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[Note that this paper is now published at Psychology of Women Quarterly in the Special Issue on Feminist Psychology and Open Science https://doi.org/10.1177/03616843211029255] Open science aims to improve the rigor, robustness, and reproducibility of psychological research. Despite resistance from some academics, the open science movement has been championed by some early career researchers, who have proposed innovative new tools and methods to promote and employ open research principles. Feminist early career researchers have much to contribute to this emerging way of doing research. However, they face unique barriers, which may prohibit their full engagement with the open science movement. We, ten feminist early career researchers in psychology, from a diverse range of academic and personal backgrounds, explore open science through a feminist lens, to consider how voice and power may be negotiated in unique ways for early career researchers. Taking a critical and intersectional approach, we discuss how feminist early career research may be complemented or challenged by shifts towards open science. We also propose how early career researchers can act as grassroots changemakers within the context of academic precarity. We identify ways in which open science can benefit from feminist epistemology and end with envisaging a future for feminist early career researchers who wish to engage with open science practices in their own research.

Humans copy other people without their conscious awareness, a behaviour known as automatic imitation. Although automatic imitation forms a key part of daily social interactions, we do not copy other people indiscriminately. Instead, we control imitative tendencies by prioritising some actions and inhibiting others. To date, neuroimaging studies investigating the control of automatic imitation have produced inconsistent findings. Some studies suggest that imitation control relies on a domain-specific neural circuit related to social cognition (the theory-of-mind network). In contrast, other studies show engagement of a domain-general neural circuit that is engaged during a diverse range of cognitive control tasks (the multiple demand network). Given the inconsistency of prior findings, in the current paper we avoided problems associated with interpreting individual studies by performing a meta-analysis. To do so, we used a multi-level kernel density analysis to quantitatively identify consistent patterns of activation across functional magnetic resonance imaging studies investigating the control of imitation. Our results show clear and consistent evidence across studies that the control of automatic imitation is guided by brain regions in the multiple demand network including dorsolateral frontoparietal cortex. In contrast, there was only limited evidence that regions in the theory of mind network were engaged. Indeed, medial prefrontal cortex showed no consistent engagement and right temporoparietal junction engagement may reflect spatial rather than imitative control. As such, the current meta-analysis reinforces the role of domain-general control mechanisms and provides limited evidence in support of the role of domain-specific processes in regulating imitative tendencies. Consequently, neurocognitive models of imitation need updating to place more emphasis on domain-general control mechanisms, as well as to consider more complex organisational structures of control, which may involve contributions from multiple cognitive systems.

The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human‐like characteristics to non‐human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory‐of‐mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory‐of‐mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory‐of‐mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory‐of‐mind network. In a follow‐up, pre‐registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and anthropomorphism., Is trying to understand an artificial mind the same as trying to understand a human mind? Using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how the process of anthropomorphism overlaps with that of theory‐of‐mind using brain and behavioural measures. While dispositional anthropomorphism did not capture variation in theory‐of‐mind network activity, situational anthropomorphism did influence how people understand and predict the ongoing actions of an agent.

Cognitive control refers to the ability of human beings to adapt flexibly and quickly to continuously changing environments. Several decades of research have identified a diverse range of mental processes that are associated with cognitive control but the extent to which shared systems underlie cognitive control in social and non-social contexts, as well as how these systems may vary across individuals, remains largely unexplored. By integrating methodological approaches from experimental and differential psychology, the current study is able to shine new light on the relationships between stable features of individuals, such as personality and sex, and the architecture of cognitive control systems using paradigms that index social (automatic imitation) and spatial processes. Across three large-sample experiments (>600 participants in total), we demonstrate that cognitive control systems are largely invariant to stable aspects of personality, but exhibit a sex difference, such that females show greater task-interference than males. Moreover, we further qualified this sex difference in two ways. First, we showed that the sex difference was unrelated to the sex of the interaction partner and therefore did not reflect an in-group bias based on sex. Second, we showed that the sex difference was tied to a form of spatial interference control rather than social (imitative) control and therefore it does not reflect a specialised mechanism for guiding social interactions exclusively. Instead, our findings suggest that a robust sex difference exists in the system (or set of subsystems) that operate in resolving a form of spatial interference control, and that such systems are unaffected by social factors such as the sex of the interaction partner. The results highlight the value of integrating approaches from experimental and differential psychology by providing a deeper understanding of the structure of cognitive control systems, while also providing new dimensions to incorporate into theories and models of social and non-social control.