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This paper introduces southern blue criminology, a novel theoretical framework that extends traditional criminological analysis to encompass the environmental harms affecting the world's oceans, particularly from a Global South perspective. This approach critiques crime-centric analysis and expands upon the concept of "harmscapes" - areas significantly impacted by ecological damage - by integrating socio-economic and cultural contexts often overlooked by prevailing enforcement paradigms developed in the Global North. Through a critical review of existing criminological theories and maritime enforcement practices, this study highlights the inadequacies of current approaches that fail to account for the transnational and complex nature of oceanic harms. Southern blue criminology is proposed through four integrative perspectives: shifting from a crime-centric view to embracing a broader conception of ocean harmscapes; moving beyond state-centric responses to foster whole-of-society involvement including non-state actors; transcending Western-centric governance models in favor of context-dependent strategies that respect local knowledge and practices; and expanding the analytical frame from human-centric approaches to include human-nonhuman assemblages, recognizing the ocean as an active participant in ecological and social interactions. The framework aims to foster more effective and sustainable management of marine environments, proposing a shift from a punitive focus to a more comprehensive, preventive, and restorative approach. The implications of this research are significant, suggesting a transformative shift in policies to better address the intricate web of factors contributing to maritime environmental crimes and to enhance global ecological justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSocial cash transfers (CTs) have expanded considerably in Africa over the last decade. While the largest programmes are run by public institutions, non-state actors are increasingly becoming involved, but have attracted less academic attention. CTs are particular in that they are more fungible and liquid than other types of welfare provision, meaning that they are more difficult to control for both providers and governments. This article explores state strategies in relation to CTs by non-state actors focusing on when and how they are politicized. We analyse politicization from two intertwined vantage points. Firstly, we argue that the distributional logic in a society’s social contract contributes to understanding how and when cash transfers become politicized. We analyse the distributional logic along a continuum from universalist to partisan and apply this analytical lens to Tanzania and Uganda. Secondly, we suggest that politicization is intertwined with how the states coordinate non-state-CTs. We show that in Tanzania non-state-CTs are integrated into the state’s framework of social protection, while in Uganda they primarily operate on the margins of the state. In both cases, however, the state retains control over non-state-CTs and uses them politically, albeit in different ways, in order to maintain its relations with important constituencies. Hence, our analytical framework, which combines analysis of the distributional logic in the social contract and the mode of coordination, enables us to unpack when and how non-state-CTs are politicized, as well as how the tensions between governments and non-state-CTs have been handled differently in the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Nature and Scope of Diplomatic History" is an article that explores the field of diplomatic history, which focuses on the interactions between states and their representatives. It discusses the nature of diplomacy and its role in shaping international relations, as well as the study of treaties, alliances, war and peace, and the influence of non-state actors. The article also acknowledges the challenges and limitations faced by diplomatic history, such as its focus on state actors and official sources. It highlights the interconnectedness and evolving nature of history, diplomacy, and diplomatic history, and emphasizes the multidisciplinary approach of the field. While there are criticisms that diplomatic history can be Western-centric and state-centric, it is recognized that the field provides a comprehensive understanding of international relations by considering various factors and perspectives. [Extracted from the article]

While partnerships between state and non-state actors have proven effective in developed contexts, this equilibrium in less developed countries is disrupted due to political instability, weak governance, and historical legacies. Governments often perceive NGOs in these regions as foreign entities that challenge national sovereignty. This complex relationship is rooted in power dynamics, patronage networks, and systemic corruption. The concept of "distant proximity," where governments prioritize localization while NGOs emphasize global values, further complicates these partnerships, leading to adversarial interactions. This article analyzes the contemporary political realities and geopolitical forces that shape these relationships. It underscores the need for trust-based, transparent alliances to address complex societal challenges. Ultimately, this research seeks to provide policymakers and practitioners with an understanding of the importance of sustainable partnerships between governments and NGOs in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last five years, violent non-state actors have acquired armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have been using them extensively. This paper presents the main non-state actors involved and the areas in which they have used this tool, as well as how UAVs are used and procured. To date, armed UAVs have mainly been used by non-state actors in the Middle East and Central Asia. They have also been used in the conflict zones of Ukraine, Myanmar, Mexico, and Ecuador. While this is worrisome, limited evidence suggests that violent non-state actors use armed UAVs intentionally in areas where mostly civilians are present. The paper details the state of UAV usage by non-state actors and develops a thesis of cyclic adaptation between state and non-state actors. Not only do non-state actors learn from state actors, so does state and state-backed actors learn from non-state actors in conflict zones. This process have been visible on the battlefield in Ukraine, where state-backed actors on both sides have incorporated smaller consumer style UAVs into their repertoire. As the use of armed UAVs developed substantially following Hezbollah’s early UAV operations in 2004 and spread to many regions of the world, the adaptation of non-state cleverness and ingenuity can be harnessed by state actors in times of poor or limited access to weaponry and support systems.

Over the last five years, violent non-state actors have acquired armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have been using them extensively. This paper presents the main non-state actors involved and the areas in which they have used this tool, as well as how UAVs are used and procured. To date, armed UAVs have mainly been used by non-state actors in the Middle East and Central Asia. They have also been used in the conflict zones of Ukraine, Myanmar, Mexico, and Ecuador. While this is worrisome, limited evidence suggests that violent non-state actors use armed UAVs intentionally in areas where mostly civilians are present. The paper details the state of UAV usage by non-state actors and develops a thesis of cyclic adaptation between state and non-state actors. Not only do non-state actors learn from state actors, so does state and state-backed actors learn from non-state actors in conflict zones. This process have been visible on the battlefield in Ukraine, where state-backed actors on both sides have incorporated smaller consumer style UAVs into their repertoire. As the use of armed UAVs developed substantially following Hezbollah's early UAV operations in 2004 and spread to many regions of the world, the adaptation of non-state cleverness and ingenuity can be harnessed by state actors in times of poor or limited access to weaponry and support systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Larq Journal for Philosophy, Linguistics & Social Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Scholars and policymakers working on non-state climate action have tended to focus on functional considerations, largely neglecting questions of ideology. This article brings them into the spotlight by investigating how ideology affects climate action initiatives. Based on a new database of 389 projects associated with reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, the article examines how ideology affects project design and partnering. A quantitative analysis and four case studies of projects in Colombia and Peru show how environmental ideology shapes the preferences of project developers for project designs and partners. Two mechanisms that underlie this are also derived. The findings show how a focus on ideology can help open the black box of climate action initiatives and explain their substantive variation. They also offer insights into the ideological implications of the transnationalization of climate governance. Non-state climate action at once entrenches the neoliberal ideological status quo of climate politics and offers critical ideologies a foothold. This poses risks for the future effectiveness and legitimacy of non-state climate action and should be considered in the design of the emerging institutional architecture that supports it. This article also sets a platform for and outlines the contours of a future research agenda on ideology in climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern times and the post-Soviet era, especially the post-9/11 period, has brought a significant change in the nature of conflict – more and more non-state actors have been entering the stage of war. As the character of such actors has changed throughout the last decades, their tactics, strategy, means and weapons have transformed as well. Being a non state side of a conflict, they also lean towards more unconventional methods such as guerrilla warfare or terrorism which seem to be one of the most characteristic elements of an asymmetric conflict. The conflict of islamist terrorism (in this case – islamist fighters in Iraq) vs. international coalition seems to be a perfect example of asymmetric warfare. The following paper discusses the concept of asymmetric conflict and the way it has been addressed in some European and American publications, listing at the same time the most distinctive features of such conflict. However, most of all, a question addressed in the text is what typical features of an asymmetric conflict might be observed in the above mentioned conflict. Fighting islamist fighters, including the Islamic State (a terrorist organization which claims to be a state) by the western countries coalition, has been given here as an exemplification of an ongoing asymmetric conflict. As a source of knowledge about this conflict, apart from available publications and articles, the author has taken the in depth interviews carried out personally with the ex-soldiers from the Polish special force unit who fought in Iraq in years 2003–2016.

When describing the essential features of the Russian peasantry, Gorky draws attention to the concepts of cruelty and, as a result, pity, which are necessary for understanding its actions. Cruelty, which goes hand in hand with the use of violence and power, is one of the existentials of the people's being. This being spreads across the vast expanses of the Russian Empire, which is characterized as a non-state formation, that is, as a formation not oriented toward the consolidation of a single ethnos, one with a multiethnic territory, with servitude (serfdom), and with hybrid leadership. The ability to order people around contributes to the creation of a model of hybrid power: this model, oriented toward the emergence of a "new people" implicitly subordinate to the sole ruler, led to the emergence of Europeanized slaves and slaveowners who made use of and at the same time strongly opposed entry into the stable life of new classes and estates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this research is to identify factors to explain the gap in exit rate between state and non-state firms in Vietnam. With a sample of 7,962 Vietnamese firms and using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition extended for non-linear models, the research finds out that a very large part of the ownership gap in exit rate between state and nonstate firms cannot be explained by the included covariates, but it is almost explained by the effects of differences in the coefficients of covariates. In particular, the differences in coefficients of covariates of initial assets, the industrial sector (mining, construction and manufacturing industries), and the service sector considerably increase the ownership gap in exit rate, but the difference in the coefficient of initial employment reduces the ownership gap in the exit rate. Moreover, differences in explanatory variables between state and non-state firms explain a very small part of the ownership gap in exit rate. This means that an estimate of the reduction in state and non-state firms’ exit rates (resulting from giving non-state firms the same characteristics as state firms) is very small. The differences in coefficients have a much greater impact on differences in exit rates than characteristics that may be due to existing discrimination between state and non-state firms.

What factors drive governments’ decisions to intervene in local conflicts within their borders? Communal conflict – that is, organized violence between non-state groups that are mobilized along a shared communal identity – kills thousands each year and severely impacts local livelihoods, at times threatening to spread and affect entire regions. Given the state’s assumed monopoly over the legitimate use of force, we should expect the concerned governments to be critical actors of the overall effort to restore peace in cases of local communal conflict, but empirical evidence indicates that central states tend to only intervene in some cases but not in others. This phenomenon has so far been understudied and the variations in states’ efforts to manage these conflicts remain unexplained. This article presents the first quantitative study of state intervention in communal conflicts. Building on existing scholarly work, I argue that state intervention is explained by a combination of strategic interests and state capacity, and that interests related to ethnic constituencies and land control play an important part in explaining governments’ strategies. These propositions find support in a statistical analysis covering sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2010. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nigeria faces a serious set of new security threats. In the south and the northeast, respectively, there are insurgencies led by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, among others, as well as Boko Haram. These insurgencies are related to a complex set of insecurities in Nigeria: poverty, income inequality, corruption, crime, and youth militias. The Nigeria state thus far has not been able to effectively address these security issues. This article examines the potential of traditional rulership in Nigeria to positively contribute to the struggle against insecurity and its consequences. It finds that there may be promise in the institutions of traditional rule. Yet, because traditional rulers have been often co-opted by the state, they have lost much of the legitimacy it needs to fulfill that potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges the assumption that the boundaries of state versus non-state and public versus private can readily be drawn. It argues that the roles of actors — as state or non-state — and the forms of authority — public or private — are not pre-given but are forged through the process of governing. Drawing on neo-Gramscian and governmentality perspectives, it suggests that a more dynamic account of the state can offer a more nuanced means of analysing the process of governing global environmental affairs. In order to understand this process and the outcomes of governing climate change, we argue that analysis should focus on the hegemonic projects and programmes through which the objects and subjects of governing are constituted and contested, and through which the form and nature of the state and authority are accomplished. We suggest that this is a process achieved and held in place through ‘forging alignment’ between diverse social and material entities in order to achieve the ‘right disposition of things’ through which the will to govern climate change can be realized (Murray Li, 2007a). We illustrate this argument by examining the governing of climate change in two global cities, London and Los Angeles. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Defense & Strategy / Obrana a strategie is the property of Institute for Strategic Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)