1. Moving Target Defense Mechanism for Side-Channel Attacks
- Author
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Alie El-Din Mady, Satyanarayana Vuppala, and Adam Kuenzi
- Subjects
021103 operations research ,Computer Networks and Communications ,business.industry ,Computer science ,0211 other engineering and technologies ,Synchronizing ,02 engineering and technology ,Encryption ,Computer Science Applications ,Attack model ,Control and Systems Engineering ,Scalability ,Rekeying ,Moving target defense ,Side channel attack ,Electrical and Electronic Engineering ,business ,Information Systems ,Computer network - Abstract
In this paper, we present a side-channel resilient moving target defense mechanism against power-/electromagnetic-based side-channel attacks. Recent countermeasures use fresh rekeying after every encryption/decryption process; this causes major overhead in synchronizing the communicating parties. In contrast to previous work, our mechanism integrates fresh rekeying and masking techniques at an interval, where these techniques are driven by the maximum number of side-channel leakage traces required toward a successful embedded attack. Hence, the mechanism tracks the effect of attacks on the number of traces, and consequently applies rekeying at suitable intervals to reduce the computational/communication overhead, while increasing the attack cost. The mechanism scalability was evaluated against an advanced attack model based on machine learning methods that reduces significantly the number of traces required for a successful attack under masking implementation.
- Published
- 2020
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