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Academic hazing within doctoral programs is often so deeply embedded within the doctoral experience that it becomes normalized. This effort translates into oppressive practices where students are broken down and rebuilt into the ideal doctoral candidate, and the process continues with the next batch of candidates. However, no one discusses the mental, physical, and spiritual burden that academic hazing takes within the lives of its students, especially the Black students. Utilizing a scholarly personal narrative approach (Nash, 2004), the purpose of this paper is to center the lived experiences of a Black woman doctoral student and how politics, identity, faith, and academic hazing framed those experiences. Implications for doctoral programs ended the narrative by recommending doctoral programs take the same effort that they place on diversifying their professoriate that they do caring for the emotional, physical, and mental wellbeing of their students, especially their Black students.

Introduction: Frailty and cognitive function are often measured during kidney transplant evaluation. However, patient perspectives on the ethical considerations of this practice are unclear. Research Question: What are patient perspectives on the use of aging metrics in kidney transplant decision-making? Design: One hundred participants who were evaluated for kidney transplantation and were enrolled in an ongoing prospective cohort study (response rate = 61.3%) were surveyed. Participants were informed of the definitions of frailty and cognitive impairment and then asked survey questions regarding the use of these measures of aging to determine kidney transplant candidacy. Results: Participants (75.6%) thought it was unfair to prevent older adults from receiving a kidney transplant based on age, but there was less agreement on whether it was fair to deny frail (46.5%) and cognitively impaired (45.9%) patients from accessing kidney transplantation. Compared to older participants, younger participants had 5.36-times (95%CI:1.94-14.81) the odds of choosing a hypothetical younger, frail patient to list for kidney transplantation than an older, non-frail patient; they also had 3.56-times (95%CI:1.33-9.56) the odds of choosing the hypothetical frail patient with social support rather than a non-frail patient without social support. Participants disagreed on the use of patient age as a listing criterion; 19.5% ranked it as the fairest and 28.7% as the least fair. Conclusion: The patient views highlighted in this study are an important step toward developing ethical guidelines to ensure fair use of frailty, cognitive function, and chronological age for kidney transplant decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Medical distrust may hinder kidney transplantation (KT) access. Among KT candidates evaluated for waitlisting, we identified factors associated with high distrust levels and quantified their association with waitlisting. Methods: Among 812 candidates (2018–2023), we assessed distrust using the Revised Health Care System Distrust Scale across composite, competence, and values subscales. We used linear regression to quantify the associations between candidate and neighborhood‐level factors and distrust scores. We used Cox models to quantify the associations between distrust scores and waitlisting. Results: At KT evaluation, candidates who were aged 35–49 years (difference = 1.97, 95% CI: 0.78–3.16), female (difference = 1.10, 95% CI: 0.23–1.97), and Black (difference = 1.47, 95% CI: 0.47–2.47) were more likely to report higher composite distrust score. For subscales, candidates aged 35–49 were more likely to have higher competence distrust score (difference = 1.14, 95% CI: 0.59–1.68) and values distrust score (difference = 0.83, 95% CI: 0.05–1.61). Race/ethnicity (Black, difference = 1.42, 95% CI: 0.76–2.07; Hispanic, difference = 1.52, 95% CI: 0.35–2.69) was only associated with higher values distrust scores. Female candidates reporting higher rescaled values distrust scores (each one point) had a lower chance of waitlisting (aHR = 0.78, 95% CI: 0.63–0.98), whereas this association was not observed among males. Similarly, among non‐White candidates, each 1‐point increase in both rescaled composite (aHR = 0.87, 95% CI: 0.77–0.99) and values (aHR = 0.82, 95% CI: 0.68–0.99) distrust scores was associated with a lower chance of waitlisting, while there was no association among White candidates. Conclusion: Female, younger, and non‐White candidates reported higher distrust scores. Values distrust may contribute to the long‐standing racial/ethnic and gender disparities in access to KT. Implementing tailored strategies to reduce distrust in transplant care may improve KT access for groups that experience persistent disparities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly assumed that belief-based reasoning is fast and automatic, whereas rule-based reasoning is slower and more effortful. Dual-Process theories of reasoning rely on this speed-asymmetry explanation to account for a number of reasoning phenomena, such as base-rate neglect and belief-bias. The goal of the current study was to test this hypothesis about the relative speed of belief-based and rule-based processes. Participants solved base-rate problems (Experiment 1) and conditional inferences (Experiment 2) under a challenging deadline; they then gave a second response in free time. We found that fast responses were informed by rules of probability and logical validity, and that slow responses incorporated belief-based information. Implications for Dual-Process theories and future research options for dissociating Type I and Type II processes are discussed.

In this chapter, the authors decenter soulless curricular and administrative practices in collegiate settings and re-conceptualize justice work through faith as a labor of love.

Humans have a unique ability to generate novel norms. Faced with the knowledge that there are hungry children in Somalia, we easily and naturally infer that we ought to donate to famine relief charities. Although a contentious and lively issue in metaethics, such inference from "is" to "ought" has not been systematically studied in the psychology of reasoning. We propose that deontic introduction is the result of a rich chain of pragmatic inference, most of it implicit; specifically, when an action is causally linked to a valenced goal, valence transfers to the action and bridges into a deontic conclusion. Participants in 5 experiments were presented with utility conditionals in which an action results in a benefit, a cost, or neutral outcome (e.g., "If Lisa buys the booklet, she will pass the exam") and asked to evaluate how strongly deontic conclusions (e.g., "Lisa should buy the booklet") follow from the premises. Findings show that the direction of the conclusions was determined by outcome valence (Experiments 1a and 1b), whereas their strength was determined by the strength of the causal link between action and outcome (Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b). We also found that deontic introduction is defeasible and can be suppressed by additional premises that interfere with any of the links in the implicit chain of inference (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3). We propose that deontic introduction is a species-specific generative capacity whose function is to regulate future behavior.

Background Frailty is associated with poor outcomes in surgical patients including kidney transplant (KT) recipients. Transplant centers that measure frailty have better pre- and postoperative outcomes. However, clinical utility of existing tools is low due to time constraints. To address this major barrier to implementation in the preoperative evaluation of patients, we developed an abridged frailty phenotype. Methods The abridged frailty phenotype was developed by simplifying the 5 physical frailty phenotype (PFP) components in a two-center prospective cohort of 3 220 KT candidates and tested for efficiency (time to completion) in 20 candidates evaluation (January 2009 to March 2020). We examined area under curve (AUC) and Cohen's kappa agreement to compare the abridged assessment with the PFP. We compared waitlist mortality risk (competing risks models) by frailty using the PFP and abridged assessment, respectively. Model discrimination was assessed using Harrell's C-statistic. Results Of 3 220 candidates, the PFP and abridged assessment identified 23.8% and 27.4% candidates as frail, respectively. The abridged frailty phenotype had substantial agreement (kappa = 0.69, 95% CI: 0.66–0.71) and excellent discrimination (AUC = 0.861). Among 20 patients at evaluation, abridged assessment took 5–7 minutes to complete. The PFP and abridged assessment had similar associations with waitlist mortality (subdistribution hazard ratio [SHR] = 1.62, 95% CI: 1.26–2.08 vs SHR = 1.70, 95% CI: 1.33–2.16) and comparable mortality discrimination (p  = .51). Conclusions The abridged assessment is an efficient and valid way to identify frailty. It predicts waitlist mortality without sacrificing discrimination. Surgical departments should consider utilizing the abridged assessment to evaluate frailty in patients when time is limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental model (Johnson-Laird, 2001) and probabilistic theories (Oaksford & Chater, 2009) claim to provide distinct explanations of human reasoning. However, the dual strategy model of reasoning suggests that this distinction corresponds to different reasoning strategies, termed counterexample and statistical, respectively. There is clear evidence that most people have a preference for a given strategy, and that this predicts performance on a variety of forms of reasoning and judgment (Thompson & Markovits, 2021). To date, however, the evidence for this conclusion has been correlational in nature; in the current studies, we manipulated strategy use. To this end, we gave people (N= 885) explicit instructions to reason either using a counterexample strategy or a probabilistic strategy. In two studies, we observed that the ability to follow these instructions was constrained by people's spontaneous strategy use, and that the effect of instructions carried over to two subsequent forms of reasoning (a) belief-biased inferences and (b) base-rate judgments. Finally, the ability to follow instructions was correlated with reasoning accuracy on both tasks. These results provide strong evidence for the underlying reality of the dual strategy model and show that explicit instructions to reason differently can modify performance on different forms of reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Base-rate neglect refers to the tendency for people to underweight base-rate probabilities in favor of diagnostic information. It is commonly held that base-rate neglect occurs because effortful (Type 2) reasoning is required to process base-rate information, whereas diagnostic information is accessible to fast, intuitive (Type 1) processing (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). To test this account, we instructed participants to respond to base-rate problems on the basis of "beliefs" or "statistics," both in free time (Experiments 1 and 3) and under a time limit (Experiment 2). Participants were given problems with salient stereotypes (e.g., "Jake lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb") that either conflicted or coincided with base-rate probabilities (e.g., "Jake was randomly selected from a sample of 5 doctors and 995 nurses for conflict; 995 doctors and 5 nurses for nonconflict"). If utilizing base-rates requires Type 2 processing, they should not interfere with the processing of the presumably faster belief-based judgments, whereas belief-based judgments should always interfere with statistics judgments. However, base-rates interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as the stereotypes interfered with statistical judgments, as indexed by increased response time and decreased confidence for conflict problems relative to nonconflict. These data suggest that base-rates, while typically underweighted or neglected, do not require Type 2 processing and may, in fact, be accessible to Type 1 processing.

In 2 experiments, we tested a strong version of a dual process theory of conditional inference (cf. Verschueren et al., 2005a, 2005b) that assumes that most reasoners have 2 strategies available, the choice of which is determined by situational variables, cognitive capacity, and metacognitive control. The statistical strategy evaluates inferences probabilistically, accepting those with high conditional probability. The counterexample strategy rejects inferences when a counterexample shows the inference to be invalid. To discriminate strategy use, we presented reasoners with conditional statements (if p, then q) and explicit statistical information about the relative frequency of the probability of "p/q" (50% vs. 90%). A statistical strategy would accept the more probable inferences more frequently, whereas the counterexample one would reject both. In Experiment 1, reasoners under time pressure used the statistical strategy more, but switched to the counterexample strategy when time constraints were removed; the former took less time than the latter. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that the statistical strategy is the default heuristic. Under a free-time condition, reasoners preferred the counterexample strategy and kept it when put under time pressure. Thus, it is not simply a lack of capacity that produces a statistical strategy; instead, it seems that time pressure disrupts the ability to make good metacognitive choices. In line with this conclusion, in a 2nd experiment, we measured reasoners' confidence in their performance; those under time pressure were less confident in the statistical than the counterexample strategy and more likely to switch strategies under free-time conditions.

Retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) is a widely studied phenomenon of human memory, but RIF of arithmetic facts remains relatively unexplored. In 2 experiments, we investigated RIF of simple addition facts (2 + 3 = 5) from practice of their multiplication counterparts (2 x 3 = 6). In both experiments, robust RIF expressed in response times occurred only for high-strength small-number addition facts with sums less than or equal to 10, indicating that RIF from multiplication practice was interference dependent. RIF of addition-fact memory was produced by multiplication retrieval (2 x 3 = ?) but not multiplication study (2 x 3 = 6), supporting an inhibitory mechanism of RIF in arithmetic memory. Finally, RIF occurred with multiplication practiced in word format (three x four) and addition tested later in digit format (3 + 4), which provides evidence that digit and written-word formats for arithmetic accessed a common semantic retrieval network. The results support the view that addition and multiplication facts are stored in an interrelated semantic network and that RIF of competing addition facts is an intrinsic process of multiplication fact retrieval. (Contains 1 footnote, 3 tables, and 4 figures.)

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement. (Contains 1 figure and 7 tables.)

Under the suppositional account of conditionals, when people think about a conditional assertion, "if p then q," they engage in a mental simulation in which they imagine p holds and evaluate the probability that q holds under this supposition. One implication of this account is that belief in a conditional equates to conditional probability [P(q/p)]. In this paper, the authors examine a further implication of this analysis with respect to the wide-scope negation of conditional assertions, "it is not the case that if p then q." Under the suppositional account, nothing categorically follows from the negation of a conditional, other than a second conditional, "if p then not-q." In contrast, according to the mental model theory, a negated conditional is consistent only with the determinate state of affairs, p and not-q. In 4 experiments, the authors compare the contrasting predictions that arise from each of these accounts. The findings are consistent with the suppositional theory but are incongruent with the mental model theory of conditionals.

De Neys proposed a "switch" model to address what he argued to be lacuna in dual-process theory, in which he theorized about the processes that initiate and terminate analytic thinking. We will argue that the author neglected to acknowledge the abundant literature on metacognitive functions, specifically, the meta-reasoning framework developed by Ackerman and Thompson (2017), that addresses just those questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on dual-process theories of judgment makes abundant use of reasoning problems that present a conflict between Type 1 intuitive responses and Type 2 rule-based responses. However, in many of these reasoning tasks, there is no way to discriminate between the adequate and inadequate use of rules based on logical or probabilistic principles. To experimentally discriminate between the two, we developed a new set of problems: rule-inadequate versions of standard base-rate problems (where base rates are made irrelevant). Across four experiments, we observed conflict sensitivity (measured in terms of response latencies and response confidence) in responses to standard base-rate problems but also in responses to rule-inadequate versions of these problems. This failure to discriminate between real and merely apparent (or spurious) conflict suggests that participants often misuse statistical information and draw conclusions based on irrelevant base rates. We conclude that inferring the sound use of statistical rules from normatively correct responses to standard conflict problems may be unwarranted when this kind of reasoning bias is not controlled for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outwardly, Sarah appears to be like any other smiling, outgoing elementary school student, no different from the other students in her second grade class. On closer observation, a difference is [...]

According to the suppositional theory of conditionals, people assess their belief in a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' by conducting a mental simulation on the supposition of p in which they assess their degree of belief in q. This leads to them to the judge the probability of a conditional statement to be equal to the conditional probability, P(q|p). Evidence for this conditional probability hypothesis has been adduced in earlier studies for abstract, causal, and counterfactual conditionals. For the realistic conditionals, it is natural to assume that people perform such mental simulations by building causal mental models from prior causes to later effects. However, in the present study we show that the conditional probability hypothesis extends to diagnostic conditionals, which relate effects to causes. This new finding presents a major challenge for theoretical accounts of the mental processing of conditional statements.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2005.03.001 Byline: Valerie A. Thompson (a), Jonathan St. B.T. Evans (b), Simon J. Handley (b) Keywords: Conditional reasoning; Pragmatics; Informal reasoning; Deduction; Argument; Persuasion; Dual process theory Abstract: Informal reasoning typically draws on a wider range of inferential behaviour than is measured by traditional inference tasks. In this paper, we developed several tasks to study informal reasoning with two novel types of conditional statements: Persuasions (e.g., if the Kyoto accord is ratified, greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced) and dissuasions (e.g., if the Kyoto accord is ratified, there will be a downturn in the economy). For these statements, the consequent event, q, is offered as an incentive or disincentive for undertaking action p. Forty-eight university students reasoned about the statements from the point of view of the writer; another forty-eight reasoned from their own perspective. We found that reasoning about these statements involves a sophisticated chain of implicit inferences (e.g., a downturn in the economy should be avoided; ratifying the accord will produce a downturn; in order to avoid a downturn the accord should not be ratified) in support of an implicit conclusion (i.e., the accord should not be ratified). When generating arguments to either support or refute a position, reasoners relied on two main strategies: addressing the truth of the conditional or arguing the merits of undertaking action p (i.e., ratifying the Kyoto accord). Finally, using a traditional conditional arguments task, we found that reasoners were more likely to adopt a deductive strategy when reasoning from the writer's point of view than their own point of view, even though we did not include any instructions to reason logically. We discuss the relevance of these findings for formal and informal models of reasoning, the writer's theory of mind, and the role of pragmatic implicatures in reasoning. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, 9 Campus Drive, Saskatoon, SK, Canada S7N 5A5 (b) University of Plymouth, UK Article History: Received 7 May 2004; Revised 22 February 2005 Article Note: (footnote) [star] This research was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and by the Economic and Social Research Council of Great Britain. The authors thank Jamie Campbell, Stephen Newstead, Kealee Playford, and Jody Shynkaruk for the thoughtful comments they provided on an earlier version of this manuscript.