1. Bank bonus pay as a risk sharing contract
- Author
-
Harald Hau, Matthias Efing, Patrick Kampkötter, Jean-Charles Rochet, University of Zurich, Hau, Harald, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris), Center for Economic Studies and Ifo for Economic Research (CESifo), CESifo Group Munich, Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative (GREMAQ), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, and HEC Paris Research Paper
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,History ,Polymers and Plastics ,Control (management) ,Bank compensation ,2002 Economics and Econometrics ,Operating leverage ,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages ,Shareholder ,Accounting ,0502 economics and business ,ddc:330 ,Risk sharing ,External financing ,operating leverage ,Business and International Management ,050207 economics ,Finance ,1402 Accounting ,050208 finance ,banker compensation ,Earnings ,business.industry ,05 social sciences ,10003 Department of Banking and Finance ,330 Economics ,Incentive ,Payroll ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G20 - General ,2003 Finance ,8. Economic growth ,G20 ,[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration ,G21 ,business ,risk sharing ,bank risk ,D22 ,bonus pay - Abstract
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202916; We show that banker bonuses cannot be understood exclusively as incentive contracts, but also incorporate a significant risk sharing dimension between bank shareholders and bank employees. This contrasts with the conventional view whereby diversified shareholders fully insure risk averse employees. However, financial frictions imply that shareholder value is concave in a bank's cash reserves---making shareholders effectively risk averse. The optimal contract between shareholders and employees then involves some degree of risk sharing. Using extensive payroll data on 1.26 million bank employee years in the Austrian, German, and Swiss banking sectors, we show that the structure of bonus pay within and across banks is compatible with an economically significant risk sharing motive, but difficult to rationalize based on incentive theories of bonus pay only.
- Published
- 2023