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The article constitutes the first comprehensive review of the EU's export of crime control policies and ‘aid to internal security’ across regions over the last 15 years. Drawing on both International Relations and criminology, it develops an analytical framework to identify the political rationalities and technologies of crime control that the EU attempts to transfer across the Eastern and Southern (extended) neighbourhoods. By scrutinising 216 projects aimed at combating transnational crime beyond Europe's borders, spanning law enforcement, border security, criminal justice, and the penitentiary sector, the empirical analysis is geared towards detecting and systematising the ways of thinking and doing crime control that the EU seeks to promote and export. Moreover, it investigates the ‘action at a distance’ whereby it does so. It is argued that in shaping third countries’ ability to criminalise, police, indict, convict, and punish, the EU is simultaneously defining its own security actorness, specifically consolidating its role as a ‘global crime fighter’.

This article makes four claims: First, tax systems at the national, regional and global level are regulatory systems. They can and should be studied as that. Second, taxation is an important extension to regulatory scholars’ empirical field of inquiry. It is a hard case to test prominent theories of new, softer modes of governance. Third, in the era of liberalization and globalization tax governance exhibits similar institutional changes as regulatory governance. It has changed (1) from national to multi-level governance, (2) from public and direct to indirect with increased involvement of private actors, and (3) from hierarchical and coercive to cooperative and responsive. Fourth, since the global financial crisis, the new sites of tax governance have increasingly been involved in the fight against tax evasion and avoidance and have become more politicized. These claims are substantiated by reference to the contributions to the special issue that this article introduces.

The COVID-19 pandemic created extraordinary challenges for governments to safeguard the well-being of their people. To what extent has leaders��� reliance on scientific advice shaped government responses to the COVID-19 outbreak? We argue that leaders who tend to orient themselves on expert advice realized the extent of the crisis earlier. Consequently, these governments would adopt containment measures relatively quickly, despite the high uncertainty they faced. Over time, differences in government responses based on the use of science would dissipate due to herding effects. We test our argument on data combining 163 government responses to the pandemic with national- and individual-level characteristics. Consistent with our argument, we find that countries governed by politicians with a stronger technocratic mentality, approximated by holding a PhD, adopted restrictive containment measures faster in the early, but not in the later, stages of the crisis. This importance of expert-based leadership plausibly extends to other large-scale societal crises.

Constitutions are social and historical artefacts that take part in the government of humans. Based on a comparison of how contemporary ‘global’ and historical ‘local’ constitutional documents establish power relations between ‘humans’ and their ‘government’, this article suggests that both types of documents involve different constitutive logics. Global constitutional documents create a ‘new normativity’ – a reversed constitution – that turns the historical relationship betweenpouvoir constituantandpouvoir constituéon its head. Such documents shift the primary responsibility for human rights from governments to humans. Research in the academic field of global constitutionalism omits this constitutional reconfiguration. By offering a more historically sensitive and reflexive account of constitutionalization, the field of global constitutionalism can realize an as yet unexplored critical potential.

First published online: 18 December 2019 This article links the consequences of the Great Recession on protest and electoral politics. It innovates by combining the literature on economic voting with social movement research and by presenting the first integrated, large‐scale empirical analysis of protest mobilisation and electoral outcomes in Europe. The economic voting literature offers important insights on how and under what conditions economic crises play out in the short‐run. However, it tends to ignore the closely connected dynamics of opposition in the two arenas and the role of protests in politicising economic grievances. More specifically, it is argued that economic protests act as a ‘signalling mechanism’ by attributing blame to decision makers and by highlighting the political dimension of deteriorating economic conditions. Ultimately, massive protest mobilisation should, thus, amplify the impact of economic hardship on the electoral losses of incumbents and mainstream parties more generally. The empirical analysis to study this relationship relies on an original semi‐automated protest event dataset combined with an updated dataset of electoral outcomes in 30 European countries from 2000 to 2015. The results indicate that the dynamics of economic protests and electoral punishment are closely related and point to a destabilisation of European party systems during the Great Recession.

The development of the energy policy of the European Union (EU) has been accompanied by organizational reforms of the EU’s energy bureaucracy. Much attention has been paid to Commission President Juncker’s reorganization of the European Commission, including how this has influenced the Energy Union initiative. The establishment of EU agencies has also expanded the EU administration and the capacity for developing new initiatives and coordinating implementation of EU legislation. However, recent research has not been sufficiently connected to policy studies on energy, climate and environment. This article analyses the extent to which two EU agencies—the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, and the European Environmental Agency—augment the policymaking capacity of the Commission by providing information that aids its work. The article ends with a discussion of the potential implications of agencification.

Why did we witness such a strong growth of anti-liberal forces twenty-five years after the triumph of liberalism? The answer is twofold. First, authoritarian populism has not sneaked into a given political space but is co-constitutive of a new cleavage in most modern societies. Authoritarian populists speak to the issues of this cleavage. Second, the rise of this new cleavage and authoritarian populists cannot be reduced to one of the two well-known explanations, namely the economic insecurity perspective and cultural backlash perspective. This current paper develops a political explanation that integrates struggles over policies with a focus on endogenous dynamics of political institutions in and beyond democracies. In this account, it is the historical compromise between labor and capital that has triggered a dynamic in which the rise of so-called non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs)—such as central banks, constitutional courts, and international organizations (IOs)—have locked in liberal policies in most consolidated democracies. This explanation brings together the party cartelization thesis with the observation that NMIs are a major target of contemporary populism. The explanatory model is probed by translating it into descriptive propositions and by showing step by step how the sequence unfolded in electoral democracies.

Despite the fact that economic concerns are the main driver of the EU integration process, integration does carry a substantial social dimension. Yet, it remains an open question whether this social dimension ‘only’ supports the market or whether goals such as social justice, solidarity and employment conditions are independent of or even work against goals of market efficiency. To address this question the paper presents an original dataset on all 346 binding EU social policy acts adopted since the Union’s founding. In a descriptive approach, I contrast instruments and dynamics in areas and subfields connected more closely to the common market with those more directly constituting a social dimension in its own right. On this basis, I argue that the shape of EU social policy has substantially changed, strengthening its market-supporting dimension while weakening policy focused on its social dimension. The paper opens up for discussion possible political dynamics driving these patterns.

Concurrent elections are widely used to increase turnout. We theorize and show empirically how concurrency affects electoral outcomes. First, concurrency increases turnout and thereby the participation of peripheral voters. Second, in combined elections, one electoral arena affects the other. In our case of majoritarian executive elections concurrent to proportional representation (PR) legislative elections, the centripetal tendency of majoritarian elections colors off to the concurrent PR race. Third, concurrency also entails spillovers of the incumbency advantage of executive officeholders to the concurrent legislative race. Drawing on quasi-random variation in local election timing in Germany, we show that concurrency increases turnout as well as council votes for the incumbent mayor's party and centrist parties more generally, with slightly more pronounced gains for the political left. As a consequence, concurrent elections consolidate party systems and political power by leading to less fragmented municipal councils and more unified local governments.

© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.What is the importance of linkages between civil society and external actors? In this article we map the landscape of civil society organisations in Belarus and Ukraine linked to the EU or Russia. Compiling an extensive dataset of organisations, we identify which domains they belong to. We find that linkages with Russia prevail in the culture domain and are based on shared past and exclusive identities. By contrast, linkages with the EU operate in domains related to a democratic future and include diverse groups. These linkages interact dynamically with limited access orders: where they can contribute to opening, they are often restricted.

As a consequence of the European Economic Crisis, the European Union (EU) has implanted mechanisms to assist fellow member states facing economic difficulties. Despite an increasing academic interest in public preferences for such intra-EU solidarity measures, research has so far largely ignored individual characteristics that could possibly influence politicians’ views. In this paper, we look at politicians’ preferences for transnational solidarity and argue that these preferences depend on attitudes regarding socioeconomic issues as well as attitudes related to the EU. Moreover, we hypothesize that the relationship is moderated by responsibility attribution and the economic situation in a country. Using survey data of about 4000 politicians running for office in nine EU countries, we find that transnational solidarity is more common for socioeconomically left-wing and pro-EU politicians. Yet, attitudinal differences only cease to matter when the beneficiary state is perceived responsible for the crisis and economic problems at home are low.

This pathway includes Open Access publishing. Outside of criminology, dominant conceptions of postcolonial statehood in the Global South as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ have long been criticized. In criminology, however, the theoretical outcomes of this critique have been scarce. In this article we therefore ask how ideals and practices of transnational criminal justice are informed by and productive of specific (Global North) conceptions of statehood. Exploring encounters between transnational and local criminal justice in the context of international state-building in Mali and Liberia, we observe frictions in which statehood divergences and global hierarchies become apparent. Through penal aid, we argue, a particular kind of penal statehood is produced wherein the options of how to perform penality are increasingly limited by the embeddedness in global power asymmetries.

First published online: 30 March 2021 This article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external actors in the region. In this introduction, we lay the conceptual framework and propose theoretical mechanisms linking state capacity and the actions of external actors to the likelihood of transformations from limited to open access orders. Previewing the findings, we note a fundamental asymmetry: while external actors have many levers to undermine the establishment of an open access order, they are more limited in how they can support reforms towards liberal democracy and free-market economy.

This article analyses the rise of populism and its discursive challenge to global constitutionalism (GC). It shows that populist contestation is more ambivalent than often suggested: its challenge depends on the populist variety and can both undermine or support liberal principles of GC. Building on the ideational approach to populism and a framework of transnational politicisation, a proposed typology identifies both communitarian types of populism and cosmopolitan types of populism. Illustrative case studies of the Alternative for Germany, the Polish Law and Justice Party, the Democracy in Europe Movement and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori substantiate these empirically. While all cases contest a perceived lack of popular sovereignty in a largely non-majoritarian global constitutional order, varieties of populism present contrasting responses: communitarian types push for global de-constitutionalisation in line with illiberal nationalist majoritarianism, while cosmopolitan types support global constitutionalisation according to liberal and democratic principles. Further, neo-socialist populists campaign against neoliberal principles in GC, but remain divided about supporting political principles beyond the state. These findings suggest an emerging politicisation of the process of global constitutionalisation at the societal level according to principles of democratic legitimacy; and global constitutional differentiation depending on outcomes of these normatively ambivalent and empirically contingent political contests.

The article explores the relevance of neo-colonial theory for criminology, and its contribution to understanding why and how penal policy and models travel from the global North to the global South. An empirical example is employed to review arguments for and against ‘penal neo-colonialism’ and to tease out the theory’s strengths and limitations; namely the European Union’s ‘penal aid’ to shape West African countries’ penal policies and practices to stop illicit flows and irregular mobility to Europe. The article further discusses neo-colonial theory’s concepts of agency, power and sovereignty by comparing them to similar poststructuralist perspectives on the ‘contingent sovereignty’ of ‘governance states’. Moreover, by drawing on a theoretical discussion on statehood in African studies, it looks at how the sovereignty of African states has been conceptualized as hollowed out ‘from above’ as well as ‘from below’. In doing so, the article contributes to a recent criminological debate that has problematized the relationship between (travelling) penal power and state sovereignty.

This article belongs to the special cluster, “Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe”, guest-edited by Katarzyna Jezierska and Serena Giusti. Think tanks outside liberal democracies have distinctive features that go beyond the features of the original concept that emerged within the US context. Departing from this empirical observation, we investigate the sources of the organizational power of think tanks in Ukraine as a case of a limited access order (LAO), a social order where privileged individuals maintain discretionary access to societal resources, functions, and institutions. To accomplish this goal, we apply Thomas Medvetz’s analytical concept of a “boundary organization,” which allows us to highlight the hybridity and flexibility of think tanks and thus understand their methods of gaining political access in an LAO. The analysis of interviews with senior representatives of nongovernmental think tanks in Ukraine in 2016–2017 demonstrates that Ukrainian think tanks are resourceful and find indirect ways of influencing politics. These organizations publish their reports in the media and deliver assessments of Ukraine’s international commitments to the country’s donors, thereby indirectly influencing the policy process in the country. Ukrainian think tanks also comply with the expectations of a boundary organization, accumulating and converting economic, academic, and media capital into political capital, using advocacy and networking as conversion tools. One important difference between the expectations of Medvetz’s framework and our findings is that political capital seems to be the goal of think tank activity, while the three other types are used merely instrumentally.

Democratic regression has become a worrying phenomenon in the last years. Social science has provided a variety of explanations why democratic regimes have lost democratic regime quality. Against this backdrop, I take stock of the recent literature by putting forward two important analytical distinctions that we should make more explicit. First, I propose to classify our current explanations along the source where the cause for the malaise originated. By doing so, I introduce a distinction between erosion and decay type of arguments. While the former is a gradual process that is caused exogenously – like wind or water hitting a stone – the latter is caused endogenously – like the half-life in nuclear decay processes. Second, I draw a distinction between the endogenous or exogenous roots of the cause and the subsequent causal mechanism that connects the cause with the outcome. I outline the need for dissecting a causal mechanism into its constitutive components and highlight its underlying dimensions of temporality. Throughout the article, I use empirical case material as well as relevant secondary literature to illustrate these points.

The extensive scholarship devoted to the congruence of mass-elite policy preferences lacks consensus about the meaning, comparison, and measurement across political settings. This makes comparisons difficult and raises obstacles to advancing the debates. This symposium aims to identify the diversity of methodological choices and to reflect systematically on several key choices of particular importance in understanding the congruence. The contributions to the symposium compare and contrast how several types of measurement fare in diverse political contexts in Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa, and East Asia, and what we can learn from those methodological choices.

President Trump has created turmoil in the transatlantic relationship. Biden has taken a conciliatory tone towards allies and promised to return the US to multilateral cooperation as president. But the transatlantic relationship will never return to its heyday. Three long-term trends will shape the future of US foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship: the global shift in the distribution of power, and especially what the US-China rivalry means for Europe; the US’ ambivalence towards multilateralism and why it will likely endure; and changing domestic coalitions within the US that might be a harbinger of a foreign policy revolution.

Few political transformations have attacked social inequalities more thoroughly than the 1959 Cuban Revolution. As the survey data in this article show, however, sixty years on, structural inequalities are returning that echo the prerevolutionary socioethnic hierarchies. While official Cuban statistics are mute about social differences along racial lines, the authors were able to conduct a unique, nationwide survey with more than one thousand respondents that shows the contrary. Amid depressed wages in the state-run economy, access to hard currency has become key. However, racialized migration patterns of the past make for highly unequal access to family remittances, and the gradual opening of private business disfavors Afro- Cubans, due to their lack of access to prerevolutionary property and startup capital. Despite the political continuity of Communist Party rule, a restructuring of Cuban society with a profound racial bias is turning back one of the proudest achievements of the revolution.

How do shifts in the global distribution of power affect the US’ preferences for institutionalized cooperation? This article explains why and when the power shift creates incentives for the US to move cooperation out of universal multilateral institutions, such as the WTO, and into exclusive multilateral institutions where it seeks to create a leading consensus among a select group of ‘like-minded’ states. An agreement reached within the sub-group imposes costs on those excluded from the deal. This increases the hegemon’s power bargaining leverage vis-à-vis outsiders who can join the new agreement as price-takers. In this scenario, the hegemon’s institutional response to the challenge of rising powers is a strategy of divide and conquer; that is, strategic cooptation based on inducements followed by power bargaining based on coercion. The double move, however, puts the hegemon in the position of challenging the institutional status quo with potentially negative consequences for the original institutional order. A case study of negotiations over a new trade in services agreement (TiSA) shows this strategy of divide and conquer at work as the US tries to first achieve a deal without emerging economies, notably China, that can later be imposed on them. As long as powerful clubs of common interest proliferate, rising powers will likely find it difficult to gain systematic and structural – as opposed to ad hoc – leverage over global governance.

This conclusion to a special issue on backlash politics develops a proto-theory of backlash politics. The special issue’s introduction defined backlash politics as a particular form of political contestation with a retrograde objective as well as extraordinary goals or tactics that has reached the threshold level of entering mainstream public discourse. While a sub-category of contentious politics, we argue that backlash politics is distinct and should not be understood as ‘regressive contentious politics’. Drawing from the contributions to this special issue, we discuss the causes of backlash politics, yet we argue that the greatest theoretical advances may come from studying backlash dynamics and how these dynamics contribute to different outcomes. We develop a proto-theory of backlash politics that considers causes for the rise of backlash movements, how frequent companions to backlash politics – emotive politics, nostalgia, taboo breaking, and institution reshaping – intensify backlash dynamics and make it more likely that backlash politics generate consequential outcomes.

One of the most important features of the multi-level governance research programme is the parallel conceptualisation of the vertical and the horizontal relationships within multi-level governance systems. Different systems of multi-level governance are characterised by the relationships between political institutions on the same level (Are there many task-specific organisations?) and by the relationship between different levels (On which level do we see political communities?). By conceptualising scale and community in a substitutive way as Hooghe and Marks in tendency do, some of the potentials are lost. I put forward the suggestion that treating the two dimensions as independent would allow for an even fuller picture of the dynamics of politics in multi-level governance systems.

This article concentrates on the path from the development of collective identities to the integration of core state powers. Firstly, we focus on the European experience. We argue that the identities of political, economic, and social elites have been crucial for the evolution of European integration. With regard to mass public opinion, European integration has been made possible by a consensus of EU citizens with inclusive national identities. Most recently, the politicization of EU affairs in many member states has been driven by populist forces mobilizing minorities with exclusive nationalist identities. Secondly, we discuss the extent to which insights from Europe have travelled to other regions of the world. Elites involved in region‐building almost always develop identity narratives linking their national experience to the respective regions. Moreover, there is evidence that the difference between inclusive and exclusive nationalist identifications has also travelled beyond Europe.

Global capitalism is a transnational “operational space” (Sassen) which is (re)produced by the practices of states, policy- and issue-specific government networks, and private organizations such as transnational corporations, global law firms, and standard-setting agencies. This “operational space,” which I call the transnational constellation, works through and beyond distinct spatial settings (i.e. local, glocal, national, global), endowing them with a global financial capitalistic logic and limiting the scope of democratic self-determination. In the second section, I analyze political protest against this transnational constellation in terms of democratic theory. I argue that transnational protest and activism have to be appreciated for their reshaping of spaces of the political, for developing and delivering a genuinely global perspective on political problems, and for their politicization of the transnational constellation by revealing and contesting structures and strategies of domination. However, it would be misleading to conceive of protest against the transnational constellation as constituent power. Instead, as I argue in the third part of the article, this kind of protest enacts a parallel world which very often lasts only for a fleeting moment, but where alternative political and social life forms are exercised and experienced. Perhaps their time is yet to come.

The financial and economic crisis has increased attention on EU social policy, yet little policy change has been realized. Drawing on Easton’s political system approach, we differentiate demand emanating from the difficult situation following the crisis and support in form of the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European elections. On the output side, we show how social policy has been substantially removed from the priorities of the EU political agenda already prior to the crisis. We argue that it is the contrast between crisis-generated demand and a more long-term lack of policy support that empowered actors interested in deepening economic integration and austerity policies. We present new empirical data that shows how partisan and governmental preferences are channelled through the EU institutions and how thus, changing ideological composition of the Commission as agenda-setter and an asymmetrical intergovenmentalist turn, have been a key driver for the substantial decline of EU social policy provision.

How and under what conditions does legitimacy affect processes of international institutional change? This article specifies and evaluates three causal mechanisms by which variation in legitimacy induces institutional change in international organizations (IOs) and argues that an important, yet hitherto neglected, source of legitimacy-based change is cognitive in nature. Using survival analysis, we evaluate these mechanisms with a novel dataset on the establishment of parliamentary institutions in thirty-six regional organizations between 1950 and 2010. We find that the empowerment of supranational secretariats, engagement with the European Union, and parliamentarization in an organization's neighborhood increase the likelihood of regional parliamentarization. This suggests that legitimacy judgments that draw on cognitive referents provide an important source of international institutional change. We illustrate the underlying cognitive emulation mechanism with a case study of parliamentarization in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The European Union (EU) is one of the world’s most active imposers of foreign policy sanctions. By contrast, the EU has never used formal political sanctions against a member. Why does the EU favour sanctions as an instrument to deal with norm violations abroad, but not at home? The article argues that an understanding of sanctions as ostracism helps illuminate this discrepancy. Far from technical instruments that can be made to ‘work’ through improved design, sanctions are social instruments that operate through selective exclusion. An in-depth scrutiny of public justifications from the European institutions and individual politicians shows that both at home and abroad sanctions are strongly associated with ostracising attributes. However, whereas practical and symbolic distance-taking from the target is core for foreign policy sanctions, at home, the same ostracising properties run against the EU’s traditional insistence on resolving disagreements through rational dialogue.

EU scholars have studied mobilization as a cross-level phenomenon. Individuals and organized interests seek preliminary rulings with the Court of Justice of the EU to challenge national rules. Likewise, the Commission takes member states to court where they infringe commonly agreed rules. However, litigation can also run horizontally in the EU system. EU institutions can go to court to annul actions of other EU institutions. Studying this so far neglected phenomenon of litigation, the paper analyses differences in mobilization across European Parliament, Council and Commission. To this aim it conceptualizes litigation decisions as resulting from an interplay of agency and structure. Decision-making within organizations and in the EU political system as well as different motivations of actors are presented to explain differences in horizontal litigation. Methodologically the analysis combines a database covering 160 horizontal annulment conflicts (1957 to 2017) and case studies based on expert interviews.

European economic integration creates unintended consequences for national public administrations. This article offers a conceptual and empirical analysis of how these challenges are met. First, three challenges are identified: a reduced capacity to offer services to citizens who move freely, increasing administrative burdens, and negative externalities for all parts from a single states’ administrative failure. Second, a conceptual framework is developed that links each challenge to a most likely response in form of modes of administrative cooperation. Third, the framework is illustrated by an empirical analysis of the coordination of social security systems, labor inspectorates, and posted workers. The case studies show that horizontal administrative cooperation is developed stepwise over time and in line with the theoretical framework. In sum, we can sustain that horizontal administrative cooperation is a relevant additional integration dynamic that buffers unintended effects of market integration on formally independent but increasingly interdependent member state executive bodies.