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Large‐scale fishing effort in the waters of tropical and lower income countries is predominantly driven by 'distant water fishing fleets' often owned by companies based in a small number of countries and has been associated with a range of negative environmental and social outcomes. West Africa is an example where such fleets are a dominant feature. In the waters of Guinea‐Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ghana, 75% of all licensed bottom trawl vessels in 2017 either registered ('flagged') or largely owned in China. In this context, we examined the size and distribution of the economic outcomes from operation of these vessels in above five countries to better understand the impacts of these coastal states' decision for allocating access to the distant water bottom trawl fleet. Based on analysis of heterogeneous sources of data, we estimate that in 2017 the China‐flagged or owned coastal bottom trawl fleets generated little to no net economic benefits in terms of resource rent for either the companies or the coastal states in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ghana. Significantly higher economic benefits were generated from the offshore fishery in Guinea‐Bissau (US$31 million) and Guinea (US$25–38 million), largely captured by the companies owning the China‐flagged fleet. The size and distribution of the resource rent suggest that based solely of economic measures, the five coastal states may want to better assess the terms of these access arrangements for the foreign‐flagged or owned bottom trawl fleets. The fishing companies may need to reassess the sustainability of their operations, particularly in the southern states for long‐term economic benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the intricacies of environmental credit generation from concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) farm systems. Livestock production generates large amounts of manure (solid and liquid waste) and consumes a high volume of water that producers must manage to control odors and reduce pollution. To mitigate environmental impacts such as nutrient releases and greenhouse gas emissions, anaerobic digesters (ADs) can be used in CAFOs to avoid certain nutrient releases and capture the methane (CH4) produced when manure is broken down anaerobically. Policy incentives have increased the use of ADs to reduce waste volumes and produce biogas for energy or bioelectricity, but the overall digester adoption rate is still very low (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], 2010; 2014). To cover the higher cost of AD adoption relative to other forms of waste management, farmers may supplement the revenues they generate from the conventional outputs of a livestock operation (e.g., milk or meat) by selling credits into environmental markets. One question that arises is whether a single operation can sell into multiple credit markets by "stacking" credits--that is, receiving multiple separate environmental payments to finance the conversion to AD technology. The issue is that the use of stacked credits introduces the possibility that some of the stacked credits might be for benefits that are "non-additional" in that they do not produce incremental pollution reductions and thus are suspect for use in offsetting a buyer's pollution. This article describes the stacking problem and explores possible solutions, such as temporal constraints on credit issuance and discounting credits to account for additionality problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We determined the difference in carbon (C) stocks and C emissions between treated and untreated ponderosa pine stands over 100 years on the Apache and Sitgreaves National Forests, Arizona, USA, under assumed treatment scenarios, wildfire frequency, and annual percentage of area burned. Compared with the no-action scenario, total C stocks (live and dead biomass) were lower in the treatment scenarios because of timber removals from thinnings, whereas aboveground live (stacks were higher in the treatment scenarios. When total C stocks were used as the baseline, net present values (NPVs) of treatments were in the range of -$759.42 and -$722.58 ha-1 if timber and reduced requirement for C in a buffer pool were assumed to be creditable, and NPVs increased significantly if (in wood products was also eligible for C credit. When aboveground live (stocks were chosen as the baseline, NPVs ranged from -$759.42 to $2,700.44 ha-1 with revenues from timber stumpage value, reduced buffer pool, and/or C in wood products. C emissions from simulated wildfires were lower in the two treatment scenarios than in the no-action scenario. The heavier thinning treatment resulted in lower C emissions from wildfires than with the lighter thinning treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]