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Vekâletsiz işgörme, kanundan doğan borç ilişkisi kaynaklarından birisidir. Vekâletsiz işgörmede, işgören akdi bir temele dayanmaksızın, yetkili veya yükümlü olmadan işsahibinin işini görmektedir. İşgören böyle bir işi işsahibinin yararına olacak şekilde görürse bu halde gerçek vekâletsiz işgörme söz konusu olurken, işgören işsahibine ait bir işi bencil amaçlarla kendi yararına görürse gerçek olmayan vekâletsiz işgörmeden bahsedilir. Gerçek olmayan vekâletsiz işgörmede, teknik anlamda bir işgörmeden dahi bahsedilememektedir. İşsahibi, akdi bir temele dayanmayan işgörmeyi sonradan uygun bulabilir. Uygun bulma sonucunda işgören ve işsahibi arasındaki hukuki ilişkiye, başlangıcından itibaren uygun düştüğü ölçüde vekâlet hükümleri uygulanır. Bunun yanında uygun bulmanın hangi vekâletsiz işgörme türlerine uygulanacağı tartışmalıdır. İsabetli olan yaklaşıma göre uygun bulma, ancak gerçek vekâletsiz işgörmede söz konusu olabilir.

How can we better protect the people in our family? The mandate contract and, more precisely, the guardianship mandate is an instrument that comes to replace another function that the trust would have had in our country. Representation is the integrated legal operation of this type of contract. Through it, the establishment of a legal transplant that seems to take the place of the institution of equity law is aimed at. In other words, the protection mandate becomes an application of equity in legal terms, a measure adapted to the circumstances in which the subject of law could be found at a given time.

Copyright of Istanbul Law Review / İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası is the property of Istanbul Law Review / Istanbul Hukuk Mecmuasi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu is the property of Sveuciliste u Zagrebu, Pravni Fakultet and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Mandate contract was created in Roman law, thanks to which was regulated indirect representation. The first modern civil codes have acknowledged direct representation based on a power-of-attorney but linked it to a mandate contract. The power-of-attorney as an independent institute emerged in the late 19th century under German law, with Paul Laband's theory taking the biggest credit in the separation of the power-of-attorney from the mandate contract In the case of the direct representation, the legal effects of undertaken legal acts directly occur for the represented person. Considering that when undertaking a legal act, the representative declares the will, the question arises whether the declared will should be understood as the will of the representative or the will of the represented. Answering the question, contemporary legal writers tend to see the replacement of the will of the represented by the will of the representative. Such an understanding of the nature of representation in private law has an interesting origin that dates back to the 13th century.

According to the provision of Art. 75 of the Criminal Procedure Code, one or more defense attorneys may be selected and authorized by the defendant, or his legal representative, spouse, blood relative, adoptive parent, adoptive parent, brother, sister, foster parent and the person with whom the defendant lives in extramarital affairs, or any other permanent community of life, unless the defendant expressly objects. The aim of this provision is to provide professional defense to the defendant in criminal proceedings even when he is unable to provide it, but the relationship between the lawyer and the person authorized to conclude a contract with him is of a civil nature. Theory and jurisprudence have not dealt much with the legal qualification of this relationship or have done it only marginally. Moreover, the explanation of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation on the solidary liability of the accused and the certain person (wife) opens a number of questions, which are the subject of research in this paper. First of all, what is the legal nature of the contract that a lawyer concludes with a client? Is it possible to conclude such a contract in favor of a third party? What is the legal nature of the subsequent granting of a power of attorney? If a contract is concluded in favor of a third party, what is the legal effect of such a contract concluded between the parties? Does the contract in favor of a third party also result in an obligation for a third party? Finally, bearing in mind that the solidary liability is not explicitly agreed, from what does the court derive that kind of liability?

The right to terminate the mandate contract granted to the parties in art. 512 of the Turkish Code of Obligations is a disruptive formative right that does not require any reason for its use. Therefore, it is possible to exercise this right arbitrarily. However, in the second sentence of the same provision, it is regulated that the party who terminates the contract at an inappropriate time will be liable to compensate the other party for the losses incurred. In this study, the liability for compensation will be discussed primarily by considering the opinions in Turkish-Swiss doctrine and jurisprudence regarding the legal nature and scope of the claim for compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institute of direct representation is indispensable in contemporary law. The first modern civil codes acknowledged direct representation regulating power of attorney through a mandate contract. The second half of the 19th century saw a change in that perception. Starting with the German Civil Code, legal texts, including the Serbian Contract and Torts Act, prescribe power of attorney as a separate institute. The contemporary law principle of direct representation contrasts with the Roman law prohibition of direct representation contained in ancient Roman sources. Under the prevailing Pandectist view, it is due to this prohibition that Roman law did not permit direct representation. The article analyses the cases in which, courtesy of classical Roman jurists, direct representation was allowed despite formal prohibition. The absence of a direct representation concept definition and general prescribing does not justify the claim that it was not applied under Roman law.

Copyright of Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split / Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Splitu is the property of Split Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We hereby propose to identify the limits where it can be assessed as just cause of the revocation of a mandate contract, as it is stipulated by the provisions of art. 1431, paragraph (4) from Law no. 31/1990, being known that the revocation without just cause of the mandatory (administrator / director of the Board of Directors) entitles him/her to payment of damages. The analysis starts from jurisprudence solutions and it has been necessary as the problem has been treated differently in practice, this collocation “just cause” being interpreted either restrictively, by reporting only to the mandatory, or extensively, by reporting to the subjective – objective resorts of the mandator.

The adoption of the new Civil Code and its entry into force on October 1st 2011 has involved an extensive reform of the private law. The new Code has aimed primarily to achieve a unification of the private law, the largest part of the land commerce regulations from the commerce code adopted in 1887 being absorbed into the new text and, secondly, to harmonize the basic institutions of the private law with the European regulations and directives. This study is preliminary and aims to highlight the inspiring models of the new Civil Code and to analyse the functionality of the newly used concepts.