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This paper investigates how individual attention triggers influence financial risk-taking based on a large sample of trading records from a brokerage service that sends standardized push messages on stocks to retail investors. By exploiting the data in a difference-in-differences (DID) setting, we find attention triggers increase investors’ risk-taking. Our DID coefficient implies attention trades carry, on average, a 19 percentage-point-higher leverage than non-attention trades. We provide a battery of cross-sectional analyses to identify the groups of investors and stocks for which this effect is stronger.

We investigate the compensation of counterparty exposure in the prices of structured products. Our analysis reveals that product issuers did not compensate retail investors for counterparty exposure before the Lehman default. Post‐Lehman, retail prices have no longer neglected this risk. We also measure retail investor attention towards issuer credit risk. For a given level of issuer credit risk, counterparty exposure is compensated more when attention is higher. Furthermore, issuers tend to construct products with larger counterparty exposure. Overall, our results shed light on the conditions under which financial engineering generates neglected risk.

In this paper, I investigate the impact of central clearing in credit risk transfer markets on a loan-originating bank's lending behavior. Under the current market regulation, central clearing undermines banks’ lending discipline. The regulatory design of the credit risk transfer market in terms of capital requirements, disclosure standards, risk retention, and access to uncleared credit risk transfer can mitigate this problem. I also show that the lending discipline channel is an essential element of the impact of central clearing on banks’ loan default loss exposure, which is a first-order consideration for systemic risk analysis.

This paper analyzes the decision of firms to sell assets to fund investments (financing asset sales). For a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms during the 1971-2010 period, we document new stylized facts about financing asset sales that cannot be explained by traditional motives for selling assets, such as financial distress or financing constraints. Using a structural model of financing, investment, and acroeconomic risk, we show that financing asset sales attenuate the debt overhang problem, because asset sale financed investments imply lower wealth transfers from equity to debt than otherwise identical but equity financed investments. This novel motive to reduce the debt overhang problem can explain how financing asset sales relate to firm characteristics and business cycles. We also confirm with simulated panels of model firms that are structurally similar to their empirical counterpart that they indeed feature the dynamic patterns of financing asset sales we observe in the data for real firms.