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I wrote most of this article before October 2016. The news has brought to the fore points made in scholarship on sexual harassment, including that people do not complain, that sexual harassment is widespread and ordinary in some work settings, that legal settlement contributes to allowing problems to go unaddressed, and that sexual harassment is experienced well beyond the high-profile settings that made the news in the fall of 2016 or winter of 2017. Political science most recently finds itself in the professional press in contests over individual stories of sexual harassment as unwanted sexual attention and the use of professional power (Gluckman, 2018). The New York Times's 2017 reporting of sexual assault by Harvey Weinstein (Kantor and Twohey, 2017) sparked the spread of #MeToo, a term that an African-American woman had first deployed years earlier (Vagianos, 2017). The term relies on framing a wrong but often without the law. Before the fall of 2016 and the spread of #MeToo, law and decisions by administrators in higher education had generated reporting about the academy. Generated in part by law and decisions by administrators in higher education, sexual harassment reporting about the academy predated the fall of 2016. This article concerns that earlier reporting and the way that sexual harassment as unwanted sexual attention can crowd out other ways of seeing law in employment problems and other ways of interpreting employment problems without relying on law.

The public service mission of public administration programs invites rethinking the exclusive focus on federal court decisions in administrative law courses. In spring 2015, we worked together in a course on the legal environment for public administration. The course included elements of the standard administrative law syllabus as well as a service component. The class worked with a city on a project that required the class to gather information about civil liability, policing, and racial inequality. A service project allows deeper learning while upending expectations of education as absorbing material presented to students. We argue service projects can be part of administrative law courses.

This paper analyzes the delivery of assistance for displaced people after Hurricane Katrina. Assistance can be understood as part of social welfare assistance in the United States. It is part of the social welfare apparatus in structure, and in how recipients experienced it. The “top tier” of social welfare assistance is available on the basis of claims that a person has worked and contributed to the American economy. However, displacement rather than the work of citizens was the point of access to assistance after Hurricane Katrina. Although humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons has an international grounding, citizenship was central to evacuees’ understanding of why they merited decent treatment. The term “internally displaced person” was not in widespread use, and to receive assistance as a refugee implied being treated disrespectfully. Although for recipients citizenship was key to assistance, analyses of migration are illuminating in (1) the delivery of casework services, w...

Analyses of American constitutionalism tend to address it as something very distinct from simple common law interpretation of rights and powers; that is, the ability to overturn statutes as unconstitutional is different in kind, not in degree, from the elaboration of principles in Common Law. Reconsiderations of constitutionalism and the Common Law have begun to note how much in courts on both sides of the Atlantic supervised hierarchical relations-in labour, in family law, between courts-through interpretation of statutes and common law principles during the nineteenth century. In the United States, courts interpreted constitutional principles through common law categories.2 Supervision included what we would now consider administrative law: the supervision of governing officials by the ordinary courts. While in Britain textbooks as well as Benthamite political theory have treated administrative law as part of constitutional law, in American constitutionalism they tend to be analysed as different phenomena, the latter dependent on the emergence of administrative agencies within the executive branch of government in the latter part of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth. Through the early nineteenth century in Britain, the High Court had supervised administrative tasks such as administration of the poor laws because the local courts, the Quarter Sessions, had administered the laws and the task of the High Court was to ensure that the local courts were enforcing the Sovereign's law.3 After about 1840, courts supervised the boards then taking over administrative tasks through supervision of jurisdiction, a key to administrative law in Britain.

Britain does not have a written constitution, which provides for a common assessment that it has no constitutional law. However, it actually instead provides a limiting case for considering the influence of courts and law in governance. For the courts have been involved in modifying both central and local government programs through statutory interpretation. The modifications that the courts have brought about have meant that the government has to take legal rules and courts into account in designing programs. The current limits on what the courts do have been part of the provocation for a movement in favor of a bill of rights in Britain.

Efforts to structure administrative processes through legality are well known in the United States. However, they are seldom analyzed in a comparative context, with an effort to explain how legal procedures are structured into administrative process. Political disputes criticizing bureaucracy and arguing for more legal accountability have occurred in Britain as well as the United States, culminating in statutes. But the extensive postwar debate in Britain led to a statute that did not accomplish as much as the American Administrative Procedure Act. This article explains the efforts and the somewhat different outcomes in Britain and the United States with an analysis of the coherence of and divisions within legal ideology and how the legal profession interacted with the different configuration of state institutions in Britain and the United States.

The comparative essays in Richard Abel and Philip Lewis's Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World and Richard Abel's The Legal Profession in England and Wales provide an excellent opportunity to reconsider the usefulness of the monopoly-control approach to the legal profession, an approach that has dominated the study of professions for the last decade. Abel, one of the major proponents of the monopoly-control thesis, uses it in the England and Wales volume and in his contribution to the edited work on the common law world. However, his discussions of the English and American professions serve more to illustrate the theory than to assess it. The wealth of information Abel and the other authors provide-most of whom take a more skeptical approach to the theory-furnish a rich data base from which to evaluate the monopoly-control framework.' The au