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The Arab—Israeli conflict, which at first had a zero-sum, protracted nature, has changed over time because of effective conflict management that has made conflict reduction and even resolution possible. Following an adaptation process in response to the outcomes of the Six Day War, and the shifts from suppression to regulation, and vice versa, both sides experienced after the Yom Kippur War some learning process by which they became ready to transform their mode of thinking in the conflict. However, without the active encouragement of the USA, the learning process could not be developed. However, the Arab—Israeli conflict is not a single conflict, especially when analyzing and evaluating movements toward new forms of behavior in a given conflict system. The differences in the rate and scope of learning in each conflict influenced differently the shifts in conflict management, and from conflict management to conflict resolution. An initial learning process proved to be necessary for shifting from regulation to institutionalization, but this was not sufficient to move from institutionalization to resolution. There was a need for a further and deeper learning process to enable conflict resolution.

Ever since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, its decision-makers have been fully aware of the impact of the international system on the ArabIsraeli conflict. Interests of external powers in the Middle East had to be taken into consideration in the formation of Israel's foreign policy. During the War of Independence the threat of British intervention on behalf of the Arab states was seriously contemplated, and a decision made to exercise self-restraint in order to avoid military confrontation.' David Ben-Gurion, Israel's Premier and Minister of Defense, was convinced that Israel must not provoke the intervention of a great power by means of its military action. While Israel had no other alternative but to fight the Arabs, war with a great power was far from inevitable.2 The question of external constraints in Israel's foreign and defense policy was rendered more acute in the early 1 950s, following the military deterioration along the armistice lines. This was aggravated by the failure of Israel's preliminary effort to obtain arms and security guarantees. The interrelationship between conflict management and consideration of great-power constraints produced two distinct schools of thought among Israel's decision maker in the early 1950s. Ben-Gurion espoused a hawkish and activist approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, while minimizing the prominence of external constraints. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett represented a doveish and more restrained line of conflict management, attributing great importance to foreign powers, the United Nations and international public opinion.3 This study aims to examine the emergence of these two approaches to management of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while analysing the actual impact of external constraints on Israel's foreign and defense policy between 1954 and 1956. It is argued that had the United States better understood Israel's defense problems, providing it with arms and security guarantees, it could have exercised greater influence over its foreign policy. Possibly the downfall of Sharett, the establishment of the Franco-Israeli alliance and even the 1956 war might have been prevented.