1. A Capacity-Price Game for Uncertain Renewables Resources
- Author
-
Shreyas Sekar, Baosen Zhang, and Pan Li
- Subjects
FOS: Computer and information sciences ,Control and Optimization ,020209 energy ,02 engineering and technology ,010501 environmental sciences ,01 natural sciences ,7. Clean energy ,Scheduling (computing) ,Microeconomics ,symbols.namesake ,Electric power system ,Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory ,0502 economics and business ,FOS: Mathematics ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,Economics ,050207 economics ,Mathematics - Optimization and Control ,Randomness ,0105 earth and related environmental sciences ,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment ,business.industry ,05 social sciences ,Bidding ,Investment (macroeconomics) ,Social planner ,Renewable energy ,Computational Theory and Mathematics ,Optimization and Control (math.OC) ,Nash equilibrium ,Hardware and Architecture ,symbols ,business ,Software ,Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ,Renewable resource - Abstract
Renewable resources are starting to constitute a growing portion of the total generation mix of the power system. A key difference between renewables and traditional generators is that many renewable resources are managed by individuals, especially in the distribution system. In this paper, we study the capacity investment and pricing problem, where multiple renewable producers compete in a decentralized market. It is known that most deterministic capacity games tend to result in very inefficient equilibria, even when there are a large number of similar players. In contrast, we show that due to the inherent randomness of renewable resources, the equilibria in our capacity game becomes efficient as the number of players grows and coincides with the centralized decision from the social planner's problem. This result provides a new perspective on how to look at the positive influence of randomness in a game framework as well as its contribution to resource planning, scheduling, and bidding. We validate our results by simulation studies using real world data., Appears in IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing
- Published
- 2022