Search

Australia has a competition problem: there is not enough of it. Our industries are concentrated. Our markets show signs of weak competition. The way Australia’s courts, parliamentarians and regulators think about competition is partly to blame. Although it has been less influential in Australia than in the United States, the Chicago School’s views on competition have shaped our laws, policies and enforcement practices. The Chicago School views market concentration as a virtue more than a vice. The School contended that barriers to entry are negligible, market power is temporary, most mergers are good, vertical restraints and predatory pricing are either benign or efficient. The growing body of research and experience, however, shows that the Chicago School’s faith in the ability of markets to self-correct and deliver competitive outcomes was misplaced. There is a strong progressive case for repositioning how we think about competition. Focusing more on the competitive process, the structure of markets and the incentives those structures create for firms will play an important role in reducing inequality.

The growth in global current account imbalances has produced a lopsided global economy, characterised by large lenders and large borrowers, large savers and large consumers, and large exporters and large importers. For many years, the G20 has committed to reducing these imbalances. But has it been successful? Are the G20's policy prescriptions for reducing these imbalances the right ones? And have countries altered their policies because of the discussions and commitments in the G20 or not? The paper assesses whether the G20 has achieved its goal of reducing global current account imbalances. It then uses the G‐Cubed (G20) model — a multi‐country, multi‐sector, intertemporal general equilibrium model — to assess the impacts of the G20's proposed policy agenda. It shows that the G20's policy prescriptions — reducing the fiscal deficit in the United States, increasing public infrastructure investment in Germany and increasing domestic consumption in China — are not necessarily effective in reducing current account imbalances and, when imbalances are reduced, it often comes at the cost of the real economy. Finally, the paper uses the results from in‐depth interviews with 61 policymakers from across all G20 countries — including Janet Yellen, Kevin Rudd, Ben Bernanke, Haruhiko Kuroda, Jack Lew, Mark Carney and 55 others — to explore whether the G20's focus on current account imbalances influences domestic policies. It finds that, while the G20's influence has been marginal, there are ways in which it could be strengthened. The paper concludes with a discussion on how the G20's agenda could be reformed to help reduce current account imbalances in the future.

Has the G20 achieved its goals in macroeconomic cooperation since 2008? The paper organises the G20's efforts under five themes: macroeconomic stimulus, fiscal consolidation, monetary policy, the global financial safety net and global imbalances. The G20 was initially successful in each of these areas, but this success was short‐lived. While the G20 met its goals on macroeconomic stimulus, it has been less successful in reducing deficits and debt. While it was successful in increasing its resources, the global financial safety net remains too small, too fragmented and institutional reform is incomplete. While the G20 succeeded in moving to more market‐determined exchange rates and avoiding competitive devaluations, it struggled to avoid negative spillovers. Despite years of effort, the G20 has made limited progress in reducing global imbalances. Current account imbalances are creeping back to pre‐crisis levels. Public debt remains high and most economies are moving in the wrong direction in correcting imbalances in household savings and debt. The paper concludes that the G20 has done better in some areas than others. But to suggest the G20 is a forum in decline ignores its shift from reactive crisis response to longer‐term structural challenges outside of the pressing need of an immediate crisis.

Economic theory suggests that monopoly prices hurt consumers but benefit shareholders. But in a world where individuals or households can be both consumers and shareholders, the impact of market power on inequality depends in part on the relative distribution of consumption and corporate equity ownership across individuals or households. The paper calculates this distribution for the United States, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, spanning nearly three decades from 1989 to 2016. In 2016, the top 20 per cent consumed approximately as much as the bottom 60 per cent, but had 15 times as much corporate equity. Because ownership is more skewed than consumption, increased mark-ups increase inequality. Moreover, over time, corporate equity has become even more skewed relative to consumption.