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It is commonly claimed that scientists should hold certain communicative virtues, such as sincerity, openness, honesty and transparency. This paper uses the case of climate science to argue against these claims. Rather, based on a novel account of the range of ways in which non-experts learn from experts (detailed in Section 1), there are reasons to deny that scientists are under any basic obligation to be sincere, honest, open or transparent. Furthermore, not only are these claims analytically confused, they are epistemologically and politically dangerous. Sections 2-4 argue for these claims. The conclusion proposes an alternative standard for ethical communication: that scientists should not engage in “wishful speaking”.

This paper argues for a novel way of addressing questions about the relationship between politics and science: in terms of norms of communication, rather than norms of cognition. The first half of the paper motivates this general shift through close study of the concept of "wishful speaking"; arguing that this vice - rather than the more familiar "wishful thinking" - better captures real-life cases, such as the Lysenko affair. The second half builds on the ethics of communication to develop an account of the proper role of non-epistemic values in justification in terms of "value-aptness".

This paper re-interprets the precautionary principle as a “social epistemic rule”. First, it argues that sometimes policy-makers should act on claims which have not been scientifically established. Second, it argues that, given how scientists ought to solve “inductive risk” problems, such guidance is required not only under actual conditions, but under any plausible conditions. Third, it suggests that procedural fairness may provide policy-makers with reasons to be very reluctant to act on claims which are not scientifically established. The restriction of precautionary reasoning to contexts of significant environmental or public health disaster may respond to this problem.

In this article I ask two questions prompted by the phenomenon of ‘politically patterned’ climate change denial. First, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to cognitive experts’ testimony? Building on work in philosophy of science on inductive risk, I argue they can. Second, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's testimony? I argue that they cannot (at least, in the way identified in the first part of the article), because of the high epistemic standards which govern that body's assertions. The conclusion discusses the theoretical and practical implications of my arguments.