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling has provided a number of important insights about the interplay between environmental tax policy and the pre-existing tax system. In this paper, we emphasize that a labor market policy of recycling tax revenues from an environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage labor cost depends on how the costs of labor are modeled. We propose an approach which combines neoclassical substitutability and fixed factor proportions. Our concept implies a user cost of labor which consists of the market price of labor plus the costs of inputs associated with the employment of a worker. We present simulation results based on a CO2 tax and the recycling of its revenues to reduce the nonwage labor cost. One simulation is based on the market price of labor and the other on the user cost of labor. We found a double dividend under the first approach but not under the second one.

Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn and Marrakech, this paper illustrates how market power could be exerted in the absence of the US ratification under Annex 1 trading and explores the potential implications of the non-competitive supply behavior for the international market of tradable permits, compliance costs for the remaining Annex 1 countries to meet their revised Kyoto targets, and the environmental effectiveness. Our results show that the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol has had by far the greatest impact on the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol. This would lead to no real emission reduction in all remaining Annex 1 regions. As the biggest single buyer on the permit market, the absence of US ratification would significantly reduce the demand for permits. Consequently, the price of permits under Annex 1 trading would drop to zero. While all remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries would enjoy meeting their revised Kyoto targets at zero costs, seller countries with excess supply of hot air would lose all their revenues under perfect Annex 1 trading.Given the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Eastern European countries (EEC) as the dominant suppliers of emissions permits on the international market, it seems likely that they would exert market power to maximize their revenues from permit sales. Depending on how market power is exerted, our results show that the overall compliance costs of all remaining Annex 1 regions in the case of FSU cooperating with EEC could reach as much as two times that in the case of only FSU acting as a monopoly. But no matter how market power is exerted, all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions are better off with emissions trading in terms of their compliance costs than with no trading at all. Moreover, curtailing permit supply by market power will cut the amount of hot air being emitted into the atmosphere by more than half and at the same time, increases Annex 1 domestic abatement efforts. Thus, the overall environmental effectiveness is increased, although it is much less under the market power scenarios examined than in the case of the ratification of all Annex 1 regions including the US.

The economic effects of environmental taxes depend on the market structure. Under imperfect competition with free entry and exit, environmental taxes have an impact on economies of scale by changing the number and size of firms. Whether economies of scale rise or fall in a particular industry depends on induced changes in the price elasticity of demand. Because export demand is more price elastic than domestic demand, the overall price elasticity rises (falls) as the industry gains (loses) in comparative advantage. We use a computable general equilibrium model for Germany to examine the effects of a unilaterally introduced carbon tax under both perfect and imperfect competition. Our key finding is that induced structural change in favor of the less energy intensive, more labor intensive industries is more pronounced under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At the macroeconomic level, the total costs of environmental regulation under imperfect competition can be higher or lower than those under perfect competition depending on whether aggregate gains or losses in economies of scale across imperfectly competitive sectors prevail.