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In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.

In the summer of 1931, a financial crisis began in Austria, spread to Germany, forced Britain to abandon the gold standard, crossed the Atlantic, and afflicted financial institutions in the United States. This article describes how banks in New York City, the central money market of the United States, reacted to this trans-Atlantic trauma. New York's money-center banks anticipated the onset of a financial crisis, prepared for it by accumulating substantial reserves, and during the European crisis, continued business as usual. New York's leading bankers deliberately and collectively decided on the business-as-usual policy in order to minimize the impact of the panic in the United States. New York banks’ behavior changed only after the Federal Reserve raised discount rates to stem gold outflows in the fall of 1931.

New data reveals that bank distress peaked in New York City, at the center of the United States money market, in July and August 1931, when the banking crisis peaked in Germany and before Britain abandoned the gold standard. This paper tests competing theories about the causes of New York's banking crisis. The cause appears to have been intensified regulatory scrutiny, which was a delayed reaction to the failure of the Bank of United States, rather than the exposure of money-center banks to events overseas.

A banking crisis began in Austria in May 1931 and intensified in July, when runs struck banks throughout Germany. In September, the crisis compelled Britain to quit the gold standard. Newly discovered data shows that failure rates rose for banks in New York City, at the center of the United States money market, in July and August 1931, before Britain abandoned the gold standard and before financial outflows compelled the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. Banks in New York City had large exposures to foreign deposits and German debt. This paper tests to see whether the foreign exposure of money center banks linked the financial crises on the two sides of the Atlantic.