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This study analyses the relationship between Augustine and Luther in their understandings of the doctrine of Original Sin and the justification of sinners, taking as its main source Augustine's writings addressed against Julian of Aeclanum as well as Luther's Lectures on Romans. I argue that the radical anthropological and soteriological insights with which Augustine opposed the theologians associated with fifth century Pelagianism are the key for understanding the early stages of Luther's call for Reformation of the doctrine of the Catholic Church regarding Original Sin and justification. The study commences with a preliminary discussion on the terminology linked with Augustine's definition of sin. I claim that the Augustinian concept of sin was defined in intimate connection with a concept he inherited from his contact with neo-Platonism the concept of order. Sin is disorder. Original Sin was an expression of disorder which implanted disorder in the very core of human nature. This was a line of thought that Luther fully endorsed. The young Luther's doctrine of Original Sin, I point out, is essentially Augustinian. Although Augustine did not invent the doctrine of Original Sin, he certainly brought a new way of understanding the implications of the Adamic Fall in the human-divine relationship and in the salvation of human beings. I explain that whether Augustine first outlined his radical approach to salvation through the gracious mercy of God and only then developed his theological formulation of Original Sin (or came to it in the reverse order) may be open to dispute. What is certain is that the way Augustine approached the gravity of Original Sin is in harmony with the way he approached the issue of justification of the sinner and the salvation process as a whole. One of the main theses maintained in this study is that the way Augustine approached human beings and their salvation put him on a collision course with the very tradition of the Church Fathers he so eagerly claims to defend. Augustine's understanding of human salvation, I explain, constitutes a break with the patristic tradition precisely because he took the notion of a general condemnation in Adam to radical consequences. After some hesitations in the initial years of his literary career, Augustine broke with the line of thought according to which humans start their salvation by turning to God and God then accomplish their salvation. This turning point was crystallized in two major works authored by the Church Father, Ad Simplicianum and Confessiones. In these two works Augustine unequivocally claims that the very first step one takes towards God is itself a divine gift. The very will to believe is God's grace. This assessment constituted a break with the traditional view of the Fathers on the issue of salvation. It is precisely this crucial detail that explains Luther's reliance upon Augustine. Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone was essentially a deliberate attempt to recover the old Augustinian claim according to which both the beginnings and the accomplishment of the salvation process belong to God and only to God. This is a crucial point because in this assessment lies the main reason why Luther preferred Augustine to any other Church Father. It was based on this Augustinian defense of the radical gratuity of the salvation process that Luther relied to oppose the Nominalist axiom of facere quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam. The teaching of the Fathers according to which human beings start and God accomplishes the process of salvation may have seemed to Luther dangerously close to the teaching of the recentiores doctores he so vehemently opposed. I show my opposition towards the trend within modern Lutheran scholarship to argue that the young Luther's doctrine of justification found its inspiration elsewhere, not in Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings. Against the common argument that while Augustine taught justification by grace and by love, Luther taught justification by faith alone, I argue that such a claim is not consistent with the evidence in the sources by showing significant affinities between Augustine and Luther's positions. Augustine, some scholars argue, never conceived justification as fides Christi, but rather as a transformation of the human will or disposition for God's commands. A closer look into the two theologians' understandings of justification would suggest otherwise. Augustine taught justification by grace as well as justification as fides Christi. Luther taught justification by faith, justification as a declaration of righteousness on account of the fides Christi, but his doctrine of justification went beyond a mere declaration of righteousness. For both Augustine and Luther, justification starts with the bestowal of the grace of faith and keeps manifesting itself through moral progress throughout the entire earthly life of the justified sinner. I also try to shed some light upon the old discussion regarding Augustine's reading of Gal. 5:6. I argue that this passage was used by Augustine with no other purpose than to characterise the genuine Christian faith, the justifying faith. Augustine's reading of Gal. 5:6 does not collide with Luther's doctrine of justification by faith. The essence of Augustine's doctrine of justification states that humans are justified through or by the grace of faith (gratia fidei). Faith is not acquired by any merit, so it is a grace, that is, freely given. Justification is entirely God's doing since it begins once one is bestowed with the grace of faith and proceeds, impelled by the grace of perseverance (which is deep down what Augustine called gratia cooperativa, a reality not absent in Luther's understanding of the justification process). The Augustinian notion of grace is a very comprehensive one. Grace assumes many forms. Among its main expressions, according to Augustine, are the gifts of faith, hope and love. Luther did not deviate from this path. Perhaps there is only a slight difference in emphasis. Augustine elected love as the great distinctive characteristic of justifying faith, while Luther selected humility. For both theologians, however, faith is the only source of justification. This faith would obviously be useless without love, hope and humility. After all, without these ingredients it would not be the justifying faith. Not available

This study analyses Augustine s concept of concupiscentia, or evil desire (together with two cognate terms, libido and cupiditas) in the context of his entire oeuvre. By the aid of systematic analysis, the concept and its development is explored in four distinct ways. It is claimed that Augustine used the concept of concupiscentia for several theological purposes, and the task of the study is to represent these distinct functions, and their connections to Augustine s general theological and philosophical convictions. The study opens with a survey on terminology. A general overview of the occurrences of the negatively connoted words for desire in Latin literature precedes a corresponding examination of Augustine s own works. In this introductory chapter it is shown that, despite certain preferences in the uses of the words, a sufficient degree of synonymy reigns so as to allow an analysis of the concept without tightly discriminating between the terms. The theological functions of concupiscentia with its distinct contexts are analysed in separate chapters. The function of concupiscentia as a divine punishment is explored first (Ch 3). It is seen how Augustine links together concupiscentia and ideas about divine justice, and finally suggests that in the inordinate, psychologically experienced sexual desire, the original theological disobedience of Adam and Eve can be perceived. Augustine was criticized for this solution already in his own times, and the analysis of the function of concupiscentia as a divine punishment ends in a discussion on the critical response of punitive concupiscentia by Julian of Aeclanum. Augustine also attached to concupiscentia another central theological function by viewing evil desire as an inward originating cause for all external evil actions. In the study, this function is analysed by surveying two formally distinct images of evil desire, i.e. as the root (radix) of all evil, and as a threefold (triplex) matrix of evil actions (Ch 4). Both of these images were based on a single verse of the Bible (1 Jn 2, 16 and 1 Tim 6, 10). This function of concupiscentia was formed both parallel to, and in answer to, Manichaean insights into concupiscentia. Being familiar with the traditional philosophical discussions on the nature and therapy of emotions, Augustine situated concupiscentia also into this context. It is acknowledged that these philosophical traditions had an obvious impact into his way of explaining psychological processes in connection with concupiscentia. Not only did Augustine implicitly receive and exploit these traditions, but he also explicitly moulded and criticized them in connection with concupiscentia. Eventually, Augustine conceives the philosophical traditions of emotions as partly useful but also partly inadequate to deal with concupiscentia (Ch 5). The role of concupiscentia in connection to divine grace and Christian renewal is analysed in the final chapter of the study. Augustine s gradual development in internalizing the effects of concupiscentia also into the life of a baptized Christian are elucidated, as are the strong limitations and mitigations Augustine makes to the concept when attaching it into the life under grace (sub gratia). A crucial part in the development of this function is played by Augustine s changing interpretation of Rom 7, and the way concupiscentia appears in Augustine s readings of this text is therefore also analysed. As a result of the analysis of these four distinct functions and contexts of concupiscentia, it is concluded that Augustine s concept of concupiscentia is fairly tightly and coherently connected to his views of central theological importance. Especially the functions of concupiscentia as a punishment and the function of concupiscentia in Christian renewal were both tightly interwoven into Augustine s view of God s being and God s grace. The study shows the importance of reading Augustine s discussions on evil desire with a constant awareness of their role in their larger context, that is, of their function in each situation. The study warns against too simplistic and unifying readings of Augustine s concupiscentia, emphasizing the need to acknowledge both the necessitating, sinful aspects of concupiscentia, and the domesticated features of concupiscentia during Christian renewal. Augustinuksen (354-430) pahan himon käsite (concupiscentia, cupiditas, libido) on kiistanalainen ja kysymyksiä herättävä. Eivätkö kaikki halut ole moraalisesti oikeita? Ovatko pahat himot ja taipumukset sinänsä syntiä vai ovatko ne moraalisesti vastuunalaisia vasta, kun ne synnyttävät toimintaa? Voiko kristitty vastustaa pahoja haluja paremmin kuin ei-kristitty? Tutkimus selvittää, mitä erilaisia teologisia käyttötarkoituksia eli funktioita pahan himon käsitteellä on Augustinuksen ajattelussa. Tutkimus analysoi systemaattisen teksti- ja käsiteanalyysin avulla koko Augustinuksen tuotantoa: painopiste on pahan halun käsitteen kannalta keskeisissä teoksissa. Tutkimus osoittaa ensinnäkin, miten Augustinus kehittää tuotannossaan ajatusta pahasta halusta jumalallisena rangaistuksena. Irrationaaliset seksuaaliset halut ovat eräänlainen jälkikuva ihmisen jumalasuhteen rikkoutumisesta. Vioittuneen seksuaalisen halun käsite liittyy tiiviisti Augustinuksen keskeiseen teologiseen käsitearkkitehtuuriin synnistä, oikeudenmukaisuudesta ja Jumalan olemuksesta. Toinen keskeinen pahan halun funktio on sen käyttö yksittäisten pahojen tekojen perimmäisenä selitteenä. Augustinus käyttää tässä yhteydessä kielikuvaa pahasta himosta kaiken moraalisen pahan juurena. Augustinuksen ajan manikealaiset tekstit käyttivät samaa kuvaa, mutta Augustinukselle pahan halun juuri ei olekaan ensisijaisesti seksuaalista himoa vaan jumalanvastaista aistien, turhan tiedon ja itseriittoisuuden tavoittelua. Tutkimus kuvaa myös, miten Augustinus käytti antiikin filosofisen tradition tunneteorioita apologeettisiin tarkoitusperiin. Varhaisessa tuotannossaan Augustinus kumoaa manikealaisia psykologisia väitteitä perinteisillä filosofisilla tunneteorioilla. Myöhemmin Augustinus kritisoi näitä tunneteorioita tehottomuudesta ja käyttää tätä kritiikkiä tukemaan omaa kristillistä antropologiaansa. Augustinuksen myöhemmässä tuotannossa keskeisin pahan himon funktio on sen asema armo-opin apukäsitteenä. Hahmotellessaan pahan halun vaikutuksia kastetussa kristityssä Augustinus rajaa ja supistaa niitä merkittävästi. Armon vaikutukset näkyvät kristityn tahdossa niin, että pahan halun tuottamia kiusauksia on mahdollista vastustaa. Tutkimuksessa kuvatut pahan halun eri funktiot paljastavat, että käsite on Augustinuksen ajattelussa moniulotteinen ja suunniteltu vastaamaan erilaisiin kysymyksiin. Se kiinnittyy tiiviisti keskeisiin suuriin teologisiin teemoihin luomisesta, synnistä ja armosta. Augustinuksen pahan himon käsitteellä on pitkä vaikutushistoria: tutkimus osoittaa, että jälkivaikutus ei ole ansaitsematon.