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The paper explores the role of the European Union (EU) in the war in Ukraine, from the run-up of the war to its impact on the EU's future structure and functions, within Europe and globally. It begins with an account of the condition of the EU before the war, which it describes as overextended and stagnant with respect to the EU's proclaimed finalité, the "ever closer union of the peoples of Europe." Next, it recounts the use of the EU in early American attempts to include Ukraine in the East European enlargement of NATO, with EU membership as a reward for Ukrainian Westernization. To the EU leadership, this presented an opportunity to revive older, by then largely failed attempts at supranational unification and centralization, by offering to the United States to serve as its transatlantic base for its Ukrainian strategy. Following this, the paper explores the consequences for the EU and its stronger member states of the impending American withdrawal from the Ukrainian war theater, as the US turns to its conflict with China. The final section discusses the conditions under which Europe, the European states, and the EU can hope for some kind of strategic and political autonomy in the emerging new New World Order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the three Europes that informed Kissinger's narrative of world affairs and Transatlantic relations: Europe as history offering vital lessons the USA was called to study and master; Europe as a junior (and subaltern) ally of the USA; Europe as the primary Cold War theater and, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the object of superpowers' détente. The article highlights how these three narratives were used in the attempt to build a new domestic consensus around a foreign policy still driven by basic Cold War imperatives, the limits and contradictions of this attempt, and its ultimate failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1955 and 1960, dozens of new members entered into the United Nations; in the meanwhile, the peaceful coexistence potentially created the conditions to relaunch the role of the UN as a milestone of peace and international security. At the same time, the United States had to modify deeply their approach towards the UN, accepting the idea that the bipolar logic of the Cold War would govern also the most important multinational organization in the world. Paradoxically, the mitigation of the Cold War caused the definitive "bipolarization" of the UN, while even the United States renounced the utopia of a "world government" based on universally shared principles and rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the parallels of various incidents in the stories of King David and Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, two giants of history and myth, in an attempt to illustrate the magnitude of their charisma. It will compare their leadership, their inner struggles, their relationships as soldiers, friends, enemies, sons, and lovers, and the deeds they are forced to perform. They can be found to be alike in many ways, including having a hint of bipolarism as defined by Kets de Veris (2006, p. 14), world expert in leadership. Bloom (1998, 2003), Caruso (2007) and Frontain & Wojicik (1980) have mentioned that King David and Hamlet, seen in the light of similarity, are of great interest in that they illustrate Shakespeare's knowledge of scripture as well as his ability and that of the scribes of the Old Testament to recognize a good story when they sees one. This text intends to synthesize how the complete and profound human nature of each of these monumental figures calls the attention of generation upon generation of avid admirers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article represents an analysis of the 2012 general elections and their consequences on the Romanian political system. The variables analysed in the study are: the effective number of parties (N), the level of electoral disproportionality (G) and the nature of bicameralism. Although measured indicators appear to call for an institutional approach and a formal analysis, the article tries to capture and simultaneously takes into account the functional dimension of the political system too. Thus, the consequences of the 2012 parliamentary elections reveal not necessarily the imbalance in the party system or the improvisation of a delegitimized electoral formula, but rather the current makeshift relationships between actors.

O presente artigo busca realizar uma análise das contribuições de George Kennan à política internacional.

O artigo parte de uma discussão metodológica para poder determinar as características do sistema internacional pós-1989. Textos da década de 1990 definiram o novo sistema a partir de variáveis tradicionais, assentadas no esquema de polaridades herdado da Guerra Fria e em instrumentos metodológicos do realismo nas relações internacionais. O advento da "nova fase" da globalização revelou que a visão dos eixos estruturantes do sistema a partir de vetores de poder estatal - em que se sobressaem os Estados Unidos - é insuficiente e distorce a real configuração de poder. A invasão do Iraque pelos EUA, em março de 2003, consistiu em laboratório para se determinar essa "real" distribuição de poder. Paralelamente à persistência de padrões de afirmação característicos da Guerra Fria (consubstanciados, por exemplo, na linguagem de que "quem não está conosco está a favor do terrorismo"), a inexistência de um competidor ou competidores estatais à altura dos EUA fez com que a invasão correspondesse não somente a uma violação da ética e do direito, mas também a um equívoco à luz dos próprios interesses norte-americanos, que perfizeram leitura do novo cenário internacional a partir de instrumentos e conceitos defasados. Dois elementos complementares desse novo cenário são explorados no artigo: a) o caráter progressivamente redundante e ineficaz de instrumentos bélicos para a promoção de "objetivos nacionais"; e b) a formação de um novo bipolarismo, conformado pela política externa republicana e pelo bloco da "sociedade civil internacional". Esta recorre a valores e utiliza-se de recursos de poder que a credenciam à condição de foco em um novo sistema internacional, caracterizado por modalidade inédita e atípica de conflito.This essay begins with a methodological discussion about the fundamental outlines of the post-1989 international system. Influential scholars have defined the new system according to traditional variables, dependent upon the polarities scheme inherited from Cold War times and on realist methodological premises. The emergence of a "new phase" of the globalization process showed that to consider state power as a structural axis of the system - in which the United States play a prominent role - is misleading and blurs the "real" configuration of power in this new system. The invasion of Irak by U. S. forces in march 2003 consisted in a privileged laboratory to determine this "real" configuration of power. Following the persistence of a pattern of power and language tone characteristic of the Cold War times (e. g., "who is not with us is in favor of terrorism"), the absence of a competitor or state competitors that could rival American power made the invasion more than a violation of principles of Law and Ethics. It can also be considered misleading and counterproductive in the light of American interests themselves, given its misperceptions and misconceptions of the new international realities. Two further components of this scenario are probed deeper in the essay: a) the redundancy and, to a certain extent, uselessness of military weapons for the promotion of the national interest; and b) the formation of a "new bipolarism", which opposes United States republican foreign policy and the rising bloc of global civil society. This bloc has amassed impressive power resources, which make it the focus of an emergent international system, characterized by a new and atypical modality of conflict. The many empirical evidences gathered in the essay will hopefully sustain this argument.

This article offers an in-depth analysis of the way in which the results of the 2013 national elections have changed the Italian political system, with a particular emphasis on the crisis and possible end of bipolarism, and its consequences. Following a long, first phase of the Italian Republic in which bipolarism was neither practiced nor possible, the second phase (1994–2013) exhibited a muscular competition between two slightly changing political coalitions. It was also characterized by full, though often confused, rotation in government after each and every election. In the wake of the inconclusive February 2013 elections, the significant electoral success of the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, Five-Star Movement), and the formation of two governments occupying the center of the political alignment, two oppositions have made their appearance. The declining Forza Italia (FI) seems unable to launch any challenge to the incumbent government, while the M5S has so far positioned itself as an anti-system actor. Bipolarism seems no longer feasible unless a new electoral law restructures the party system and revives a decent European-style bipolar competition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This introduction sets the background for the analysis developed in this special issue. The focus is on the new developments that have emerged in the aftermath of the momentous 2013 general election, and the way in which these have impacted so far on the Italian political system and its main political actors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The economic crisis has triggered a process of political convergence between Italy and Greece. The simultaneous downfall of the Italian and Greek governments, following the public withdrawal of European confidence in their ability to handle the crisis, was followed by the establishment of technocrat-led governments based on parliamentary ‘super-majorities’ and then by ‘protest elections’, marked by unprecedented levels of electoral volatility. By apparently ending bipolarism, the crisis has completely changed patterns of national government formation and resulted in experiments with unusual government types. Both political systems have entered a transitional phase whose outcome is anything but certain, especially in the continuing context of economic crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article represents an analysis of the 2012 general elections and their consequences on the Romanian political system. The variables analysed in the study are: the effective number of parties (N), the level of electoral disproportionality (G) and the nature of bicameralism. Although measured indicators appear to call for an institutional approach and a formal analysis, the article tries to capture and simultaneously takes into account the functional dimension of the political system too. Thus, the consequences of the 2012 parliamentary elections reveal not necessarily the imbalance in the party system or the improvisation of a delegitimized electoral formula, but rather the current makeshift relationships between actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely accepted, among political scientists at least, that Italy's so-called 'First Republic' (c.1946-1994) had a tripolar party system while the 'Second Republic' has had, at least until 2008, a fragmented bipolar one. A superior conceptualisation of the party system of the 'First Republic' was provided by Paolo Farneti, and it remains relevant both for a better understanding of the current party system and for exploring party system dynamics, particularly the relationship between structure and agency in such dynamics. Farneti synthesised Sartori's 1976 analysis of tripolar mechanics with Galli's equally famous analysis of the party system (as one of 'imperfect bipartism') in terms of the coexistence of a subordinate bipolar dynamic and a dominant tripolar one. This article argues that the dynamics of the party system in the 'Second Republic', or at least the transition to it, can be conceptualised in terms of a dominant bipolar dynamic and a subordinate, tripolar one. This latter dynamic is significant, both empirically and theoretically, despite being subordinate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments, especially the outcome of the 2008 election, appear to point to the definitive sidelining of centrism in Italian politics. In reality, it remains significant - not least because of the opportunities for influence all bipolar systems give to parties not of the left or right, and because of the possible consequences of reassessments of centrism's historical significance. The term itself has been used to denote a kind of political outlook or ideology and, consequently, a kind of political strategy. A number of party and elite-level strategies called centrist are identified; one of these - transformism - has roots that stretch back at least to the nineteenth century and is not specifically Italian. Transformism has been variously interpreted. Against this background, the articles in this special issue together evaluate the historical importance of centrism and its current significance for Italian politics. As a governing strategy, centrism is practiced differently now than in the past, but it continues to be practiced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent Italian elections have taken place under a new proportional system, but have confirmed and even strengthened the main trends already at work since the beginning of Italy's political transition. The center-left coalition has won by the slightest margin, thus ensuring the third alternation in power since 1994. The system's extreme competitiveness underscores its full-fledged bipolar format, the eclipse of center parties, and the continuing electoral stagnation and political integration of extreme left and right. These trends coexist with a party system fragmentation whose level is within the standard of other European systems of moderate pluralism and this fragmentation is, moreover, kept at bay by the coordination ensured by the majority bonus seats provided through the electoral law. At the same time, the main parties show persistently low levels of structural consolidation, that tend to hinder the stability and effectiveness of coalition cabinets. This problem might paradoxically have been sharpened by systemic competitiveness through a negative impact on coalitional discipline and the maximization of destabilizing effects of the smallest changes in electoral and parliamentary behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay begins with a methodological discussion about the fundamental outlines of the post-1989 international system. Influential scholars have defined the new system according to traditional variables, dependent upon the polarities scheme inherited from Cold War times and on realist methodological premises. The emergence of a ''new phase'' of the globalization process showed that to consider state power as a structural axis of the system - in which the United States play a prominent role - is misleading and blurs the ''real'' configuration of power in this new system. The invasion of Irak by U. S. forces in march 2003 consisted in a privileged laboratory to determine this "real" configuration of power. Following the persistence of a pattern of power and language tone characteristic of the Cold War times (e. g., "who is not with us is in favor of terrorism"), the absence of a competitor or state competitors that could rival American power made the invasion more than a violation of principles of Law and Ethics. It can also be considered misleading and counterproductive in the light of American interests themselves, given its misperceptions and misconceptions of the new international realities. Two further components of this scenario are probed deeper in the essay: a) the redundancy and, to a certain extent, uselessness of military weapons for the promotion of the national interest; and b) the formation of a ''new bipolarism'', which opposes United States republican foreign policy and the rising bloc of global civil society. This bloc has amassed impressive power resources, which make it the focus of an emergent international system, characterized by a new and atypical modality of conflict. The many empirical evidences gathered in the essay will hopefully sustain this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of the second Berlusconi government in 2001 can be seen as a consequence of disunity on the left; this sprang from Italy's incomplete transition from the ‘First Republic’ of 1948–1992, which aroused potentially incompatible demands for political normalization, openness to the radical left and ethical renovation. While the Berlusconi government's record has been confused and ineffectual, dominated by the shifting relations between coalition partners Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord, the government has made sustained efforts to secure the anomalous position of Berlusconi himself. Berlusconi has resisted widespread political and legal opposition by orchestrating a combination of populism and patrimonialism; in the process he has blocked or reversed all three of the reforming drives of the 1990s. The Berlusconi government presents a challenge to Italy's continuing transition, and to the country's democratic institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of the Cold War on the Italian political system. It compares the relations of the two main Italian parties - the DC and the PCI - with their external interlocutors and allies - the USA and the USSR - during the first decade of the Cold War. By doing so, the article rejects traditional interpretations of how post-Second World War international constraints limited Italy's sovereignty. It argues instead that the main Italian pro-western party, the Christian Democrats, deliberately opted for a policy of containment of American pressures. Such a policy was functional to the twin objectives of consolidating DC hegemony, and safeguarding Italy's new republican constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]